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Regional trade agreements (RTA’s) have become a fixture in the global trade arena.
Their advocates contend that RTA’s can serve as building blocks for multilateral
trade liberalization. Their opponents argue that these trade pacts will divert trade
from more efficient nonmember producing countries. U.S. agriculture can benefit
from participating in RTA’s and may lose when it does not. Agriculture is an
important source of potential U.S. gains from RTA’s. While the United States, as a
global trader with diverse trade partners, can gain potentially more from global
free trade than from RTA’s, many recent RTA’s have been more comprehensive in
their liberalization of agricultural trade liberalization than the Uruguay Round. A
strong multilateral process can help ensure that RTA’s are trade creating, rather
than protectionist. 
The authors wish to thank Sophia Huang, our economics editor. Thanks also to
Deana Kussman, Thomas McDonald, and Dale Simms, our technical editors, and
Wynnice Pointer-Napper and Victor Phillips, Jr., our graphics editors.
Appreciation is extended to Cheryl Christensen, Steven Haley, and David Skully
for their role in the oversight and review of the project’s development. Verna Blake
and Lilia George provided technical support. The authors gratefully acknowledge
the reviews of Abraham Avidor, Mary Bohman, Britta Bjornland, Jaime Casteneda,
Larry Deaton, Praveen Dixit, Carol Goodloe, Munisamy Gopinath, David
Harrington, Timothy Josling, Maureen Kilkenny, William Kost, Jeffrey D. Lewis,
Wolfgang Muench, Robert Paarlberg, Emilio Pagoulatos, Sherman Robinson, Terry
Roe, G. Edward Schuh, Renee Schwartz, Robert Spitzer, Ron Trostle, Silvia
Weyerbrock, Alan Winters, and Fumiko Yamazaki. 
Abstract
Acknowledgments
1800 M Street, NW
Washington, DC  20036-5831 November 1998Summary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iv
List of Abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vi
I. Introduction
Chapter 1.  Introduction and Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
(Mary E. Burfisher and Elizabeth A. Jones)
Appendix 1: The Economics of Regional Integration  . . . . . . . . .19
(Mary E. Burfisher)
Appendix 2: Regional Integration and Farm Household 
Adjustment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
(David Skully)
II. Regional Trade Agreements: The Global Perspective
Chapter 2. RTA’s and Agricultural Trade: A Retrospective Assessment . . . . .27
(Thomas L. Vollrath)
Chapter 3. Multilateral and Regional Trade Reforms: A Global 
Assessment from a U.S. Perspective  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
(Mark Gehlhar)
III. Regional Trade Agreements and Domestic Policies
Chapter 4.  A Dynamic Evaluation of the Effects of Western Hemisphere 
Integration on the U.S. Economy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43
(Diao Xinshen, Agapi Somwaru, and Terri Raney)
Chapter 5. CEEC Accession to the EU: A General Equilibrium Analysis  . . .56
(Peter S. Liapis and Marinos E. Tsigas)
Chapter 6. Farm Policy Reforms and Harmonization in the NAFTA  . . . . . .66
(Mary E. Burfisher, Sherman Robinson, and Karen Thierfelder)
Appendix 3: Chile Entering NAFTA: Implications for U.S. 
Horticultural Trade  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75
(Susan Pollack and Agnes Perez)
Chapter 7. Regional Trade Agreements and Foreign Direct Investment  . . . .77
(Thomas Worth)
Appendix 4: U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in the Global 
Processed Food Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84
(H. Christine Bolling)
IV. Regional Trade Agreements: Building Blocks, Stumbling Blocks, or
Complements to Multilaterals?
Chapter 8. Agriculture, GATT, and Regional Trade Agreements . . . . . . . . . .87
(Sharon Sheffield)
Appendix 5: U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement . . . . . . . . . .97
(Michael Kurtzig and Daniel Pick)
Chapter 9. U.S.-Japan Agreements on Beef Imports: A Case Study of 
Successful Bilateral Negotiations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99
(John Dyck)
ii U Regional Trade Agreements and U.S. Agriculture/AER-771 Economic Research Service/USDA
ContentsChapter 10. Economic Integration and Open Regionalism in APEC: 
The Gains for U.S. Agriculture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .108
(William Coyle and Zhi Wang)
Chapter 11. Enlargement of the European Union to Central and 
Eastern Europe: Obstacles and Possible Consequences of 
Policy Harmonization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121
(Susan E. Leetma, Elizabeth A. Jones, and Ralph Seeley)
Chapter 12. Western Hemisphere Trading Blocs and Tariff Barriers for 
U.S. Agricultural Exports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .131
(James V. Stout and Julieta Ugaz-Pereda)
Appendix
Model Documentation   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .141
Economic Research Service/USDA Regional Trade Agreements and U.S. Agriculture/AER-771 U iiiRegional trade agreements (RTA’s) have become an increasingly important part of
the global trading system. The United States has become an active participant in
RTA’s, with memberships in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the U.S.-Israel Free
Trade Agreement. The United States also has trade initiatives in the Caribbean
Basin. An important new regional trade agreement is the proposed Free Trade Area
of the Americas (FTAA), which would encompass most countries of the Western
Hemisphere, and help reconcile the proliferation of trade agreements in the
Hemisphere into one comprehensive trade pact. 
Regional trade agreements have generated intense debate. Advocates for RTA’s
emphasize their trade-creating effects. By providing for freer trade among
members, RTA’s can increase welfare by shifting regional production toward the
most efficient producers, enabling consumers to purchase goods at lower prices.
Opponents of RTA’s argue that because most agreements introduce some degree of
trade discrimination, they are likely to divert trade from more efficient producers
in the rest of the world. A second issue raised by RTA’s is their effect on multilat-
eral trade negotiations. Whether RTA’s will reinforce or accelerate global trade
talks, or act to slow down or derail them is under debate.
This report analyzes the implications of regional trade agreements for U.S. agricul-
ture. Key findings include:
—U.S. agriculture can gain from participating in RTA’s. By lowering trade
barriers among members, the major RTA’s in which the United States participates
—NAFTA, APEC and, potentially, the FTAA—are expected to benefit U.S. agri-
culture. In the long term, their trade-creating effects—increased agricultural trade
and specialization among RTA partners—will increase the efficiency of U.S. agri-
cultural producers and reduce prices for consumers. These RTA’s are expected to
improve the U.S. international terms of trade in agriculture, with an increase in
U.S. farm export prices relative to import prices. 
—U.S. agriculture can lose when not a member of RTA’s. Expansion of the
European Union (EU) is likely to divert agricultural trade and reduce U.S. agricul-
tural exports to the EU and to third markets. But, the current CAP program is
probably unsustainable with EU expansion, and potential EU farm program
reforms would reduce these negative impacts on the United States. A U.S. decision
to remain outside the FTAA would divert trade from U.S. agriculture. However,
many expect RTA’s to induce economic growth in the Western Hemisphere. If this
trade-linked growth occurs, the United States is expected to benefit from the
FTAA, even as a nonmember. 
—Agriculture is an important source of U.S. gains from RTA’s. Gains from
trade liberalization are roughly proportional to the size of the trade barrier.
Because U.S. agricultural exports still face relatively high trade barriers in world
markets, the inclusion of agriculture in trade agreements accounts for much of the
U.S. gains from RTA’s. Over the past decade, RTA’s have become more compre-
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SUMMARYhensive in their treatment of agriculture, in contrast to earlier RTA’s, many of
which excluded agriculture. 
—RTA’s interact with domestic farm programs. RTA’s limit the ability of
member countries to maintain independent farm programs. Market arbitrage within
a free trade area will tend to unify prices, making members’ efforts to use farm
support programs to maintain different price levels either ineffective or costly. The
conversion of most U.S. farm support into decoupled contract payments is compat-
ible with free trade pacts. At the same time, the reduction in farm support and
greater market orientation of many countries’ farm sectors over the past decade has
made RTA’s more likely to include agriculture, increasing the gains from RTA’s. 
—In agriculture, RTA’s have both trade-creating and trade-diverting
impacts, but trade creation dominates in most RTA’s. To date, the empirical
evidence shows that the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations, the
Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement, and MERCOSUR (the Common Market of the
South, among South American countries) have led to increased agricultural trade
with both partners and nonmembers, supporting the view that RTA’s can unleash
growth in trade that benefits members and nonmembers alike. When fully imple-
mented, NAFTA, APEC, and the FTAA are expected to be net trade creating in
agriculture. Only the EU has resulted so far in net agricultural trade diversion. Its
expansion to include Central and East European countries is also expected to be
trade diverting. 
—Regionalism and multilateralism are likely to be mutually reinforcing in
agriculture. A strong multilateral process can help minimize the negative aspects
of RTA’s and make it more likely that RTA’s will take shape as trade-creating,
rather than protectionist, agreements. In turn, the freer agricultural trade already
achieved in the Western Hemisphere and committed to in APEC is likely to
strengthen efforts to achieve freer trade at the upcoming mini-round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
—The United States can potentially gain more from multilateralism than
from RTA’s. Because the United States is a global trader with diverse trade part-
ners, it can potentially gain more from global free trade than from regional trade
agreements. So far, however, multilateral talks have fallen far short of achieving
free trade, and the gains to the United States from the deeper commitments made
by RTA’s are expected to exceed those from the Uruguay Round. But the influence
of RTA’s on the multilateral process is still uncertain, and they hold the potential to
harm nonmembers. Because the two processes can provide important, mutually
reinforcing influences, U.S. support of both can benefit U.S. agriculture.
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T
he United States has been a strong proponent of a
multilateral approach to global trade liberalization.
From the perspective of economic theory, this is unam-
biguously a “first best” strategy. The global reduction
of trade barriers raises global welfare as world produc-
tion shifts toward the most efficient producers, and
consumers are able to purchase goods at lower prices.
Regional trade agreements (RTA’s), in contrast, can
have both positive and negative impacts. By providing
for freer trade among members, they can improve
resource allocation within the region and generate
welfare gains for member countries. But because they
introduce some degree of trade discrimination, they
can divert trade from more efficient producers in the
rest of the world. In general, if trade diversion exceeds
trade creation, an RTA reduces global welfare.
Concern over the potential for trade diversion is at the
root of pessimism regarding RTA’s.
A second issue raised by RTA’s is their relationship to
multilateralism. The current proliferation of RTA’s has
occurred simultaneously with successful global trade
negotiations, which were concluded in 1993 under the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), and have continued in a series of
“mini-rounds” for specific sectors, including telecom-
munications and services. In agriculture, a mini-round
of trade liberalization talks is scheduled to begin in
1999 at the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
successor organization to the GATT. The current prolif-
eration of RTA’s has generated debate about the
dynamics of the relationship between them and the
multilateral process of global trade liberalization under
the WTO. Will regional trade agreements serve as
building blocks for multilateral trade liberalization in
the WTO? Will RTA’s have a tendency to expand 
their membership as they adopt more open economic
policies—and will this tendency eventually converge
on global free trade? Could these smaller, regional
negotiating groups reinforce or even accelerate the
multilateral process by making more progress on diffi-
cult issues—going narrow and deep instead of wide
and shallow? Or will regional trade agreements tend 
to do the opposite, and act as stumbling blocks to
multilateral trade liberalization? Will they entrench
protectionist interests that benefit from trade diversion?
Will they create “fortresses” that slow or derail multi-
lateral trade negotiations? Uncertainty regarding the
effects of regional trade agreements on the multilateral
process is a second reason why some argue that region-
alism could be detrimental to the global trading system. 
Over the past decade, regional integration has gained
momentum, with active U.S. participation. The pursuit
of regionalism by the United States rests on a view that
the trade-creating effects of the current regional agree-
ments are likely to predominate, for a number of
reasons. One is that the characteristics of the current
wave of regional agreements tend to reinforce the glob-
alism to which the United States remains committed.
Many recent agreements have locked in domestic
reforms and the opening of economies, reinforcing the
goals of globalism for freer trade, greater market
access, and global efficiency gains. Recent agreements
stand in contrast to those that proliferated in the 1930’s,
and again in the 1950’s and 1960’s, many of which
were inward looking, and motivated by protectionism. 
Second, the U.S. pursuit of regionalism, particularly in
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
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Mary E. Burfisher and Elizabeth A. Jonesforum has been in part a response to some faltering in
the GATT/WTO process. Regionalism represented a
second best alternative when prospects for multilateral
trade liberalization under the GATT became uncertain
in the early 1990’s. The U.S. pursuit of regionalism
and the prospect of “fortresses” developing on both
sides of the Atlantic were credited with helping to
bring the Uruguay Round to a successful conclusion.
Now, regionalism and multilateralism under the WTO
process are both being pursued, consistent with the
U.S. view that the two processes are mutually rein-
forcing. Finally, U.S. participation in regional trade
pacts assures the United States of a continued role in
regional agreements, which appear likely to move
forward with or without U.S. participation. 
This report analyzes the implications of regionalism
for the United States, focusing on the effects of major
RTA’s on U.S. agriculture. These are the key questions
and findings of this report:
How Will Regional Trade Agreements
Affect U.S. Agriculture?
U.S. agriculture can gain from participating in
RTA’s. By lowering trade barriers among members,
the major RTA’s in which the United States partici-
pates—NAFTA, APEC and, potentially, the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA)—are expected to be
trade creating. Increased U.S. agricultural trade and
specialization among RTA partners will generate effi-
ciency gains for U.S. farm producers and consumers,
although this will lead to some adjustment and change
in U.S. agriculture. The U.S. international terms of
trade in agriculture are expected to improve, with an
increase in farm export prices relative to import prices. 
U.S. agriculture can lose when not a member of
RTA’s. RTA’s divert trade by lowering imports from
the rest of the world as trade with partners increases.
European Union (EU) expansion is likely to divert
agricultural trade and reduce U.S. agricultural exports
to the EU and to third markets. But, the current
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) program is prob-
ably unsustainable with EU expansion, and potential
EU farm program reforms would reduce these negative
impacts on the United States. A U.S. decision to
remain outside the FTAA would divert trade from U.S.
agriculture. However, RTA’s are expected to induce
economic growth in the Western Hemisphere. If this
trade-linked growth occurs, the United States will
benefit from the FTAA, even as a nonmember.
Economic growth in the region will stimulate Latin
American agricultural trade with the United States and
raise farm incomes, although these effects would be
larger if the United States were party to the FTAA. 
Agriculture is an important source of U.S. gains
from RTA’s. Gains from trade liberalization are
roughly proportional to the size of the trade barrier.
Because agriculture still faces relatively high trade
barriers in world markets, its inclusion in trade agree-
ments accounts for much of the U.S. gains from
RTA’s. Recent RTA’s have been more comprehensive
in their treatment of agriculture, in contrast to earlier
RTA’s, many of which excluded agriculture. In APEC,
agriculture accounts for 75 percent of total expected
U.S. welfare gains from the RTA. With or without U.S.
participation in the FTAA, U.S. agricultural trade will
increase by more than other sectors due to the hemi-
sphere-wide RTA. In the case of EU expansion, U.S.
agriculture will be affected more than other sectors,
but these effects will be negative, while effects on U.S.
manufacturing will be positive.
RTA’s interact with domestic farm programs. RTA’s
limit the ability of member countries to maintain inde-
pendent farm programs. Market arbitrage within a free
trade area will tend to unify prices, making members’
efforts to use farm support programs to maintain
different price levels either ineffective or costly. The
conversion of most U.S. farm support into decoupled
contract payments is compatible with free trade pacts.
At the same time, the past decade’s reduction in farm
support and greater market orientation of many coun-
tries’ farm sectors have eliminated the inherent conflict
between free trade and farm programs, making RTA’s
more likely to include agriculture, and increasing the
gains from RTA’s.
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Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks 
to Multilateralism?
Economywide trade creation effects dominate in
major RTA’s, raising world welfare. Concern over
the size of the trade-diverting impacts of RTA’s has
been an important argument against regionalism. Case
studies of the longrun impacts of four major RTA’s
(NAFTA, APEC, FTAA, and expanded EU) show that
trade-diversion effects are likely to be smaller than
trade-creation effects. Because they are expected, on
net, to create trade, these RTA’s will improve global
welfare. These findings suggest that these RTA’s will
fulfill the intent of the GATT/WTO rules that permit
RTA’s: their gains from liberalizing internal trade at a
pace faster than committed to in the Uruguay Round
will outweigh the negative impacts that result from
their discrimination against nonmembers.
In agriculture, RTA’s have both trade-creating and
trade-diverting impacts, but trade creation domi-
nates in most RTA’s. The Australia-New Zealand
Closer Economic Relations (CER), the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA), and MERCOSUR
have led to increased agricultural trade with both part-
ners and nonmembers, supporting the view that RTA’s
can unleash growth in trade to benefit members and
nonmembers alike. When fully implemented, NAFTA,
APEC, and the FTAA are expected, on net, to create
trade in agriculture. Only the EU has resulted so far in
net agricultural trade diversion. Its expansion to include
Central and Eastern European countries is also expected
to be trade diverting. While trade-creating RTA’s are
likely to pursue more open markets at multilateral talks,
trade-diverting RTA’s are less likely to do so.  
Recent RTA’s have committed to deeper agricul-
tural trade liberalization than agreed to in the
Uru-guay Round. Smaller regional negotiating groups,
the reduction and decoupling of domestic farm support
in some RTA’s, and a policy paradigm shift in many
countries toward more open markets may account for
commitments by recent RTA’s, particularly in the
Western Hemisphere, to a comprehensive liberalization
of agricultural trade. This trend is likely to create a
stronger constituency for meaningful trade reforms in
the upcoming WTO mini-round on agriculture. 
Regionalism and multilateralism are likely to be
mutually reinforcing in agriculture. A credible
multilateral process has already proven to be an impor-
tant element in the agricultural trade liberalization
achieved in some agreements. In the future, multilat-
eral commitments to reduce protection and support in
agriculture could be pivotal in influencing the direc-
tions to be taken by APEC and an expanded EU on
farm policy reforms and the pace of regional agricul-
tural trade liberalization. In turn, the freer agricultural
trade already achieved in the Western Hemisphere and
committed to in principle in APEC is likely to
strengthen efforts to achieve freer trade at the
upcoming mini-round. 
What Are the Policy Implications 
for U.S. Agriculture? 
It is important that RTA’s achieve their commit-
ments to liberalize agricultural trade. While some
recent RTA’s have defined a time frame for liberal-
izing substantially all agricultural trade (NAFTA,
MERCOSUR), specific reduction commitments have
not been defined in APEC, and the treatment of agri-
culture in the FTAA is still to be negotiated. Progress
in the multilateral talks on reducing barriers to agri-
cultural trade could influence these undefined aspects
of RTA’s. RTA’s that selectively liberalize trade make
the trade-diverting effects of RTA’s more likely to
dominate. 
A strong multilateral process can help minimize the
negative aspects of RTA’s. Studies in this report find
that most RTA’s have trade-diverting impacts in agricul-
ture, although they are smaller than their trade-creating
effects. Protectionist aspects of RTA’s include: closed
memberships and the adoption by members of common,
distorting internal policies, as in the EU; the exclusion
of some sensitive agricultural commodities, as in
NAFTA; and the adoption of common external tariffs
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and Central America Common Market (CACM). A
strong multilateral process that effectively disciplines
the negative aspects of RTA’s makes it more likely that
RTA’s will take shape as trade creating, rather than
protectionist agreements. 
The United States can potentially gain more from
multilateralism than from RTA’s. However, multilat-
eral talks have fallen far short of achieving global free
trade. Economywide U.S. welfare gains from the
Uruguay Round are less than those expected from all
RTA’s combined. Although the regional initiatives
have made significant commitments for opening trade
with key U.S. partners, the potential remains for large,
additional U.S. welfare gains from achieving global
free trade. Agriculture accounts for much of these
gains from free trade, indicating the importance to the
United States of pursuing both regional and multilat-
eral agricultural trade initiatives. 
Regionalism and Multilateralism:
What Do They Mean?
Regionalism
“Regionalism,” “regional trade agreement,” and
“regional trade area” are general terms that refer to a
commitment among a group of countries to achieve
some degree of economic integration. The terms refer
to the whole spectrum of levels of economic integra-
tion (table 1). The most common type of regional
integration is a free trade area, in which internal trade
barriers are removed but members maintain inde-
pendent trade policies toward nonmembers. The free
trade agreement among the United States, Canada, and
Mexico is an example of a free trade area. The most
comprehensive RTA is an economic union, in which
members remove all internal trade barriers, permit the
free movement of capital and labor, erect common
external trade barriers, and unify their fiscal and
monetary policies. The EU, as it moves toward the
adoption of a common currency, is an example of an
economic union. 
Two agreements analyzed in this report are not
included in table 1. APEC is a regional trade initiative,
but not a formal RTA. Likewise, formal negotiation of
the FTAA has just begun. The level of economic inte-
gration it will achieve is unknown, although it is not
expected to become an economic union. APEC and the
FTAA differ from RTA’s in some important respects. A
key characteristic of both is their inclusion of countries
as well as existing trade agreements as components.
APEC includes the AFTA and NAFTA agreements,
among others; while the FTAA includes NAFTA and
MERCOSUR, among others. One role for these initia-
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proliferation of RTA’s. While these supranational
negotiating initiatives might better be termed free trade
networks (Josling, 1998), for convenience they will be
referred to as RTA’s in this report. 
Regional trade agreements have become a significant
part of the global trading system. Between 1947 
and 1994, 109 regional trade agreements were
reported to the GATT, nearly equal to the number of
countries that are GATT members (see article by
Sheffield in this report). Since 1995, at least 16 new
RTA’s have been reported to the WTO. RTA’s have
been es-tablished in every region of the world. In the
Western Hemisphere, for example, about 40 trade
agreements are currently operating, and at least a
dozen others are under negotiation (see articles in this
report by Diao/Somwaru/Raney; and Stout/Ugaz-
Pereda). Nearly all WTO members are party to at
least one RTA.
RTA’s have taken different approaches to reducing
barriers to agricultural trade. Most of the recent major
RTA’s have included agriculture in the removal of
internal trade barriers, particularly in the Western
Hemisphere (table 2). However, some of the European
agreements have only partially liberalized internal
agricultural trade. In most recent agreements, most
farm products are included, although sensitive agricul-
tural products are either given long transition periods
or excluded (notably, dairy, poultry, and eggs in
NAFTA; sugar in MERCOSUR). 
Global agricultural trade has become increasingly re-
gionalized, in some cases in advance of formal
regional trade agreements. Thomas Vollrath (see
article in this report) analyzed the agricultural trade
patterns of the 34 member countries of six RTA’s.
Collectively, these countries accounted for 62 percent
of global trade from 1970 to 1995. While their share
of global trade is stable, the share of trade within
these regions relative to their trade outside the region
increased from 30 percent in 1970 to 40 percent by
1995.
Multilateralism
Like regionalism, “multilateralism” is a general term
that has several meanings. In this report, we define
multilateralism as the multilateral negotiation of global
trade liberalization. While multilateralism was
strengthened by the completion of the Uruguay Round,
full liberalization of global trade has not yet been
achieved, and some trade barriers will likely remain
for some time. The definition of multilateralism is
important when the question is: “How does region-
alism relate to multilateralism?” In theory, global free
trade is optimal, but this has less policy relevance than
a comparison of RTA’s, many of which have achieved
substantially free trade, with a multilateral process that
still contains many remaining trade barriers. 
Multilateralism also refers to the lowering of trade
barriers on a nondiscriminatory, Most-Favored-Nation
(MFN) basis, in which any tariff concessions granted
to a partner are also extended to the rest of the world.
An example of this is the “open regionalism” approach
of APEC. Under open regionalism, members of APEC
reduce their import barriers against both other
members and the rest of the world. This MFN-based
approach by an RTA can benefit all countries, but there
is the danger that nonmembers will “free ride” and
accept an RTA’s tariff reductions without lowering
their own barriers.
The Welfare Effects of RTA’s
Trade creation, trade diversion, and terms of trade
effects constitute the welfare impacts of an RTA (see
appendix on the “Economics of Regionalism”). Trade
creation refers to the increased trade within an RTA
when internal tariffs are lowered or removed.
Production efficiency increases when a member
imports more from a lower cost RTA partner, and its
own high-cost domestic production falls. Trade diver-
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more efficient, nonmember producers to less efficient
partner countries within the RTA. Regional trade
agreements are likely to have both trade-creating and
trade-diverting impacts, and which effect will domi-
nate depends on many factors. 
The effect of RTA’s on consumers is also important to
consider. Trade creation benefits consumers because
they can buy imported goods that are produced at
lower cost than the domestic variety. Lower prices, in
effect, raise consumer income. Increased income and
consumption may cause consumers to import more
goods, and through this trade expansion the RTA could
even benefit nonmembers.
RTA’s also have terms of trade impacts: changes in
the supply of and demand for traded goods will lead
to changes in export and import prices for both
members and nonmembers. An improvement in terms
of trade is good for a country; it means a given level
of exports buys more imports, which increases
consumption and welfare. 
Welfare is the sum of trade creation, trade diversion,
and terms of trade impacts. In most analyses in this
report, welfare is measured in terms of “equivalent
variation,” which measures the cost to consumers of
the same bundle of goods, before and after entering an
RTA. Welfare improves if the bundle of goods costs
less as a result of the RTA, but deteriorates if the
bundle of goods costs more. 
There are other sources of welfare gains from an RTA
in addition to the “static” gains described here. RTA’s
can lead to “dynamic” gains if they stimulate invest-
ment, or if trade leads to productivity growth through
technology transfers or learning by doing. RTA’s can
also lead to a rationalization within industries, with
fewer companies specializing in production for a
larger market, while less efficient producers close
down. Studies in this report focus on the static welfare
impacts of RTA’s, except for the analysis of the FTAA,
which links trade with increased investment and
productivity growth.
How Major RTA’s are Analyzed
The studies in this report include two global assess-
ments of RTA’s: a historical analysis of the impacts of
six RTA’s on world agricultural trade during 1970-95,
by Thomas Vollrath, and an analysis of the expected
impacts of five RTA’s on U.S. and global trade and
welfare by Mark Gehlhar. There are regional case
studies of four RTA’s—an expanded EU, APEC, FTAA,
and NAFTA. The first three case studies analyze RTA’s
under alternative assumptions about membership or
internal policies, reflecting the current uncertainty about
the conditions of their implementation. EU enlargement
is analyzed under the assumptions that the support
presently provided under its CAP is extended to the
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), and
alternatively, that significant CAP reforms are imple-
mented simultaneously with enlargement. APEC is
analyzed as both a preferential free trade area, and as an
MFN-based RTA, in which members adopt “open
regionalism” and extend their trade liberalization to
both members and nonmembers of APEC. Regional
integration in the Western Hemisphere is analyzed
under the two assumptions that the United States does
and does not join the FTAA. This construction of model
experiments is for analytical purposes, and provides a
measure of potential U.S. gains from the FTAA. In the
case of NAFTA, the interactions of the RTA and recent
domestic farm program reforms are analyzed. 
The global analysis by Mark Gehlhar and most
regional analyses use multi-country, computable
general equilibrium (CGE) models, which are
described in the appendix to this report. CGE models
are economy-wide and take into account linkages
between agriculture and other sectors through interme-
diate demand and factor markets. These models focus
on sectoral resource allocation, production, and trade.
They solve for prices, wages, and the real exchange
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and the balance of trade between countries. The
analysis of EU expansion by Leetmaa, Jones, and
Seeley uses ESIM, a partial equilibrium model of the
European agricultural sector. This model has more
disaggregation of EU agriculture than is now available
in a CGE model, and includes detailed modeling of
EU farm programs. Both the CGE models and ESIM
provide controlled simulations of the impacts of RTA’s
only, and do not provide actual long-term projections
of the U.S. or world economies. 
A Global Assessment of RTA’s
In the global analysis, Gehlhar finds that all RTA’s
combined, including those already being implemented
(NAFTA and MERCOSUR) and proposed RTA’s (an
FTAA that includes the United States, APEC under
open regionalism, and EU expansion), will raise world
welfare by $49.6 billion (table 3). Of this total welfare
gain, $47.6 billion is due to APEC (assuming open
regionalism), reflecting the large role of APEC’s
members in the world economy, and the relatively high
trade barriers in Asia. RTA’s contribute more to world
welfare than did the Uruguay Round (UR) of the
GATT. This is because RTA’s are assumed to achieve
full trade liberalization in all sectors, compared with
the partial trade liberalization achieved in the Uruguay
Round. Yet, even these comprehensive RTA’s leave
considerable scope for further gains from multilateral
trade liberalization. World welfare could increase by
an additional $62 billion under global free trade. 
The global analysis identifies some important interac-
tions among RTA’s. One example is the conclusion
that NAFTA could result in a small reduction in world
welfare, although the United States is expected to gain
from its membership. Most of the welfare loss would
occurs in Asia and stems from policy distortions in
Asian agriculture, including high import protection
and other farm support. NAFTA slightly increases
farm production in Asia, and this movement of addi-
tional resources into a highly distorted sector could
lower Asian welfare. If Asian countries remove their
trade distortions, as committed to under the APEC
agreement, global welfare losses due to NAFTA will
be eliminated. A second example is the effect that EU
enlargement and farm program reforms may have on
U.S. gains from APEC. If APEC adopts open region-
alism rather than trade preferences, U.S. agriculture
would face greater competition in Asian markets from
subsidized EU agricultural producers and from other
countries. If EU enlargement is accompanied by
reduced farm support, as expected, then U.S. benefits
from APEC under open regionalism will increase. 
Major RTA’s Increase World 
and U.S.Welfare
In table 4, we report the global and U.S. welfare
impacts from the regional case studies. An important
difference between the regional and the global
analyses is that the global analysis, which is sequen-
tial, incorporates additional trade liberalization into
each base. Regional case studies isolate the impact of
a single RTA, and enrich the analysis by incorporating
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including the dynamic gains from RTA’s. All regional
case studies of the prospective effects of RTA’s find
that in aggregate (but not necessarily in agriculture)
their trade-creation effects dominate trade diversion.
The size of the trade-diverting impacts of RTA’s has
been an important element in the debate over RTA’s.
We find that their trade-diversion effects are smaller
than their trade-creation effects. Because they are net
trade creating, these RTA’s improve global welfare.
While the global welfare impact of an RTA is impor-
tant, much of the concern about RTA’s relates to the
distribution of welfare effects between members and
nonmembers. Although all RTA’s are net trade
creating, most have some trade diversion effects that
hurt nonmembers. In this report, we find that the
United States benefits from the RTA’s in which it is a
member (NAFTA, APEC, FTAA). Increased trade and
low trade diversion generate efficiency gains and raise
U.S. welfare. We also find that U.S. welfare may
increase even when it is not an RTA member. In the
two such cases examined in this report (FTAA without
U.S. participation, EU expansion), two different
factors are important: the economic growth associated
with RTA’s, and the interaction of trade liberalization
with other domestic policy distortions. 
RTA’s can stimulate foreign investment, capital stock
growth, and productivity gains, and this economic
growth increases the benefits from free trade. These
potential dynamic gains from an RTA are captured in
the regional case study of the FTAA by Diao, Somwaru,
and Raney. The starting point of the dynamic FTAA
analysis is the observation that as a result of market-
oriented policy reforms in many Latin American
countries in the 1980’s, trade has increased and
economic growth has accelerated. Assuming that trade
and productivity growth are linked, the increased 
trade under Western Hemisphere RTA’s is likely to 
lead to strong economic growth in the Hemisphere.
Economic growth will lead to an expansion of trade that
benefits the United States. Western Hemisphere integra-
tion (including the Uruguay Round, NAFTA, and
MERCOSUR) could lead to a $5.8-billion increase in
U.S. welfare, in the short run. U.S. participation in the
FTAA could generate additional welfare gains of $7
billion. The global analysis by Gehlhar concurs that
there are costs (or smaller gains) to the United States
from not participating in the FTAA. The static, global
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tivity increases related to trade, and concludes that U.S.
welfare declines if the United States does not participate
in the FTAA. 
EU expansion provides an example of how domestic
policy distortions interact with trade liberalization.
(Domestic farm policies and RTA’s are discussed in
more detail below). In Liapis and Tsigas’analysis of
EU expansion, the CEEC is assumed to adopt internal
EU policies, including 1992 farm price supports. This
would reverse a policy structure within the CEEC
countries that previously subsidized manufacturing and
taxed agriculture. As the policy incentives are reversed
with EU accession, and CEEC manufacturing output
declines, U.S. manufacturing will likely gain. U.S.
manufacturing gains are likely to be sufficient to
outweigh losses to U.S. agriculture, and result in a
small, net welfare gain for the United States. The
regional analysis finds a small net welfare gain ($240
million) for the United States from EU expansion while
the global analysis finds a small welfare decline ($600
million). The regional analysis probably overstates the
welfare gain to the United States because it assumes
that U.S. farm programs are coupled to production, so
that a declining agricultural sector reduces U.S. subsidy
expenditure and contributes to the U.S. welfare gains.
Both the global analysis and the regional case study
share a key conclusion regarding EU expansion to
central and eastern Europe: the aggregate economic
impacts on the United States are likely to be small.  
U.S. welfare could improve due to its membership in
APEC, whether as a preferential trade agreement or
under an “open regionalism” agreement. However,
U.S. welfare gains are smaller under open region-
alism. This is because nonmembers can “free ride”
and accept APEC tariff reductions without an obliga-
tion to reciprocate. Some of the loss to the United
States from free riding occurs in agriculture, which
faces greater competition and downward pressures on
export prices in the APEC market, compared with a
preferential RTA. These terms-of-trade losses account
for the relatively smaller gains to the United States
from open regionalism. Free riding may not, however,
be a stable equilibrium. Coyle and Wang find that free
riders’ balance of trade worsens under open region-
alism because they become uncompetitive in global
markets if they maintain their own tariffs on imported
intermediate inputs into consumer or capital goods.
This gives non-APEC countries an incentive to under-
take similar trade liberalization. The uncertainty about
whether free riding is likely to occur has raised
concerns about open regionalism in the APEC frame-
work. Nevertheless, open regionalism is considered to
be an ideal form of RTA because it eliminates the
possibility of trade diversion. 
U.S. Agriculture and 
Regionalism
We consider the effects of regional trade agreements
on U.S. agriculture from two perspectives. First, from
a sectoral perspective, we can ask the same questions
about the U.S. agricultural sector as we do for the U.S.
and the global economies: Is the RTA, on net, trade-
creating or trade-diverting? Do terms of trade improve
for U.S. agriculture? But, welfare cannot be addressed
at the sectoral level because it is an aggregate
measure; it represents the sum of RTA impacts that are
likely to differ by sector.
Second, we consider the more complex question of the
relationship between regionalism and domestic policy,
particularly farm support programs. Many countries
provide their farmers with price or income support, and
import protection or export subsidies. How does free
trade within a region affect members’domestic farm
programs? Conversely, how have RTA’s been affected by
the unilateral, domestic policy reforms adopted by many
countries in the 1990’s, particularly in agriculture?
Most Existing RTA’s Have Created 
Trade in Agriculture
Vollrath’s historical analysis of agricultural trade
during 1970-95 finds that three RTA’s—the Australia-
New Zealand CER, the CUSTA, and MERCOSUR
—have been net trade-creating in agriculture. The
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), whose members are
competitive rather than complementary in agricultural
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agricultural trade flows. Of the major RTA’s analyzed,
only the EU has resulted in agricultural trade diver-
sion. Because the NAFTA and APEC RTA’s are not yet
fully implemented, it is too soon to assess their
impacts on agricultural trade.  
U.S. Agriculture Mostly Benefits from
Prospective RTA’s
U.S. agriculture is expected to gain from its member-
ship in RTA’s (NAFTA, APEC, FTAA). Regional case
studies found that increased agricultural exports and
imports will generate efficiency gains, contributing to
welfare gains. Agricultural trade creation is expected
to exceed trade diversion and, in NAFTA and APEC,
U.S. terms of trade in agriculture are likely to improve
(table 5). In the FTAA, U.S. agricultural terms of trade
may decline in the long run as agricultural productivity
gains in Latin American countries increase their
competitiveness in third markets—and assuming U.S.
trade-linked productivity gains are relatively small—
but this economic growth also further stimulates their
agricultural trade with the United States. 
RTA’s in which the United States does not participate
have mixed effects on U.S. agriculture. Liapis and
Tsigas find that U.S. agriculture is hurt by the trade
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farm exports decline. U.S. agricultural terms of trade
improve because increased subsidized production in
new EU members causes U.S. agricultural import
prices to fall by more than export prices. Leetmaa,
Jones, and Seeley find that declining EU agricultural
import demand is likely to reduce U.S. farm exports. In
the case of the FTAA, economic growth will benefit
U.S. agriculture even if the United States does not
participate in the FTAA, but it gains more by partici-
pating. Diao, Somwaru, and Raney find that U.S.
agricultural exports and imports would increase by 6
and 3.2 percent, respectively, if it does not participate,
compared with 7.9 and 6.4 percent, respectively, if the
United States joins the FTAA. That is, if the United
States joins the FTAA, U.S. farmers can achieve an
additional 2 percent increase in agricultural exports,
and U.S. consumers benefit from an additional 3
percent increase in agricultural imports in the short run. 
EU expansion and the FTAA, both have important
effects on increased export competition for the United
States in third markets. The expansion of the EU to
include the CEEC countries results in lower U.S. agri-
cultural exports to both the EU and third countries. In
the case of the FTAA, this competition is likely to
become keener if the United States participates in the
regional free trade area. This is because the technolog-
ical advances in our FTAA partners that are linked to
trade are likely to be larger if they have greater oppor-
tunities to integrate their economies with the U.S.
economy through trade and capital investment. (It is
assumed that U.S. trade-linked productivity growth is
lower than in its less developed partners in the FTAA.
Sources of U.S. productivity growth that are not trade-
linked are not taken into account in this model.) In the
FTAA analysis, the gains in U.S. exports are greater in
the short and medium run, compared with the long
run, when sustained technological change in our FTAA
partners increases their export supply. While this
analysis highlights the effects of an FTAA on
increased competition for the United States, it also
shows the importance of economic growth and devel-
opment in these countries for stimulating their demand
for U.S. farm exports.
Until recently, agriculture has been excluded or given
special treatment in most RTA’s. Yet, the comprehen-
sive inclusion of agriculture is a source of much of the
expected gains from RTA’s. This is because tariffs and
nontariff barriers are relatively high in agriculture, and
the gains from liberalization are more or less propor-
tional to the size of the initial trade distortions. Coyle
and Wang find that agriculture accounts for more than
75 percent of total U.S. welfare gains from APEC
because of high initial rates of protection. ASEAN’s
trade-weighted agricultural import tariff was 43 percent
in 1992, China’s was 44 percent, and Japan’s was 76
percent. Gehlhar also finds that food and agriculture
contribute significantly to U.S. terms of trade gains
under an APEC preferential agreement. When the rela-
tively high APEC tariff barriers are removed, rising
APEC demand for U.S. farm products raises the U.S.
agricultural export price and offsets the rising price of
manufacturing imports from Asian members of APEC.
However, U.S. agriculture contributes a negative terms-
of-trade impact if APEC adopts open regionalism
because of increased competition from free riders. 
Agriculture is affected more than other sectors from
regional integration in the Western Hemisphere. Diao,
Somwaru, and Raney find that U.S. agricultural
imports and exports will increase more than trade in
other sectors, increasing the share of agriculture in
total U.S. trade. In their analysis of EU expansion,
Liapis and Tsigas find that its impact on third coun-
tries, including the United States, is proportionately
greatest in their agricultural sectors. In most cases,
agricultural production and exports decline, while non-
agricultural exports are hardly affected. Burfisher,
Robinson, and Thierfelder find that the greater market
orientation of agriculture within NAFTA has increased
the allocative efficiency gains from regional free trade.
In Mexico, the domestic farm program reforms linked
to NAFTA are critical: agriculture can now generate
allocative efficiency gains that are large enough to
offset terms-of-trade losses, enabling Mexico to
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NAFTA.  
RTA’s and Domestic 
Farm Policy Linkages
The studies in this report focus on four important link-
ages between RTA’s and domestic policy. First, the
arbitrage that will occur under regional free trade will
create tremendous pressures on RTA members to
reduce, decouple, or harmonize their farm support. In
effect, RTA’s limit the ability of members to maintain
independent farm programs that are “coupled” to, or
influence, farm production or trade.
Countries have commonly used policies such as input
subsidies, guaranteed government purchases or support
prices, consumer subsidies, import protection, and
export subsidies to achieve such objectives as higher
farm prices and rural incomes, and to maintain rural
employment. Often, in developing countries, farm
subsidies are also linked to overvalued exchange rates
and are an attempt to correct an urban bias in domestic
policies. Coupled policies become problematic in an
RTA: they rely on import controls to be effective or
affordable, they undermine the export market of the
partner, or they redistribute quota rents to trade part-
ners (table 6). If, for example, a member of an RTA
tries to maintain a different price level from its partner
through guaranteed prices or government stocks, then
imports from the partner country with the lower price
will tend to enter its market. Increased imports will
drive down the member’s domestic price and drive up
the costs of its price support policies. If the member
country can afford the support program, it in effect
bears at least some of the cost of supporting its
partner’s producers as well. Domestic production
subsidies may be considered to be outside the scope of
a regional trade agreement, but by increasing domestic
supply, they can in effect reduce the demand for
imports from the RTA partner and create tensions
within the union.
NAFTA provides an example of the problems resulting
from incompatible farm programs because the agree-
ment has both substantially freed regional agricultural
trade and allowed the domestic farm programs of its
individual members to remain in place. Since NAFTA
was signed in 1993, however, all three members have
autonomously moved to reduce or eliminate farm
support, and most remaining support has been decou-
pled from production or prices. Before NAFTA,
Mexico had a system of guaranteed producer prices for
key crops, and provided subsidies to millers that
compensated them for the high cost of domestic corn
and wheat relative to imports. In the 1980’s, Mexico’s
imports were relatively cheap because of both fixed
domestic prices and its overvalued exchange rate. In
anticipation of the effects of free trade on its guaran-
teed price program for corn and beans, Mexico
converted its price support programs into direct
payments. Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder esti-
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increased 135 percent due to increased farm imports
under NAFTA if it had not restructured its farm
programs. NAFTA members’ remaining farm support
programs have predictably led to some trade disputes
among them. 
The EU provides an example of how countries can
choose to harmonize their domestic policies as they
allow free regional trade. Liapis and Tsigas analyze the
expansion of the EU to include the Central and Eastern
European countries. In addition to the elimination of
internal trade barriers, EU enlargement entails harmo-
nization of trade barriers against third countries, the
harmonization of domestic farm policies under the
CAP (leading to common prices), and a common
budget to finance agricultural support. This common
sharing of support costs can lead to unequal and unsus-
tainable fiscal burdens. Liapis and Tsigas find that
extending the CAP to the CEEC countries will cost
current EU members $16.2 billion. This will likely
create pressures for reforming the CAP as it is extended
to new members, and this would reduce the trade-
diverting effects of EU expansion on U.S. agriculture.  
A second linkage is that the reduction in farm support
levels and the greater market orientation of many
countries’ farm sectors over the past decade have
reduced the inherent conflicts between farm support
and free trade. Since the mid-1980’s, many countries
have adopted policy reforms intended to make their
farm sectors more market oriented and competitive in
global markets. In the Western Hemisphere, in partic-
ular, agricultural support has been dramatically
reduced, eliminated, or decoupled. On one hand, this
likely accounts for the more comprehensive treatment
of agriculture in recent RTA’s. While earlier RTA’s,
such as the European Free Trade Area (EFTA),1
excluded agricultural products, most RTA’s formed in
the last 10 years treat agriculture more comprehen-
sively, particularly in the Western Hemisphere. In a
case study of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area
Agreement, Michael Kurtzig and Daniel Pick analyze
how the treatment of agriculture has evolved over time
in a single agreement, including its more comprehen-
sive treatment of more difficult, nontariff trade
barriers. Conversely, by entering into free trade agree-
ments that include agriculture, countries are effectively
locking in the reforms that they have implemented in
their farm sectors. Market arbitrage within a free trade
area acts as a discipline on internal subsidies by
making some ineffective or too costly to restore. 
Third, domestic farm policy reforms can increase the
efficiency gains that can be achieved under RTA’s.
Farm policies such as guaranteed prices, government
stock holding, and export subsidies tend to insulate
farmers from market price signals and prevent the 
reallocation of resources that is a source of gains from
free trade. Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder
analyze the separate and combined effects of NAFTA
and recent farm program reforms in the United States,
Canada, and Mexico. In all three countries, the
impacts of farm program reforms alone are greater
than the impacts of NAFTA on agricultural output and
trade. However, the shift toward decoupled farm
programs has caused producers to become more
responsive to changing market prices due to NAFTA,
and this has increased efficiency gains from the RTA.
Under decoupled farm programs, the greater magni-
tude of agricultural resource reallocation in response to
NAFTA leads to larger welfare gains for the United
States and Canada. In the case of Mexico, the new
farm programs enable Mexico to gain from NAFTA.
With a more market-oriented farm sector, Mexico’s
allocative efficiency gains offset its terms of trade
losses from NAFTA. Without farm program reforms,
Mexican welfare would have declined under NAFTA.
It is the combined effects of NAFTA and farm
program reforms that may account for the perception
that NAFTA has had large impacts on the region’s
farm sectors. 
Fourth, trade liberalization within an RTA is, in many
cases, not the only policy reform being implemented,
making the effects of RTA’s difficult to isolate. In
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1The EFTA free trade agreement, established in 1960 and which
now includes Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein,
excluded agriculture from the removal of internal trade barriers.some countries, economy-wide reforms that include
removing or reducing domestic taxes and subsidies
and unilateral trade policy reforms pre-date the forma-
tion of an RTA. These reforms create the conditions
for rapid growth in some regions’ trade and economies
even before the RTA, and may themselves have built
up pressures to open up markets through RTA’s.
Vollrath’s analysis of the effects of RTA’s on agricul-
tural trade finds that increased integration and
regionalization of trade occurred in both MERCOSUR
and APEC prior to formal agreements. In other cases
(Australia-New Zealand CER and CUSTA) a sharp
rise in intraregional agricultural trade occurred after
the agreement. This suggests that those RTA’s had an
important influence on trade and, according to
Vollrath, were net trade creating. 
Thomas Worth examines the effects of RTA’s on
foreign direct investment (FDI) and argues that
domestic policy reforms other than regional trade liber-
alization have been more important in influencing
investment in some cases. For example, the enactment
of NAFTA did not represent a large policy change for
the United States, Canada, or Mexico. Canada and the
United States had liberal trade and investment policies
before NAFTA. Mexico’s reduction in its trade and
investment restrictions in 1989 had led to a tripling of
U.S. investment in Mexico from 1989 to 1993, but
little additional investment occurred after the enactment
of NAFTA, due in large part to the currency crisis. In
the MERCOSUR countries, the changes in FDI appear
to have correlated more with changes in macroeco-
nomic policies than with the formation of an RTA. The
case of AFTA is unique in that large increases in FDI
and trade in the region led to the trade agreement
instead of the other way around. H. Christine Bolling
analyzes U.S. FDI in food processing industries in the
three major RTA’s: EU, MERCOSUR, and NAFTA.
Her findings corroborate Worth’s argument that joining
an RTA does not necessarily bring new FDI: economic
growth, market size, and changing consumer tastes
have more direct effects on investment, although an
RTA can affect these key determinants. 
RTA’s and Agriculture:
Building Blocks or Stumbling
Blocks to Multilateralism?
The debate over the role of RTA’s as building blocks
or stumbling blocks for multilateralism has an imme-
diacy for global agriculture because of the
commitment to begin a WTO mini-round on agricul-
ture in 1999. An RTA acts as a building block by either
prompting an acceleration in multilateral negotiations,
or adding new members and converging on globalism.
Stumbling blocks do the opposite. We emphasize a
third relationship between RTA’s and multilateralism:
their complementary and mutually reinforcing impacts
in liberalizing agricultural trade.
Sheffield describes the concurrent progress made on
agricultural trade liberalization in RTA’s and under 
the Uruguay Round. Until recently, RTA’s largely
exempted agriculture from regional trade liberalization,
with the notable exception of the European Union. But
over the past decade, many RTA’s, particularly in the
Western Hemisphere, have been comprehensive in their
liberalization of agriculture, eliminating both tariff and
nontariff barriers, and going substantially further than
their WTO commitments. By opening their agriculture
to regional free trade, member countries’farm sectors
are already making adjustments to open markets. This
reduces the remaining burden of adjustment posed by
multilateral trade reforms, and promises to build a
constituency for further agricultural trade liberalization
at the mini-round. 
The ability of RTA’s to omit agriculture was also
circumscribed by the Uruguay Round. The exclusion
or limited liberalization of agriculture by RTA’s was
possible in part because of the many other “holes” in
the GATT agreement regarding trade restrictions on
agricultural products, such as waivers on quantitative
import restrictions if they interfered with domestic
supply control policies. A significant accomplishment
of the Uruguay Round was to close some of these
holes by imposing disciplines on agricultural trade
barriers and trade-distorting domestic farm policies.
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that stronger multilateral disciplines are having in
influencing the direction of farm program reforms in
the EU. EU expansion and the prospect of extending
the CAP to new members from Central and Eastern
Europe has the potential to massively increase EU
farm program expenditures. Budget pressures are a
key factor in instigating a reduction in EU farm subsi-
dies, but the direction of this reform is being defined
by the commitment in the Uruguay Round to
“decouple,” and to reduce the trade-distorting effects
of domestic subsidies. 
In a second example, Michael Kurtzig and Daniel Pick
analyze the 1996 revision of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade
Area Agreement to provide for greater access for U.S.
agricultural products. The 1996 Agreement on Food
and Agriculture (AFA) was motivated partly by
Israel’s failure to fully implement the terms of the
1985 agreement. It was also an effort to bring the 1985
agreement into compliance with the new rules of the
Uruguay Round governing agricultural trade. The AFA
dealt mainly with removal of nontariff barriers, which
had been permitted by the 1985 agreement but are no
longer allowed under the WTO.
The U.S.-Japan beef negotiations offer an additional
example of the importance of a credible multilateral
process in influencing the successful outcome of a
bilateral trade agreement. John Dyck provides a case
study of U.S.-Japan beef negotiations: these were
narrowly focused discussions that successfully dealt
with nontariff barriers. In 1988, the United States and
Japan signed an agreement to phase out Japan’s quota
system for beef. The agreement is viewed as of major
consequence because of the size of Japan’s beef
imports and because of the length and intensity of the
negotiations, which took place sporadically over 20
years. The U.S.-Japan negotiations on beef and the
Tokyo Round were closely connected. While there was
no formal link between these bilateral talks and the
Uruguay Round of the GATT, Dyck argues that the
bilateral agreement could only have been achieved
with the credible threat of GATT actions against Japan.
In the early 1980’s, U.S. complaints to the GATT
about Japanese trade practices not related to beef were
one form of leverage that influenced Japanese deci-
sions on beef. Conversely, Dyck argues that the 1988
agreement may have influenced the outcome of the
Uruguay Round, since, for U.S. agriculture, the
successful performance of U.S. exports to Japan
provided additional evidence that U.S. agriculture
could gain from freer world trade. 
The Uruguay Round also strengthened the multilateral
oversight of RTA’s. RTA’s represent a major deroga-
tion of the most favored nation principle of the GATT.
They are allowed under Article 24 of the GATT, which
places constraints on RTA’s that are intended to foster
their trade-creating characteristics, while minimizing
their trade-diverting impacts. Article 24 allows RTA’s
provided that (1) no external tariffs are raised, (2)
substantially all barriers to trade between partners are
removed, and (3) a “reasonable” time frame is estab-
lished for the complete implementation of the
agreement. GATT treatment of RTA’s has been criti-
cized because of the ambiguity of these provisions.
For example, it was not clear what constituted
“substantially” all trade, nor was it specified whether
tariffs referred to applied tariffs or to average or
weighted rates. Under a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) signed during the Uruguay
Round, tariff rates and adjustment periods were
defined more specifically. 
RTA’s now must be reported to the WTO Committee on
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), which was formed
in 1996. So far, the CRTA has devoted much of its time
to developing a systematic approach to RTA notification
and review, as well as identifying areas where greater
clarification is required. At the same time, the CRTA has
also had to examine the backlog of new or existing
RTA’s reported since the formation of the WTO. It is too
early to say how well the CRTA will be able to perform
its surveillance role given the amount of work and the
difficulty in addressing these issues. 
The more comprehensive treatment of agriculture in
recent RTA’s, and their net trade-creating impacts,
suggests that RTA’s are playing a positive role in liber-
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process is likely to remain important—both to mini-
mize trade-diverting characteristics of RTA’s, and to
define or constrain the unfinished agendas in some
RTA’s. In Latin America, for example, RTA’s are
rapidly proliferating, and the effects of these criss-
crossing preferential tariff rates is uncertain. Stout and
Ugaz-Pereda analyze agricultural tariffs in four Latin
American RTA’s, and identify tariff-related issues. In
MERCOSUR, the RTA both lowered the agricultural
tariffs of Argentina and Brazil against nonmembers,
and eliminated tariff escalation, in which tariffs on
processed goods are higher than on bulk agricultural
products. But, the common external tariff of
MERCOSUR was increased in late 1997, at least
temporarily, signaling the ability of the members to
achieve consensus on raising trade barriers. In Chile,
the overlapping tariffs that result from its network of
bilateral trade agreements require complicated rules of
origin (ROOs). ROOs are particularly difficult to
enforce in agriculture because of the homogeneity of
bulk agricultural products, and can easily become a
form of disguised protection. Both the Andean Pact
and the Central American Common Market (CACM)
have adopted common external tariffs that provide
tariff escalation, making it difficult to compete in their
processed food markets. One of the main objectives of
an FTAA would be to reconcile and simplify the
increasingly complex system of Latin American tariffs.  
What APEC will look like when fully implemented is
another important question for the global economy.
From the U.S. perspective, inclusion of agriculture in
APEC is critical because of the high protection rates in
East Asia. APEC has set a goal of free trade in agricul-
tural products for developed members by 2010, and
for less developed members by 2020, but no interim or
staged reductions have been specified. Some members,
including Mexico and Chile, already have low agricul-
tural trade barriers and are reducing or eliminating
farm support. Other APEC members have continued to
protect their agricultural sectors. It is difficult to
predict whether APEC will achieve its goals in agricul-
ture. Some of APEC’s agricultural trade liberalization
will probably coincide with the multilateral negotia-
tions under the mini-round in agriculture. The two
processes are likely to interact: multilateral talks may
help to make APEC’s agricultural trade liberalization
more concrete, while the APEC commitment to free
agricultural trade may help to define the goals of the
mini-round.
This report provides an economic evaluation of major
RTA’s, but the political economy of regional trade
agreements is also important in understanding how
they may affect the multilateral process. The political
economy characteristics of RTA’s are not yet well
understood: there are opposing views as to how some
important characteristics influence the dynamic path of
the RTA. These are the key elements of the debate: Is
the motivation for an RTA to open markets, and to
complement or lock in other market-oriented policies,
or is the RTA protectionist in character? Does an RTA
create or strengthen interest groups that benefit from
trade diversion and have incentives to lobby against
free trade? Organized producer groups can effectively
“capture” the national policy agenda, and divert it
toward protecting producer interests. As RTA’s
continue to expand, are large blocs likely to exert
market power to improve their terms of trade, and
thereby lose the incentive to move toward global free
trade? Or are large blocs better able to negotiate global
free trade? Is admission to the RTA open, so that any
nonmember who is negatively affected by the RTA can
eliminate trade diversion impacts by joining? Or, does
open admission seduce members into regional initia-
tives and divert their political energies from
multilateral initiatives? Does free trade within the RTA
result in deeper integration of policies and institutions,
and is this deeper integration around trade-creating or
trade-diverting policies? 
Whether RTA’s are more beneficial for the United
States than multilateralism is a fundamental policy
issue. Because the United States is a global trader with
diverse trade partners, it can potentially gain more
from global free trade than from regional trade agree-
ments. But so far, multilateral talks have fallen far
short of achieving free trade, and the gains to the
United States from the deeper commitments made by
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Introduction and OverviewRTA’s are expected to exceed those from the Uruguay
Round. But the influence of RTA’s on the multilateral
process is still uncertain, and they hold the potential to
harm nonmembers. Because the two processes can
provide important, mutually reinforcing influences,
their joint pursuit can benefit U.S. agriculture.
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Introduction and OverviewThe concepts of trade creation and trade diversion
form the core of economic analyses of RTA’s. Trade
creation can occur within an RTA. Production effi-
ciency improves when RTA members import more
from lower cost RTA partners, and less efficient
domestic production falls. Consumption efficiency
improves when consumers in an RTA can buy imports
at prices that are lower than those for domestic prod-
ucts. As a hypothetical example, assume an RTA is
formed between Guatemala, an efficient coffee
producer that can produce wheat only with intensive
and costly irrigation, and Nicaragua, an efficient wheat
producer that can produce coffee only in greenhouses.
An RTA creates trade if it results in greater Nicaraguan
imports of relatively low- cost Guatemalan coffee, and
a shift in Nicaraguan farm production from hot-house
coffee into wheat. Guatemala gains if it imports more
relatively low-cost Nicaraguan wheat, and grows less
of its intensively irrigated domestic wheat. Nicaraguan
consumers gain because of the decline in the price of
coffee, while Guatemalan consumers gain from the
lower price of wheat. 
Trade diversion occurs when RTA members shift their
imports from more efficient, nonmember producers, to
less efficient partner countries within the RTA. This
reduces the world’s production efficiency, and hurts
consumers within the RTA, who now import from
high-cost members of the RTA. In the example of
Nicaragua and Guatemala, assume that prior to
forming an RTA, Nicaragua had identical tariffs on its
imports of cocoa from all sources. Assume that at that
tariff, Nicaragua imported its cocoa from Mexico,
which produced it at lower cost than Guatemala. After
the RTA, trade diversion would occur if Nicaragua
shifts its cocoa imports from Mexico to Guatemala. In
this case, the removal of Nicaraguan tariffs gives
Guatemala’s higher cost cocoa an advantage over
Mexican cocoa in the Nicaraguan market. Nicaraguan
consumers pay less for duty-free cocoa imports under
the RTA, but when lost tariff revenue is also accounted
for, Nicaragua has net losses from trade diversion. 
RTA’s can either benefit or harm nonmembers.
Efficiency gains and increased real income within the
RTA may increase the RTA’s demand for imports. This
is trade expansion, and it can benefit nonmembers.
Conversely, both producers and consumers in
nonmember countries are hurt by trade diversion.
Production efficiency declines if nonmember countries
must now produce goods they formerly imported at
lower cost from RTA members. In the case of Mexico
and Nicaragua, the shift of Nicaraguan wheat exports
to Guatemala reduces export availability for Mexico,
and causes Mexico to shift to wheat production and
out of cocoa, the crop in which Mexico has an interna-
tional comparative advantage. Mexico’s consumption
efficiency declines because it must now pay for higher
cost domestic wheat.  
Most RTA’s have both trade-creating and trade-
diverting impacts. Whether the trade-creation or the
trade-diversion effect dominates depends on many
factors, including production cost differences, rates of
initial tariffs, and relative supply and demand
responses (app. table 1). For example, if an RTA is
formed between two countries with very different
costs of production, there would be large potential
gains as production shifted to lower cost producers. 
Terms-of-Trade Effects
If the RTA is large enough in world markets to affect
the prices of its imports and exports, or if the costs of
production increase as production expands, there can
also be terms-of-trade effects. “Terms of trade” refers
to the relative prices of imports and exports. An RTA
is likely to improve the terms of trade for members
and lower them for the rest of the world. This is one of
the primary concerns that nonmembers have about
RTA’s. In the example of the RTA between Nicaragua
and Guatemala, decreased Nicaraguan demand for
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Mary E. BurfisherMexican cocoa might lower its price. Likewise, the
shift of Nicaraguan wheat exports to Guatemala could
reduce the availability, and raise the price, of Mexico’s
wheat imports from Nicaragua. While Nicaragua loses
from the diversion of its imports from Mexico to
Guatemala, its full cost would be reduced by its
improved terms of trade with Mexico. That is, the
Nicaraguan wheat export price to Mexico has risen,
while its cocoa import price from Mexico has
declined. Conversely, the trade diversion causes
Mexico’s terms of trade to worsen. Terms-of-trade
changes are key to understanding the distributional
impacts of an RTA: the costs of trade diversion can be
partially, or even fully, borne by nonmembers if their
terms of trade deteriorate. 
Trade creation, trade diversion, and terms-of-trade
effects constitute the welfare impacts of an RTA (app.
table 2). Welfare refers to the efficiency of resource
use in production, and the ability of consumers to
satisfy their preferences. 
RTA’s as Building Blocks or Stumbling
Blocks to Multilateralism
The effects of RTA’s on the multilateral trade liberal-
ization process have generated intense debate. Just as
Viner (1950) influenced the debate over customs
unions by articulating the twin concepts of trade
creation and trade diversion, Bhagwati (1991) has
influenced the debate over regionalism by developing
a time path conceptualization of RTA’s as building
blocks or stumbling blocks to the multilateral freeing
of trade. Building blocks contribute to multilateralism
by adding new members or by prompting an accelera-
tion in multilateral trade negotiations. Stumbling
blocks do the opposite. Economic theory is still
engaged in identifying the characteristics of RTA’s that
are likely to make them building blocks or stumbling
blocks to multilateralism (app. table 3). For many of
the characteristics considered relevant, there are
opposing views as to how they influence the dynamic
path of the RTA. 
20 U Regional Trade Agreements and U.S. Agriculture/AER-771 Economic Research Service/USDAEconomic Research Service/USDA Regional Trade Agreements and U.S. Agriculture/AER-771 U  21By focusing on the adjustment problems of farm
households, this article pursues a different approach to
the challenge of regional integration than the other
articles in this publication. The other articles consider
the aggregate or sectoral impacts of integration: How
will U.S. agricultural exports or imports change? How
will investment flows shift? How will GDP growth
change? These are important questions, and the
economic tools employed to answer them require
making some simplifying assumptions about the struc-
ture of the economy and the structure of agriculture.
Such models treat the economy and the sectors within
it as one big firm, or, equivalently, the summation of
millions of identical “representative firms.” For agri-
culture, one models how a representative farm will
react to potential changes in the economic environ-
ment. For statements and inferences about the
economy or the sector as a whole, the representative
farm, firm, or household assumption works reasonably
well. However, if one wishes to examine the impact of
integration at a finer level of detail, the representative
agent assumption leads to problems: there frequently is
not sufficient information to render accurate disaggre-
gated results (Kirman, 1992).
This article looks beyond the representative farm to
examine the diversity of U.S. farm households. This
disaggregated information complements the aggregate
analysis of the other chapters. Analysis of the distribu-
tional effects of regional integration for farm
households is a new research topic with, at present,
few definitive answers. The information presented here
is used to frame the important questions and indicate
what kinds of farm households are the most likely to
benefit from integration and which are at greatest risk
of financial failure. 
Several themes are elaborated in this article.  First,
there is a wide variety of farm households, and their
capacity to adjust varies accordingly. Second, agricul-
tural adjustment is systematically different from
adjustment for most other sectors of the economy
because of the structure of farm households. Farm
households differ significantly from nonfarm house-
holds: their assets, including their skills, land, and
equipment, tend to be more sector-specific than those
of nonfarm households. Third, how a farm household
will fare following integration depends on both its
commodity exposure (what the farm can produce prof-
itably), and its asset exposure (the tenure (ownership
versus rental), leverage, sector specificity and diversi-
fication of its assets).
Commodity Exposure 
Regional integration may, for example, reduce the
price of vegetables relative to the price of grains. The
increase in the relative price of grains will induce a
shift of land and other resources into grain production
and out of vegetable production. If we assume that the
farm sector is simply one big representative farm the
adjustment seems smooth. At the farm level, however,
problems can emerge. 
First, consider that few if any farms are significant
commercial producers of both grains and vegetables.
Modern agriculture tends toward specialization at the
farm level, yielding increased variety at the sectoral
level. Consider a specialized grain farm. Integration
increases the price of grains relative to vegetables, but
suppose it also increases the price of corn relative to
the price of soybeans. The grain farm simply changes
its crop mix, planting a few more acres to corn and a
few less to soybeans. The adjustment might require
some minor changes in farm equipment and input
purchases, but these are neither particularly difficult
nor expensive. 
Because the prices of both corn and soybeans rise 
relative to pre-integration levels, the value of grain-
producing farmland increases. If the household owns
or has equity in the land, it will enjoy an unrealized
capital gain. Such an increase in net worth may make
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David Skullyit easier to finance adjustment and expansion. If the
household rents the land, it will likely face higher
rents. Thus the household must share some of the gain
in sales with the the landowner; still, the returns to the
farmer’s skills and experience in growing corn and
soybeans are likely enhanced. For the stylized grain
farm, adjustment to our assumptions about integration
is relatively easy and profitable.
Now consider the case of a vegetable producer. At the
time of integration, the farm specializes in tomato
production, with considerable fixed investments in
specialized equipment. The next best use of the farm is
to produce peppers. By assumption, the price of all
vegetables has fallen relative to pre-integration levels,
and the price of tomatoes has fallen relative to the
price of peppers. Conversion to pepper production
requires considerable new investment. Some of the
tomato equipment can be adapted for peppers, but
some will have to be sold, likely at a substantial
discount because of the decline in tomato prices. 
Because of the decline in vegetable prices, a
landowning household suffers a decline in its net
worth. This decline may be substantial if the land is
heavily mortgaged (leveraged), and it may prove
difficult, if not impossible, to finance the conversion
to an alternative crop. A renting household escapes
the fall in land values and benefits from lower rents,
but the lower product price means that returns to the
household’s specialized vegetable farming skills will
likely erode. For the sylized vegetable farm, adjust-
ment to this integration scenario is difficult and
results in a decline in household income and net
worth. Indeed, for a farm household with a high
debt/asset ratio, adjustment may force an exit from
farm proprietorship.
Asset Exposure
Assume that there are only two kinds of jobs in the
economy: salary (or wage) jobs and self-employment.
Salary or wage jobs compensate effort at a predeter-
mined rate. Once one is in a salary position, one’s
income is relatively certain and, except for exception-
ally good or bad performance, one’s income and
employment status do not change dramatically year to
year. Most jobs in industrialized economies are either
managerial, administrative, or service sector salary
positions or wage positions in manufacturing where
wages are typically determined collectively.
Self-employment compensates effort based on the
value of one’s sales or billings less one’s costs. In
addition to self-employed professionals, entrepreneurs,
and most farmers, this category includes some sales
positions. In contrast to salary compensation, self-
employment exposes one to greater income
uncertainty. Car sales, for example, depend in large
part on who shows up at the showroom. If there is no
customer, it is impossible to close a deal. Farmers can
control the amount of land planted and the quality of
cultivation, but weather and insects, among other
factors, ultimately determine yield and output. Farmers
are a special case of self-employment because the vari-
ance of farm product prices is, in general, greater than
the variance of industrial prices, such as automobiles,
men’s suits, and insurance premiums. Moreover, the
price of services (e.g., medical, accounting, repair) are
even less variable than the price of goods. 
Although agriculture accounts for only 2.5 percent of
U.S. employment, the sector accounts for over one-
seventh (14.4 percent) of all self-employment. Almost
half of all those employed in agriculture are self-
employed as opposed to only 7 percent of those
working in the nonfarm sector.
Beyond the Representative Farm
There are approximately 2 million farm operator house-
holds in the United States. Average income for farm
households in 1996 was $50,361, about 7 percent more
than the average income of all U.S. households, at
$47,123. It is hardly surprising that the two averages are
so similar, given that the average farm household derives
only 16 percent of its income from farming activity, the
other 84 percent comes from nonfarm employment and
investment (see table 1). This is an excellent example of
how uninformative averages can be.
USDA distinguishes between commercial farms (those
with sales in excess of $50,000) and noncommercial
farms. This simple division of the farm household
population into two groups yields much more informa-
tion about the underlying diversity of farming. (For an
even more detailed view see table 2.) Noncommercial
farms constitute 74 percent of all farm households, but
only 10 percent of total farm sales. The average
noncommercial farm loses money from farming.
Largely because of the loss from farming, noncommer-
cial farm average household income is less than the
U.S. household average. The representative commer-
cial farm, in contrast, earns 55 percent of its income
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$74,519, about 60 percent more than the U.S. house-
hold average. Commercial farm households are also
considerably wealthier than nonfarm households of
comparable income or occupational status (table 3). 
Farm households’ wealth tends to be more sector
specific than that of nonfarm households. First, the
value or returns to a farmer’s skills and effort on the
farm (often called human capital) is largely determined
by the price of farm output. These prices also deter-
mine the value of farmland and specialized farm
equipment which constitute the bulk of farm house-
holds’ net worth, particularly of commercial farms. As
illustrated in the examples above, farm income and
farm net worth tend to move in the same direction,
compounding the impact of good or bad price move-
ments. In contrast, nonfarm households’ net worth is
typically concentrated in home equity (principal resi-
dence) with the balance diversified among vehicles,
retirement plans, equities, and certificates of deposit.
None of these assets is highly correlated with the
salary or wage rates of household members (table 4).
Because farm households’ core assets (land, buildings,
and equipment) trade in markets that are often less
liquid than the residential and financial assets of
nonfarm households, their asset values tend to be more
volatile. Moreover, farm assets are not easily divisible.
Consequently, farmers often find themselves “land rich
and cash poor.” 
The representative commercial farm is not highly
leveraged; its average debt/asset ratio is 17 percent. Of
course, behind this low average are many farms with
no debt and a small proportion, 4 percent, with a high
debt/asset ratio (above 70 percent). As 85 percent of
commercial farms have a leverage ratio below 40
percent, the vast majority are financially capable of
adjusting to a significant change in relative prices. The
24 U Regional Trade Agreements and U.S. Agriculture/AER-771 Economic Research Service/USDAonly commercial farms at great financial risk due to
adjustment are those with highly leveraged balance
sheets and a high degree of exposure to products likely
to fall in price after integration.
The adjustment prospects for noncommercial farm
households are even more varied. Many of these house-
holds can be distinguished from nonfarm households
only by their nominal engagement in farming.  Clearly
the adjustment to integration will also be nominal and
pose no significant risk. Similarly, one might safely
discount the adjustment problems of households
engaged in farming primarily to reap tax benefits. 
But there are many small farms that derive virtually all
of their income from farming, although their gross
sales are less than $50,000; they are hardly noncom-
mercial. Some of these farms may do a thriving
business truck farming on the urban fringe. Even if
highly leveraged, integration is unlikely to affect net
worth because the conversion value to residential real
estate probably determines land values. Similarly, for
farm households with substantial nonfarm human
capital, for example if one or both spouses have
advanced off-farm skills, it is relatively easy to shift
out of farming to a reasonable salary in town. 
The most problematic small farms are households in
relatively isolated or persistently poor rural areas.
Changes in relative prices can cause significant adjust-
ment problems. However, as economist Theodore
Schultz argued over 50 years ago, rural poverty is not
significantly alleviated through higher commodity
prices (Schultz, 1945, 1949). Lower commodity prices
may increase the burden of poverty, but the causes of
rural household poverty are, principally, lack of skills,
resources, and access to information and services
(public and private). Even the most favorable changes
in agricultural trade policy and international commodi-
ties flows will not alleviate these causes.
Conclusion
The two linked diagrams in figure 1 summarize the
arguments above. The upper diagram summarizes the
grain and vegetable farm examples: how a farm house-
hold will fare following integration depends on both
its commodity exposure and its asset exposure. In
terms of asset exposure, renters are considered to have
negative exposure and landowners to have positive
exposure. Of the four combinations in the upper
diagram, only the upper right quadrant is likely to face
significant adjustment risk. The curved arrow expands
these potential at-risk farms in the lower diagram.
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on a farm household’s income diversification, in partic-
ular, its dependence on farm income and the farm’s
financial exposure, that is, its debt/asset ratio. Farms
with high farm income dependency are at risk of
liquidity problems and perhaps solvency problems. Of
these farms, those with high leverage are at the greatest
risk of insolvency (lower left quadrant).
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A
gricultural markets in many countries have gradu-
ally opened to world trade since the mid-1980’s.
Countries have adopted domestic market-oriented
reforms, honored timetables for reducing tariffs under
the Uruguay Round, and joined regional trade areas
and/or agreements. Researchers have described the
progress toward free trade in agricultural products as
being glacial (Barichello et al., 1991): “The situation
changes at a speed so slow that the observer may think
there is no movement at all. But, as with a glacier,
there is an underlying flow so inexorable that it is hard
to think of the trend being soon reversed.”
Regional trade agreements (RTA’s) can advance the
cause of trade liberalization. They can free up markets
by reducing tariffs among member countries, albeit at
the risk of diverting trade away from nonmember coun-
tries. They can also facilitate agreement on contentious
issues that confound the multilateral trade negotiations of
the World Trade Organization, such as the harmonization
of technical standards and the formation of technical
working groups that address pesticide regulations,
phytosanitary restrictions, and product quality stan-
dards—all of which may be disguised nontariff barriers.
Within the past decade, many prominent economists
(Bergsten, Dornbusch, Krugman, Summers) have
become advocates of regional blocs as a practical means
to achieve freer trade (Economist, various years). Many
policymakers believe that RTA’s make markets more
efficient—neoclassical theory says that the reduction of
international trade barriers shifts world production
toward efficient producers and enables consumers to
purchase goods at lower prices. But the growth in
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This article examines the impact of six regional trade areas on agricultural trade.
Five are of recent origin: AFTA, APEC, CER, CUSTA, and MERCOSUR. The
sixth, the EU, has a longer legacy. All of these areas, with the exception of APEC,
are formalized agreements. Except for AFTA, all have imported increasingly more
agricultural goods from member states than from the rest of the world since the
mid-1980’s. This raises a concern about whether integration has lowered world
economic welfare through agricultural trade diversion. Empirical evidence shows
that, with the notable exception of the EU, none of the regional trade agreements
(RTA’s) diverted agricultural trade at the sector level. The analysis also show that
the CER, CUSTA, and MERCOSUR created agricultural trade.intraregional trade and the recent proliferation of RTA’s
concern others who worry that RTA’s may diminish
welfare gains from multilateral trade liberalization
(Economist, Oct.18, 1997; and Panagariya, 1996). 
A welfare problem may exist because RTA’s extend
preferences to (and, therefore, discriminate in favor of)
partner countries. Whether any individual RTA
advances the well-being of society—that is, its trade-
creating effects dominate its trade-diverting effects—is
an empirical issue. This article addresses this question
by examining agricultural trade of six regional trade
areas, namely AFTA, APEC, CER, CUSTA, EU, and
MERCOSUR.1 All of these areas, except APEC,
possess formal agreements. 
World Agricultural Trade Is
Becoming More Regionalized
Figure 1 puts regional agricultural imports into a
global perspective by showing trade shares of the 34
countries belonging to 6 regional trade areas. The
importance of member countries in global imports
does not appear to have changed much in the last 25
years. Collectively, these countries accounted for 62
percent of global trade in agricultural goods in 1995,
the same percentage as in 1970 and the 1970-95
average. By contrast, the share of their intraregional
trade to global trade rose more than 10 percentage
points between 1970 and 1995, increasing to 40.3
percent by 1995. This suggests the rising importance
of regionalization in world agricultural trade.
The total value of intraregional imports in comparison
with member imports from all suppliers shows how
deep integration is. Increases in intraregional trade
shares depict increased reliance upon regional sources
of supply. Declining shares indicate decreased depend-
ence. Figure 2 shows how intraregional import shares
of the specific regional trade areas changed between
1970 and 1995.2
The European Union’s (EU) precursor, the European
Economic Community (EEC), established the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the early
1960’s to manage the agricultural market. The aim was
to improve farmer income, stabilize the market, and
guarantee regular supplies for consumers. The CAP
promoted free internal trade by granting preferences to
member-country suppliers, as demonstrated by the
intra-EU share of agricultural imports rising from 28
percent in 1962 to 70 percent in the 1990’s.
Australia and New Zealand established the Closer
Economic Relations (CER) in 1983. Within 5 years,
the agricultural import shares that Australia and New
Zealand supplied each other increased 10 percentage
points to 27 percent, before reaching what appears to
be a new structural equilibrium (23-25 percent). 
The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA) was
formally launched in 1989. As with the CER, the intra-
CUSTA share of Canadian and U.S. trade increased for
several years before leveling off. The sharp rise in
intraregional trade shares immediately following the
birth of both CER and CUSTA suggests that integra-
tion induced a change in the sourcing of agricultural
imports—one that favored member-country suppliers.
In 1988, MERCOSUR established an economic union
between Argentina and Brazil after years of unilateral
tariff reductions in both countries. This early liberaliza-
tion altered the agricultural price structure within both
countries, inducing changes in the pattern of their agri-
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2MERCOSUR is not included in figure 2 only because it would
render the chart hard to read.
1The 18 original APEC countries are Australia, Brunei, Canada,
Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico,
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, South
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States. Russia, Peru and
Viet Nam joined in 1998. The AFTA countries are Brunei,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The
CER countries are Australia and New Zealand. The CUSTA coun-
tries are Canada and the United States. The EU countries are
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United
Kingdom. The MERCOSUR countries are Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay.
RTA’s and Agricultural Trade: A Retrospective Assessmentcultural imports. From 1983 to 1990, the share of intra-
MERCOSUR trade doubled, rising to 60 percent. After
declining sharply between 1990 and 1991, this share
moved upward again with the expansion of
MERCOSUR to include Paraguay and Uruguay in 1991. 
Members of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), originally formed for political and
military reasons in 1967, formally launched the
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1991. Little
incentive exists for AFTA countries to import many
agricultural goods from each other, given similarity in
their resource endowments and production patterns.
Indeed, intra-AFTA trade shares show that member
countries have become less dependent upon each other
to supply domestic agricultural import needs within
the last 15 years (fig. 2). 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
Forum, unlike the other regional trade agreements, is a
prospective RTA. APEC has yet to sanction any
concrete trade disciplines. The steady growth in intra-
APEC trade, as with MERCOSUR, predates formal
integration. APEC’s membership includes both major
agricultural exporters, such as the United States,
Canada, and Australia, as well as large and/or rapidly
growing agricultural importers like Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and China.
The mix of supplying and purchasing countries is
favorable to growth in intraregional trade. 
Trade shares provide some insight into the changing
structure of agricultural trade. But, an economic
framework is needed before welfare implications can
be drawn about the formation of these regional trade
areas. The concepts of trade creation and trade diver-
sion are central in determining whether an individual
regional trade area or RTA advances freer world trade
or diminishes world welfare. 
A Search for Trade Creation 
and/or Trade Diversion
According to Viner (1950), trade creation occurs when
imports are substituted for domestic products as a
result of tariff reductions that reduce the price of
member imports below that of home-produced goods.
Trade diversion occurs with a shift in imports from an
efficient nonmember exporter to a more expensive
producer from the country’s RTA partners due to pref-
erential tariff treatment. Trade diversion, in Viner’s
view, does not necessarily mean a decline in trade, but
rather a shift in trade away from least-cost suppliers. 
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RTA’s and Agricultural Trade: A Retrospective AssessmentMeade (1955) extended the concepts of trade creation
and trade diversion to include trade expansion, which
occurs whenever demand is highly price-responsive.
Should the prices consumers pay for agricultural
goods decline following the imposition of an RTA,
imports expand if the price elasticity of demand is
greater than one.
Trade creation/diversion associated with the elimina-
tion of internal duties can be evaluated from a country,
regional, or global perspective. Here, the issue is
addressed within the context of RTA-member and
RTA-nonmember suppliers offering agricultural goods
in the international market using an empirical model
first developed by Balassa (1967). Economic implica-
tions are drawn for the six regional trade areas and the
world at large. 
Balassa was interested in assessing the welfare impact
of European integration. He developed an economic
model because it was not possible to observe directly
how much trade would have taken place in the absence
of the EEC. The analytical framework requires three
types of import demand functions to be estimated—
one typifying imports from member countries, another
imports from nonmember countries, and finally total
imports. The model generates ex post income elastici-
ties of import demand in periods preceding and
following the creation of the EEC. The difference in
the two period elasticities “correspond to Meade’s
extended concepts” of trade creation and trade diver-
sion (Dayal and Dayal, 1977).” 
The generated elasticities measure the relative respon-
siveness of imports to changes in both income and
prices. Being ex post estimates, they reflect both substi-
tution effects (movement along indifference curves), as
well as income effects (movement from one indiffer-
ence curve to another) (Balassa, 1963). An RTA that
purchases goods from lower-priced suppliers induces
trade expansion because of the direct price and income
effects of integration. Lower prices and increases in
real income entail movement to an indifference curve 
farther from the origin.3 Conversely, an RTA that
purchases goods from high-priced suppliers induces
movement to an indifference curve closer to the origin.
Assuming that the generated elasticities would have
remained unchanged in the absence of integration,
Balassa reasoned that a rise in the income elasticity
for intra-regional imports following RTA creation
indicates gross trade creation and that a rise in the
income elasticity for imports from all sources
together expresses trade creation proper. Similarly,
external trade creation would be signified by a shift
of imports from partner-country to nonpartner
producers when the income elasticity of demand for
extra-area imports rose. 
Trade diversion is revealed by a decline in the income
elasticity of demand for extra-area imports following
integration. This occurs when an RTA supports high-
priced production by shifting from efficient
nonmember producers to less efficient RTA-partner
producers. Trade diversion involves a misallocation of
resources, causing not only global trade to contract but
world economic welfare to decline. 
To obtain the necessary elasticities, Balassa (1967,
1974) simply divided the percent change in imports by
the percent change in income. Subsequently, a number
of researchers, also investigating the impact of EEC
integration, used regression analyses to estimate the
elasticities from import demand functions (Kreinin,
1969; Sellekaerts, 1973; Truman, 1969; and Thorbecke
and Pagoulatos, 1975). 
In this study, the ex post income elasticities of import
demand were calculated using the following model: 
1n M = b0 + b1 1n Y + b2 D + b3 [ (1n Y) * D] + ,
where M is the sum of RTA-member agricultural
imports expressed in constant 1987 terms, Y is the
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neoclassical theory.
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1987 dollar value of RTA gross national product
(GNP), D is the dummy variable with the value of 0
for the pre- or previous-integration years and unity for
the post- or modern-integration years, and , is the
stochastic error term. Agricultural trade data are from
ERS’s reconciled UN Comtrade. Real GNP data were
obtained from the World Bank’s CD-Stars disk. These
data were not available prior to 1970. For this reason,
Balassa (1974) elasticity estimates for intra, extra, and
total trade were used for the 1953-59 and 1959-70
periods (table 1).
The income elasticity for the pre-integration period is b1
and for the post-integration period, the sum of b1and b3.
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^ ^
^(Estimated coefficients are denoted by beta hats, b’s).
Both the intercept, b0, and the intercept dummy, b2, are
included in the empirical model for statistical, not
economic, reasons. The b0 intercept embodies the mean
effect of omitted variables and, thereby, ensures that the
estimating equation conforms to the classical assump-
tion that the expected value of the error term is zero; the
b2 intercept dummy guarantees that the parameter esti-
mate of the slope dummy, b3, is not biased.
The econometric model is not perfectly specified. There
is no provision for gauging the impact of the Uruguay
Round. Unfortunately, it is not possible for regression
techniques to distinguish between regional-trade-area
and Uruguay-Round effects until more time passes and
additional data become available. It is important to bear
in mind, when interpreting the econometric results, that
the slope dummy variable may be upwardly biased. The
Uruguay Round, an omitted variable, is expected not
only to have a positive influence on agricultural
imports, the dependent variable, but is likely to be posi-
tively correlated with the regional trade areas. 
Empirical Findings
The empirical findings are summarized in table 1 using
Balassa’s terminology. “Gross trade creation” relates to
Viner’s trade-creation scenario whereby imports from
partners belonging to the same regional trade area are
implicitly compared with domestic sources of supply.
“Trade diversion” and “external trade creation” relate
to Viner’s trade-diversion scenario whereby imports
from members are compared with those from nonmem-
bers. “Trade creation proper” compares domestic
sources of supply with all foreign sources. 
RTA member countries are interested in determining
whether gross trade creation characterizes their union.
Meanwhile, nonmember countries are interested in
determining whether external trade creation or trade
diversion dominates. Global welfare increases when
intra-area trade creation outweighs extra-area trade
diversion. This is measured by trade creation proper.
The results of both individual t-tests on the slope coef-
ficients as well as Chow tests, which determine
whether observations in both the pre- and post-integra-
tion periods belong to the same regression model, are
shown in table 1. Estimated b1 income coefficients
were always statistically significant at the 5-percent
level. Individual tests for the slope dummies showed
b3 to be significant in most cases. 
Change in trade patterns attributable to the formation
of regional trade areas was confirmed in two-thirds of
the cases examined, as revealed by the F-statistics
exceeding the critical value of 3.44. But the null
hypothesis (no difference between the two periods) was
not rejected among any of the APEC and AFTA
supplying markets except for extra-AFTA suppliers.
However, in this latter instance, the t-null hypothesis
that b3 equaled zero was “accepted,” meaning that
AFTA probably did not affect trade with nonmember
suppliers.
The econometric results show neither trade creation
nor trade diversion in APEC or AFTA. These results
are not particularly surprising. APEC lacks a formal
agreement among members. As a consequence, no
trade disciplines have been imposed. The countries
belonging to AFTA have similar resource endowments
and produce similar types of agricultural goods. There
is, therefore, little economic incentive for them to
increase agricultural trade among themselves despite
the existence of a formalized agreement. 
But the empirical evidence points to trade creation in
the CER, CUSTA, and MERCOSUR. In these three
RTA’s, the income elasticities of agricultural import
demand increased for intra-area, extra-area and total
trade following integration. The changes in these elas-
ticities suggest that once agricultural markets become
more open, consumers readily shift to lower-priced
foreign sources of supply. 
There is no evidence of trade diversion in the CER,
CUSTA, or MERCOSUR. In fact, the CER and
MERCOSUR are associated with external trade
creation, as demonstrated by the rise in their extra-area
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^
^import demand elasticities after the pre-integration
period. The statistically significant t-statistics for the
slope dummies depicting extra-area imports support
the view that these two RTA’s have become more
reliant upon agricultural imports from not only
member countries but from the rest of the world. 
Agricultural trade was created by CUSTA in its
supplying markets. But the rise in the income elasticity
for imports from member suppliers was considerably
greater than the rise in the elasticity from all suppliers.
While the responsiveness of agricultural imports to
income growth in CUSTA almost doubled for total-area
imports, it tripled for intra-area imports. This nonuni-
formity suggests CUSTA may have enhanced market
efficiencies between Canada and the United States. 
Post-period elasticities in the CER and MERCOSUR
were three to five times greater than pre-period elastic-
ities, indicating substantial trade creation, both proper
and gross. Moreover, percentage changes in their
extra-area and intra-area elasticities show that both
CER and (pre-1991) MERCOSUR integration were
associated with more rapid growth in external than
internal trade creation. These results support the view
that these RTA’s did not divert agricultural trade from
more efficient nonmember suppliers, but created trade
worldwide as more open markets unleashed dynamic
efficiency gains.
Post-integration import demand elasticities fell in all
three markets for the EU. This can be explained by the
slowdown in the growth of EU agricultural imports
and the decline in the longrun income elasticity of
demand for agricultural goods in member countries.
The relevant test for trade diversion in the EU case
involves a comparison of the change in their intra elas-
ticities with their change in the extra elasticities. The
empirical results indicate that the EU may have shifted
from nonpartner to partner sources of supply in the
post-1970 period. Notice that the drop in the extra-EU
elasticity between 1959-70 and 1971-95 (1.16) is
greater than the drop in the intra-EU elasticity (0.59).
These results, albeit based upon tenuous extrapolations
using Balassa’s estimates, suggest continued agricul-
tural trade diversion in the EU. 
Summary
Trade-share analysis shows that the agricultural trade
of member economies of the major RTA’s is being
increasingly dominated by intra-regional trade. The
formation of regional trade areas may have influenced
the growth in regionalization. In AFTA, however,
intraregional trade did not increase following the
establishment of its free-trade agreement because
member countries possess competitive, not comple-
mentary, production patterns in agriculture. Moreover,
intraregional trade has increased in APEC, despite the
absence of binding agreements. APEC countries have
complementary production and consumption patterns
in agriculture. 
It is difficult to draw economic inferences from an
analysis of trade shares alone. We, therefore, use an
economic model of trade creation and trade diversion
to draw economic implications about the changing
patterns of agricultural imports. This model utilizes
import demand elasticities to assess the impact of
specific RTA’s on economic welfare. However, the
empirically generated elasticities may embody effects
other than RTA’s, such as rational expectations about
the Uruguay Round.
The econometric results suggest that not all regional
trade areas have had an impact on economic welfare as
a result of altering agricultural trade patterns. Neither
APEC nor AFTA display evidence of either creating or
diverting agricultural trade. However, the CER,
CUSTA, and MERCOSUR were found to have had
positive influences on economic welfare and to have
helped open members to the world agricultural
economy. Each of these regional trade agreements has
created more agricultural trade than it has diverted, in
contrast to the EU. 
The story is still unfolding. Fully envisioned regional-
trade-area liberalization has not yet been achieved.
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RTA’s and Agricultural Trade: A Retrospective AssessmentAPEC is not yet a bona fide RTA. All regional trade
areas analyzed in this study are programmed to
become more open in the future. Within CUSTA, and
its NAFTA extension, for example, commodities are
classified into categories that became duty-free imme-
diately in 1994, and others that will be freed in 5, 10,
and 15 years. But, there can be some backsliding.
After agreeing to put into place a common external
tariff in 1995, MERCOSUR members increased
external tariffs by 3 percent this past November
(Economist, Dec. 20, 1997). 
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Introduction
T
he United States has played a significant role in
both regional and multilateral trade negotiations
and is likely to have an influential role in shaping
future trade reforms. The rapid growth and high profile
of regional trade agreements (RTA’s) has shifted public
attention toward these agreements. For example, the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) stim-
ulated greater public interest in the United States than
did the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Destler, 1995). This may
stem from the fact that the issues addressed by multilat-
eral agreements are not as clear to the public as those
raised by RTA’s. While it is clear that regional trade
agreements have stimulated greater public interest, it is
less clear whether the economic importance of RTA’s
matches that of the multilateral trade agreements. 
Economists have addressed whether regionalism is in
conflict with multilateralism. A global viewpoint,
however, does not necessarily represent a particular
country’s perspective. Countries initiate trade agree-
ments based on their own perspectives, which
typically are more regionally oriented. Generally
RTA’s form when countries recognize their economic
interdependence with regional partners. This depend-
ence is characterized by the strength of regional trade
and investment. The degree of regional dependence
can vary across countries, and because of this, the
actual importance of RTA’s may also differ signifi-
cantly from one country to another.
Multilateral and Regional Trade Reforms:
A Global Assessment 
From a U.S. Perspective 
Mark Gehlhar
Abstract
To assess how the United States is served by various trade agreements, this paper
provides a global analysis of regional and multilateral trade reforms. A series of
regional trade agreements is conducted using a global model. This approach permits
welfare gains to be accounted for in a consistent manner while allowing for interac-
tion between regional agreements. The U.S. perspective differs from that of other
countries because it has a more global orientation in its trade patterns. Although
there can be significant gains from U.S. participation in regional agreements, the
success of regional trade agreements (RTA’s) does not diminish the importance of
multilateral agreements. After full implementation of all major regional trade agree-
ments, the economy-wide gains to the United States from a complete multilateral
reform remain higher than the net gains from RTA’s. An open-regional agreement
like that proposed by APEC appears less attractive for the United States than an
open-global agreement that could be achieved by a WTO multilateral agreement.The United States holds a unique trade position in the
global economy because of its array of trading partners
and wide range of products traded. This global orienta-
tion magnifies the issue of regionalism versus
multilateralism. Is the United States better served by
individual RTA’s or by comprehensive global reforms
pursued through the World Trade Organization (WTO)? 
Characteristics of U.S.Trade 
The economic impact of regional and multilateral trade
reforms on the United States depends partly on
existing trade patterns. For example, Canada’s and
Mexico’s shares of trade with NAFTA are 74 percent
and 79 percent, while the U.S. share of total trade with
NAFTA is only 27 percent. Similarly, individual
APEC1 countries have greater trade with the APEC
region than does the United States. For Australia,
Japan, and Taiwan, the shares of trade with other
APEC countries are 56, 44, and 56 percent, whereas
the U.S. share is 38 percent. Australia has become
increasingly integrated into the dynamic Asia-Pacific
region while trade with Europe has become less
important. It was this growing interdependence of
Australia on the Asia-Pacific region that prompted
Australia to initiate an APEC free-trade agreement.
Among NAFTA and other APEC members, the United
States has a higher share of trade with other Southern
Hemisphere countries including the countries of
MERCOSUR and other Latin America. The EU is an
important partner for many non-EU, especially for
Argentina and Brazil. But from the EU’s perspective,
trade with non-EU countries is less important than trade
with other European countries. Geography, common
economic policies, and historical cultural ties forged close
trade links in Europe. For example, France and Germany
both have intra-EU trade shares above 60 percent. The
Czech Republic, a candidate for joining the EU, conducts
79 percent of its trade with other EU countries. 
Another important characteristic of U.S. trade is the
wide variation in sectoral trade balances by region.
While gains from trade liberalization are brought about
by increased volumes of imports and exports, these
gains can be offset through terms-of-trade effects.
Differences in regional trade balances (table 2) can
affect the U.S. terms of trade. For example, the United
States is a net supplier of services to the world, there-
36 U Regional Trade Agreements and U.S. Agriculture/AER-771 Economic Research Service/USDA
1Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum consists of Australia,
Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States.
Multilateral and Regional Trade Reforms: A Global Assessment From a U.S. Perspectivefore, trade in services is an important source of U.S.
income. A drop in the price of services relative to other
tradeables can lead to lower U.S. welfare. A lower
price for light manufactures, where the United States is
a net importer, can be welfare improving since this
reduces household expenditures.
While the United States is generally thought of as a
net food supplier, this is not the case on an individual
partner basis. The United States is a net food supplier
with respect to “other APEC,” the EU, and the “rest
of world,” with trade balance ratios of 3.3, 1.27, and
4.68. But the United States is a net food importer
with NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and other Latin
American countries, with export/import ratios of
0.84, 0.46, and 0.86. Terms-of-trade effects for a
given regional agreement are related to existing trade
balances within that particular region.
Empirical Modeling of Regional and
Multilateral Reforms 
For this global analysis, it is important to obtain a
consistent set of results for both regional and multilat-
eral reforms. This is done using a single modeling
framework that explicitly links all countries in the
global economy. For this study, the GTAP2 framework
is used consisting of a standard neoclassical-type model
and a global database. Trade linkages are represented
by bilateral trade flows and measures of tariffs and
non-tariff barriers are represented on a bilateral basis.
Economic gains from trade reforms are measured in
terms of household welfare, which takes into account
changes in income and all prices. Simply put, house-
hold welfare is a measure that reflects the economic
well-being of an aggregate household in each region.
Models vary in the way welfare is measured. One
difference in the way welfare is measured in the GTAP
model is that it takes into account both consumption
and savings, with the return on savings determined by a
global market for savings and investment. 
Experimental Design
To assess the total impact of RTA’s requires an
accounting of impacts of individual regional trade
agreements, including both those in existence and
those being proposed. The NAFTA and MERCOSUR
agreements are well into implementation. Still in nego-
tiation is the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
(FTAA), covering NAFTA and South American coun-
tries. The FTAA debate is over whether all NAFTA
members will participate in a regional agreement or
whether bilateral agreements will be formed with indi-
vidual NAFTA countries. Of most interest in this study
is how the United States will be affected by either
participating or not participating in an FTAA. 
The largest regional trade agreements on the horizon
are in Europe and the Asia Pacific area. The EU has
made plans for expansion to include the Central and
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2Global Trade Analysis Project established a common data base
and modeling framework for a world wide consortium of
researchers performing global trade analysis. The GTAP database
is documented in McDougall (1997). Theory of the model is
described in Hertel and Tsigas (1997).
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regional trade agreement does not directly involve the
United States, the outcome could have implications for
other RTA’s. New EU members are expected to adopt
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Depending on
reforms of the CAP, its extension to all CEEC
members could create additional trade distortions in
world agricultural markets. 
The United States is a member of the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation forum. In 1994, members of
APEC set a goal of free and open trade in what is
known as the Bogor Declaration. Full implementation
of reforms is expected by 2010 for developed coun-
tries and by 2020 for developing countries. In 1995, at
the Osaka Ministerial meeting, members agreed that
trade liberalization would be comprehensive in
sectoral coverage. Members have not resolved the
fundamental issue of whether to adopt a preferential
free-trade arrangement or a potentially divisive
arrangement called “open regionalism” by opening
their markets to nonmember countries.4
Table 3 describes the series of experiments used in the
analyses. The sequence of the experiments is consis-
tent with the order in which trade liberalization has
occurred or will likely occur. Each experiment is
performed using a set of policy shocks that represents
removal of trade barriers. Since GTAP is a global
model where countries are linked by bilateral trade,
the effects of policy changes in one region are trans-
mitted to other regions. The world economy adjusts to
these policy shocks by establishing new market equi-
librium prices and quantities. Each experiment
produces an updated base equilibrium, which is then
used in a subsequent experiment. This sequencing of
experiments allows for measurement of incremental
impacts of individual trade reforms. 
The starting point for conducting the set of experi-
ments is a post-Uruguay (GATT) base. This means that
the Uruguay Round commitments are phased in and all
markets adjust from these reforms. The first in the
series of experiments is the NAFTA (experiment 1).
Here, all border interventions are removed between the
United States, Mexico, and Canada for all agricultural
and nonagricultural sectors. The “post-NAFTA” state
would represent the world economy after full adjust-
ments have occurred from the trade liberalization of
NAFTA. The impact of the NAFTA agreement is
measured as the difference between the beginning base
(post-Uruguay) and the post-NAFTA state. This post-
NAFTA state then becomes a new base for conducting
the MERCOSUR trade reforms (experiment 2), and so
on (table 3).
Experiment 4 involves the integration of the CEEC’s
with the EU-15 member countries. Exactly how EU
integration will occur is still unknown. Attempts at
modeling the EU expansion and associated reforms
have done so with a number of alternative scenarios.5
Basically, modeling it involves the elimination of
barriers on intra-European trade and harmonizing
external barriers at the post-Uruguay Round levels.
Trade barriers are removed on trade between CEEC’s
and the EU-15 while the CEEC’s adopt the same
external import barrier as the EU. Domestic support
and export subsidies are left unchanged for both EU-
15 and CEEC members. 
The final regional trade agreement, APEC, is examined
in steps. First, trade in the APEC region is liberalized
on a preferential basis (5a). Second, APEC members
open their borders to non-APEC members. This is
carried out in two steps in order to show incremental
impact of opening trade to the EU. Opening trade to
non-EU countries becomes experiment 5b and opening
trade to EU members becomes experiment 5c. The
combined effects of experiments 5a-5c equals the open-
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Swaminathan (forthcoming) for alternative scenarios of EU
expansion. 
3The Central and Eastern European Countries include Poland,
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Romania, and
Bulgaria.
4Fane (1995) makes the point that the Bogor Declaration left this
choice open by qualifying “the goal of free and open trade” by the
clause “in Asia Pacific.” 
Multilateral and Regional Trade Reforms: A Global Assessment From a U.S. Perspectiveregional agreement. After completion of the APEC
liberalization scenario, it is assumed that all remaining
barriers are removed by way of a WTO multilateral
trade agreement (experiment 6). 
Results
Table 4 provides a summary of the U.S. and global
welfare gains from each of the trade reforms. When
the United States does not participate in an RTA, it
experiences a loss. This can be seen for the
MERCOSUR, the FTAA, and the EU expansion. The
net U.S. welfare gain for the Western Hemisphere is
$4.9 billion. By comparison, gains from the Uruguay
Round yield $4.6 billion. Also, the gain from joining
FTAA ($3.28 billion) is greater than the gain from
NAFTA ($2.32 billion). 
Expansion of the EU will provide gains ($480 million)
by expanding its membership and exploiting the
comparative advantages of East and West Europe.
Exports of agriculture and light manufactures from
CEEC’s to the EU-15 increase substantially. The
United States experiences a loss of $600 million. The
manner of CAP reforms, which is entirely outside the
realm of U.S. policy, can affect this outcome. 
The various APEC trade liberalization experiments
show different outcomes.6 The largest single RTA gain
for the United States ($11.3 billion) comes from the
APEC preferential agreement. If APEC is imple-
mented on an open-regional basis, the U.S. gain is
only $2.4 billion. The loss in U.S. welfare is accounted
for largely ($6 billion) as a result of extending free
trade to the expanded EU. 
After accounting for RTA gains, the full multilateral
agreement generates $7.5 billion in welfare gains to the
United States, higher than the cumulative gains from all
RTA’s ($6.7 billion). That suggests that the United
States has considerable incentive for further trade liber-
alization beyond the currently proposed RTA’s. 
Without further analysis of the results, in particular for
the APEC liberalization, it remains unclear exactly why
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6Similar results for APEC liberalization were generated by Young
and Huff (1997). the United States experiences gains or losses. Of partic-
ular interest are the differences in results generated in
experiments 5a-c, where there is a dramatic shift in
U.S. welfare. To understand the factors behind these
changes, it is helpful to perform an analysis of welfare
decomposition. Changes in welfare for the experiments
conducted here are generated from two major sources:
allocative efficiency, and terms of trade.7 These compo-
nents of welfare for the APEC experiments are shown
in table 5. Allocative efficiency captures the gains
caused by resources shifting from one sector to another.
For the APEC preferential agreement, this efficiency
effect accounted for $6.7 billion of the $11.3 billion
(U.S.) welfare gain. The results are conservative.
Accounting for factor accumulation effects or produc-
tivity gains would tend to amplify the results and
increase the gain in welfare.8
The deterioration in U.S. terms-of-trade effects domi-
nates the welfare changes in both experiments where
APEC opens to non-APEC members. When APEC
opens borders to nonmembers except the EU, the effi-
ciency effect is only $1 billion, compared with a large
decline in U.S. terms of trade ($3.9 billion). When
APEC removes barriers on trade from the EU, the
terms-of-trade effect contributes a U.S. welfare loss
($6 billion).9
By sector, agriculture and light manufactures contribute
significantly to the positive terms of trade under the
APEC preferential agreement (table 6). When APEC
trade liberalization occurs, Asia-Pacific’s light manu-
facturing sector expands. This increases the cost of
production for the agricultural sector as labor and
capital are bid up. Agricultural production costs rise at
the same time that import protection is removed
leading to an overall contraction of the Asia-Pacific
agricultural sector. Food consumption in that region
shifts toward foreign-produced food, thereby increasing
the demand and export price for U.S. agriculture. 
The United States depends more on Asia-Pacific as a
source of agricultural income than as a supplier of
food. For light manufactures, Asia-Pacific is more
important as a supplier than a purchaser. As a result of
liberalization, U.S. consumers face higher priced food
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9Strong terms-of-trade effects are common with the type of import
demand specification used in GTAP (see Brown 1987 for discus-
sion of this topic).
7See Huff and Hertel (1996) for details on welfare decomposition
in the GTAP model.
8See Lewis, Robinson, and Wang (1995) for incorporating
dynamic effects in APEC liberalization.
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manufactures, which make up a far larger share of
U.S. household expenditures on foreign goods. 
When APEC removes trade barriers for non-APEC
members, the United States experiences a terms-of-
trade loss. In experiments 5b and 5c, agriculture has a
negative terms-of-trade effect. U.S. agriculture faces
greater competition, driving down agricultural export
prices. Opening trade to non-EU member countries
(experiment 5b) contributes more to the decline in
U.S. agricultural terms of trade (-0.098) than opening
to EU member countries (-0.093). This suggests that
U.S. agriculture faces as much (or more) competition
from non-EU members as from the EU. Of more
significance is the terms-of-trade loss due to trade in
services.10 Because the United States is a large net
supplier of services, a lower export price can hurt U.S.
terms of trade. Here we see that when APEC opens
trade with the EU, the services sector contributes more
than any other sector to the decline in the U.S. terms
of trade. The U.S. terms of trade are positive in the
FTAA and the multilateral reforms reflecting differ-
ences in sectoral trade flows by region. 
Conclusions
From a U.S. perspective, the success of regional trade
agreements does not diminish the importance of multi-
lateral agreements. After full implementation of all
major regional trade agreements currently under
consideration, the economywide gains to the United
States from a complete multilateral reform remain
higher than the net gains from RTA’s. While the
United States conducts international trade with a wide
range of partners throughout the world, for other coun-
tries RTA’s appear more attractive than multilateral
agreements because of closer economic ties with
regional partners and the greater ability to negotiate
these agreements. 
RTA’s will continue to evolve, and the United States
runs a risk by not participating. As with the FTAA, a
regional agreement can form regardless of U.S. partici-
pation, and the United States may suffer when
excluded. However, when the United States partici-
pates, the gains can be significant. In fact, the
combined gains from NAFTA and FTAA are greater
than the welfare gains from the Uruguay Round. This
highlights the fact that regional trade reforms with
Latin America are important as is “fast-track” trade-
negotiating authority.
The way in which an RTA is implemented has strong
implications for U.S. trade gains. The United States
stands to gain significantly from an APEC preferential
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Much of these gains are from greater efficiencies
achieved by better resource use. On the other hand, if
APEC countries remove barriers to all partners on an
open regional basis, a significant reduction in U.S.
welfare could result. This loss is driven chiefly by
unfavorable terms-of-trade effects. This open-regional
agreement appears lopsided from a U.S. perspective.
Free-riding by nonmembers puts the United States at a
competitive disadvantage. For other APEC members
this may not be important, since much of their trade is
conducted with member countries. But for the United
States, with a larger share of trade with other coun-
tries, it is more important that non-APEC countries
reciprocate in a GATT-consistent manner by removing
their trade barriers. 
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Introduction
R
egionalism is an integral part of the broader
economic policy reforms that have occurred in the
Western Hemisphere over the last decade. This chapter
examines the dynamic effects of regional integration
arrangements in the Western Hemisphere on the U.S.
economy, including U.S. agriculture and agricultural
trade, by taking into account changes in saving-invest-
ment and capital accumulation. Through close linkage
between open trade and economic growth, especially
through technological spillovers embodied in the trade,
countries within the hemisphere, including the United
States, will enjoy economic gains from more trade in
the Americas. Besides its comparative advantage in
trade of agricultural commodities and services, the
United States, as a wealthy country, also has a compar-
ative advantage in financial capital markets. This
allows U.S. households to further enjoy the benefit of
hemisphere-wide economic integration by accumu-
lating assets of other nations in the hemisphere,
especially when United States joins the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA).
Development of Regional Trade and
Integration in the Western
Hemisphere
Regional trade agreements have been a key factor in
advancing and consolidating the market-oriented
reforms underway in the hemisphere in this decade.
Beginning in mid-1980, many Latin American coun-
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tries undertook comprehensive economic reform
programs, including a fundamental shift from the
import-substitution development policies of previous
decades to more open, market-based policies.
In the 1960’s and 1970’s, governments in most Latin
American countries adopted an import-substitution
strategy in forming their economic policies, especially
trade policies. These developmental strategies were
based on the idea that the substitution of domestically
produced goods for imports would stimulate a
country’s economic growth by supporting local indus-
tries in the form of producer subsidies and conserving
foreign exchange. In implementing this strategy, many
Latin American countries levied heavy taxes on agri-
cultural exports to subsidize industrial development
and imposed high import barriers on agricultural
inputs. Such tax burdens were further exacerbated by
inflationary fiscal policies that implicitly taxed the
primary sectors of production, especially agriculture.
These fiscal policies subsequently led to monetization
and overvaluation of the countries’ currencies, which
resulted in further taxing producers of traded goods.
The two oil shocks of the 1970’s raised import prices
for the Latin American countries and slowed their
economic growth. When interest rates rose sharply in
the early 1980’s, these countries were trapped in
serious macroeconomic crises with heavy burdens of
foreign debt. Thus, structural adjustment and economic
policy reforms became inevitable in trade as well as
macroeconomic policy reforms. 
While government expenditures were reduced, fiscal
deficits remained in the early reform period because of
lack of tax reforms. The monetization of the fiscal
deficit and the use of domestic debt instruments made
foreign investors hesitant, which further contributed to
shortrun instability in real exchange rates (Little et al.,
1993 and Alam and Rajapatirane, 1993). Latin
American countries inevitably had to adopt tight
monetary and fiscal policies accompanied by devalua-
tion of floating exchange rates. To promote and
maintain a stable macroeconomic environment, they
also adopted prudent fiscal management, economic
deregulation, and financial sector reforms.
Trade reforms involved a shift from import-substitution
regimes toward outward-oriented trade regimes. After
the reforms, average tariff rates declined dramatically.
Many countries also simplified the tariff categories.
Thus, the degree of openness, measured by the ratio of
the sum of exports and imports to Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), increased from a pre-reform level of 49
percent to a post-reform (1991) level of 58 percent for
Latin American countries on average (Alam and
Rajapatirane, 1993). The reduction of protection
barriers on imports and expansion of exports led these
countries to adopt rules consistent with the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and, conse-
quently, to become members of GATT.
Regional integration was another step in the successful
trade and macroeconomic reforms and became an inte-
gral part of them. MERCOSUR (The Mercado Común
del Sur), the second largest regional trade arrangement
in the Western Hemisphere, was established in 1991
among the countries of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay,
and Uruguay. MERCOSUR eliminated most trade
barriers among its members and established a common
external tariff for most agricultural products by 1995,
with longer transition periods for a few sensitive agri-
cultural products. 
The United States and Canada also started to reduce
their direct government intervention in agricultural
markets and liberalized agricultural trade in the
1980’s. In 1989, these two countries established the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. In 1994, the
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the
largest regional trade arrangement in the Western
Hemisphere, was established among the three north
American countries. 
Besides NAFTA and MERCOSUR, a multitude of
other trade agreements have been initiated or re-acti-
vated during the past decade. About 40 trade
agreements now operate in the hemisphere, and at
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Integration on the U.S. Economyleast another dozen are under negotiation (see map in
chapter 12). 
This proliferation of trade agreements with the broader
economic policy reforms in the hemisphere has given
rise to calls for a comprehensive, hemisphere-wide
agreement. At the Miami Summit of the Americas,
held in December 1994, the leaders of 34 Western
Hemisphere democracies, including the United States,
pledged to negotiate a Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) by the year 2005. Formal negotia-
tions were initiated in April 1998 at the second
Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile. 
An FTAA could simplify the complex system of
regional and bilateral trade preferences prevailing in the
hemisphere, and ensure more open and transparent rules
for U.S. trade and investment in the rapidly growing
markets of Latin America on a comparable basis with
other exporters. Further, an FTAA could help countries
in the hemisphere lock in the economic reforms they
have already adopted and improve the long-term
outlook for growth and stability in the hemisphere.
The Western Hemisphere is a large market for U.S.
agricultural exports as well as an important supplier
for U.S. agricultural imports. Many countries in the
Western Hemisphere are both important trade partners
and major competitors for U.S. agricultural products in
third-country markets. In addition, many of them have
a comparative advantage in agricultural production. As
the old policies that discouraged agricultural produc-
tion and constrained economic growth are replaced
with more market-oriented economic policies, agricul-
tural productivity and economic growth in the region
are expected to accelerate. As a highly dynamic region
with abundant agricultural resources, the Western
Hemisphere is setting up a stage for dynamic changes
in the region by adopting economic policies and trade
reforms. Therefore, how the regional integration of the
Americas evolves, specifically whether the United
States is actively involved, will have important impli-
cations for U.S. agriculture.
Structure of the Analysis 
Studies on the effects of regional integration in the
hemisphere on the U.S. economy need to take into
account the major dynamic factors, especially capital
accumulation and the close linkage between trade and
economic growth through technological spillovers.
Thus, this study was conducted in a global, dynamic,
general equilibrium framework developed in the U.S.
Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research
Service (Diao and Somwaru, forthcoming. See also
their analysis of the FTAA, using a static framework
with more commodity detail, in a forthcoming ERS
report). The model is dynamic in the sense that firms
and households have intertemporal optimization
behavior, that is, a forward-looking behavior, such that
a regional trade agreement (RTA) or other trade poli-
cies will affect savings, investment, capital
accumulation, and international borrowing and lending
activities of each country and region in the model.
Furthermore, in the model, trade liberalization affects
a country’s productivity growth through technological
spillovers. That is, if a country, especially a developing
country, becomes more open in trade to other coun-
tries, it is more likely to learn and adopt advanced
technologies embodied in international trade, espe-
cially trade with developed countries. Such spillovers
of advanced technologies or knowledge through
imports of capital goods or foreign investment, will
improve a country’s productivity, that is, more outputs
can be produced using the same amount of productive
resources (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Romer,
1994). 
Besides its intertemporal or dynamic property, the
model is global and covers all countries and regions in
the world. As the focus of the study is in the Western
Hemisphere, the major Western Hemisphere countries
are included as individual countries, while the rest of
the countries in the world are treated as an aggregated
region in the model. Western Hemisphere countries in
the model are the United States, Canada, Mexico,
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and all other Western
Hemisphere countries as a region (OWH). The
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sectoral production, consumption, exports and imports,
investment, aggregate domestic savings, international
borrowing and lending (that is, international financial
capital flows) is consistent with economic theory
(Goulder and Summers, 1989; Go, 1994; Barro and
Sala-I-Martin, 1995). Trade flows among regions are
multilateral and, hence, world prices are endogenously
determined by world market-clearing conditions.
Except for the policy variables, which are exogenous,
the endowment of land is the only variable that cannot
be endogenously determined by the model. Capital is
endogenously accumulated over time. Resources can
move among sectors and the general equilibrium
feature of the model ensures that adjustments are
consistent cross sectors.
The evaluation of the potential dynamic effects of
alternative regional integration scenarios is captured
by the use of several economic indicators. These indi-
cators include the growth paths of real GDP, total
consumption, agricultural income, total investment,
total and agricultural trade (exports and imports), as
well as changes in foreign capital inflows or outflows.
We conducted two alternative hemisphere-wide inte-
gration scenarios in the model. In both scenarios,
NAFTA, MERCOSUR (including Chile), and the
Uruguay Round agreement are fully implemented. In
the first scenario, a hemisphere-wide FTAA is modeled
by eliminating all tariffs among the hemisphere coun-
tries except for the United States. Specifically, the
United States eliminates only its import tariffs with the
other two NAFTA member countries, while Canada
and Mexico join the FTAA and eliminate tariffs with
all other countries in the hemisphere. We call this
scenario RIAA-1 (Regional Integration Arrangements
of the Americas). In the second scenario, RIAA-2, the
United States fully participates in a hemisphere-wide
free trade agreement, eliminating all tariffs with all
other hemisphere countries, while all other countries in
the hemisphere eliminate tariffs with each other and
with the United States. 
The data used to calibrate the model are aggregated
from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) data-
base, version 3, which represents the world in 1992
(McDougall, 1997). The focus of the model, based on
the data of 1992, is not to predict real economic
performance after the base year (1992). Instead, the
model is used to generate and compare different
outcomes from alternative policy scenarios. Thus, the
model outcomes are reported in relative terms, that is,
deviations from the base. The impacts of an FTAA on
the U.S. economy are measured by comparing the
different outcomes of the two scenarios.
The estimated effects of an RTA depend critically on
the initial level of protection and the degree of liberal-
ization applied in the model. We measure trade
restrictions as ad valorem tariff equivalents. The initial
levels of tariff rates for the countries and regions in the
model were obtained from the GTAP database, version
3. The tariff rates were weighted applied rates for each
individual country and region in the database, and the
weights are sectoral import shares for each country
and region in the model. The trade share data were
also obtained from that database. Within the Western
Hemisphere in 1992 (base year), average tariffs (agri-
cultural and manufacturing sectors) ranged from 5
percent for Canada and 10 percent for the United
States to 30 percent for Argentina and Brazil (for the
sectoral tariff rates see table 1).1
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1However, for most of the countries in the hemisphere, especially
for NAFTA and MERCOSUR member countries, the tariff rates
have been significantly reduced in recent years, but the database
fails to capture that. Hence, the simulated effects of tariff reduc-
tions in the hemisphere, regarding NAFTA and MERCOSUR
member countries, may be overestimated by accounting for some
effects that have already been achieved in the last 5 years after the
implementation of these two agreements. Additionally, the data-
base does not include nontariff barriers.Dynamic Effect of Alternative
Regional Integration Schemes on
the United States
The gains from trade liberalization are mainly generated
from three sources: the allocation of resources to more
profitable activities, the more rapid capital accumulation
due to more profitable investment alternatives, and
growth in a country’s total factor productivity (TFP) due
to access to new foreign product and process technolo-
gies. Since the United States is a highly developed
country with relatively low levels of economic distor-
tions in trade, gains for the U.S. economy generated
directly from its own trade liberalization or from trade
liberalization of other countries in the hemisphere can
be expected to be small compared with gains by the
developing countries in the hemisphere. Furthermore,
the aim of this study is not to predict the real growth or
performance of the U.S. economy, which is determined
by many factors including domestic economic policies
and the level of domestic technological research and
development activities. 
Effects on GDP 
Numerous studies have found empirically strong and
positive linkages between growth in a country’s TFP
and the share of its economy involved in trade with a
more advanced nation (for example, Coe and Helpman,
1995; Wang and Xu, 1997; and Coe, et al., 1997). It is
very important for the analysis to capture such link-
ages, especially since most countries in the hemisphere
are developing countries. In the model, the full imple-
mentation of existing regional integration agreements
(NAFTA and MERCOSUR) and the Uruguay Round
agreement, together with a hemisphere-wide integra-
tion, stimulate productivity growth of the countries 
in the hemisphere as well as investment. This allows 
all countries in the hemisphere to enjoy more rapid
growth. For instance, under the two scenarios, Mexico
and Chile would enjoy a two-digit positive increase in
their GDP levels from the base, while the growth in
Argentina’s and Brazil’s GDP would exceed 7 percent
in total in both scenarios (fig. 1). 
On the other hand, gains for the U.S. economy, meas-
ured by annual growth in its GDP, are relatively small
in both scenarios, regardless of whether the United
States joins the FTAA. In the first scenario, if the U.S.
remains outside of an FTAA, U.S. GDP would grow
0.6 percent in total. In the second scenario, when the
U.S. joins the FTAA, its GDP increases by 1.2 percent
in total. Hence, the net FTAA effect of U.S. participa-
tion in the bloc, measured by the deviation in U.S.
GDP growth under the two scenarios, is quite modest,
about 0.6 percent in total (fig. 2, the chart for the
United States).
Growth in a country’s GDP takes time. Establishment of
an RTA does not immediately translate into capital accu-
mulation and improvements in productivity. Thus, the
simulation results show that GDP growth in each
country in the hemisphere is insignificant in the first few
years of the two scenarios. Except for Mexico and Chile,
almost all other countries in the hemisphere observed
less than 1-percent growth in their GDP in the first 3 to 5
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GDP only increased totally by 0.08 and 0.18 percent,
respectively, in the first 3 to 5 years). These short-term
effects of the RIAA or the effects observed in the first
few years in the simulations are equivalent to the static
effects of the RIAA captured by a comparative static
analysis in a traditional computable general equilibrium
(CGE) framework. In other words, a static CGE analysis
mainly captures the effects of resource reallocation at
given levels of productive resources, including capital
stock and technology. 
Effects on Capital Accumulation 
and TFP
Deviations in GDP growth under the two different
integration scenarios reflect differences in capital
accumulation (in response to trade policy changes) and
productivity growth (in response to spillovers of tech-
nologies from advanced developed countries, fig. 2).
The investment responses in each country are endoge-
nously determined in the model by their firms’ choices
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Figure 1
Deviation from base GDP in selected Western Hemisphere countries
(The base GDP is normalized to one)to maximize their intertemporal profits. The technolog-
ical spillover elasticity, which links productivity
growth with trade (especially with advanced developed
countries), is based on the result from econometric
estimation in the literature.2
The simulation results indicate that, for the developing
countries in the hemisphere, improvement in their total
factor productivity and increased investment due to
regional integration are equally important to their
economic growth, while for the United States, with
small technological spillovers emanating from the
poorer countries, the direct effects of a regional trade
agreement on its growth are mainly captured by an
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2A sensitivity test was performed for determining the size of
spillover elasticities.increase in its investment.3 Under the two alternative
RIAA scenarios, the U.S. total capital stock increases
by 0.7 and 1.4 percent (fig. 2), respectively, while the
level of its TFP improves by only 0.25 and 0.5
percent, respectively, over the entire time horizon.
Effects on U.S. Foreign Assets 
As a wealthy economy, the investment opportunities of
the United States are not limited to within the country
and, hence, a rise in GDP alone cannot be used to
describe all the effects of an RTA on the U.S.
economy.4 As increased capital investment in devel-
oping countries cannot be fully financed by their
domestic savings, international financial capital
markets would be an important source to finance their
rapid growth in investment. This would create oppor-
tunities for the United States to invest abroad, either
through international lending activity or foreign direct
investment in these hemisphere countries. These indi-
rect effects generated from the growing demand for
U.S. capital outflow may be relatively strong, given
that the economic adjustments in the developing coun-
tries in the hemisphere are expected to be drastic. The
model simulations capture such indirect effects of
regional integration. Under both scenarios, we observe
that for the developing countries in the hemisphere,
foreign capital inflows increase dramatically following
a hemisphere-wide integration, and demand for foreign
capital inflows increase more in the second scenario in
which the United States joins an FTAA. These create
opportunities for U.S. firms to invest abroad. In total,
the foreign assets owned by the U.S. private sector and
invested in other countries in the hemisphere rise by 9
and 13 percent, respectively, under the two scenarios
implying a 4 percent gain in U.S.foreign investment if
the United States fully participates in an FTAA (fig.
3).5 This implies that the measure of importance of the
FTAA for the U.S. economy should be based on the
indirect effects generated from the growing foreign
demand for the U.S. financial capital, rather than on
the direct effects on commodity trade only. 
As a wealthy country, the United States has a compar-
ative advantage in the financial capital market, besides
its comparative advantage in trade of agricultural
goods and services. With rapid economic growth in the
developing economies due to the RIAA, increases in
the demand for U.S. financial capital are expected to
be large, which allows U.S. households to accumulate
assets of other nations in the hemisphere. Hence, to
evaluate whether the United States should participate
actively in further economic integration in the hemi-
sphere, it is important to also emphasize U.S.
comparative advantage in world financial markets.
Effects on Consumption
Economic growth implies higher income for
consumers and, hence, increases in their levels of
consumption. Under both scenarios, the path of
changes in a country’s overall consumption is almost
the same as the path for its GDP growth. This is not
too surprising since income growth is a major determi-
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3When growth in a country’s TFP takes place, the country’s invest-
ment and, hence, capital stock increases more than in the absence
of TFP growth. This reasoning relies on the famous diminishing
returns to scale theorem. That is, if TFP does not grow, returns to
capital fall with an increase in capital stock, and, hence, invest-
ment becomes less profitable and eventually stops augmenting and
so does capital stock. On the other hand, if TFP grows, i.e., the
productivity of labor employed in an economy rises, returns to
capital become relatively constant, and capital can grow continu-
ously with investment. In the RIAA-2 scenario, for example, while
Mexico’TFP increases by 5 percent in the time horizon, the stock
of capital on Mexico rises by 12 percent. If TFP did not grow, the
stock of capital in Mexico would increase by only 3.4 percent in
the same scenario.
4According to the World Bank definition, the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) is measured by returns to productive factors
employed in domestic production processes.
5By definition, returns from foreign assets are included in a
country’s gross national product (GNP) and not in its GDP. In the
simulations, the increased returns from foreign assets owned by the
U.S. private sector are about 0.05 percent of the U.S. GNP; hence,
growth of the U.S. GNP is almost parallel to growth of its GDP.nant of consumption patterns. This result implies that
consumers in all countries in the hemisphere benefit
from a hemisphere-wide integration, but the benefits
for the U.S. consumers are modest, in terms of
changes in U.S. overall consumption. Furthermore, the
gap between the two growth paths of U.S. total
consumption, depending on whether or not the United
States joins the FTAA, is also quite small.
Effects on U.S. Farm Income
Similar to changes in GDP and total consumption,
U.S. farm income, measured by returns to capital and
labor employed in the agricultural and agricultural-
related sectors, also shows modest growth (slightly
more than 1-percent increase in total) under both
scenarios (fig. 4). The increase in U.S. farm income
due to its particiation in the FTAA is quite small, less
than 0.5 percent. The major effects of the alternative
RIAA’s on U.S. farm income originate from more effi-
cient allocation of resources, including the creation of
more job opportunities in agricultural and agricultural-
related sectors than from increased capital investment.
This is clearly captured by the shortrun effects (3 to 5
years) on U.S. farm income, that is, increases in farm
income due to increased returns to agricultural and
agricultural-related labor, land, and capital. In the long
run, however, additional increases in U.S. farm income
are negligible. This indicates that, as the United States
has a comparative advantage in agriculture, U.S. full
participation in an FTAA would allow resources to be
more efficiently used in U.S. agricultural production,
which is a major source for increased U.S. farm
income. However, other countries in the hemisphere
also have a comparative advantage in agricultural
production, and may become competitors for U.S.
agricultural products. Thus, in the long run, the
competitiveness of U.S. agricultural exports may be
challenged by neighboring countries. This is captured
in the model by the relatively stagnant long-term
growth in U.S. farm income. Note that, as the agricul-
tural sector is quite aggregate in the analysis, we
cannot identify which sub-sectors may be hurt and
which may grow. Furthermore, TFP growth in agricul-
ture may be different from economywide TFP growth.
The United States could, in principle, counter the
competitive tendency by increasing investment in agri-
cultural research and development (R&D). The effects
of that, however, are beyond the scope of this study.
Effects on U.S.Total and
Agricultural Trade
As expected, the effects of an RTA on trade flows are
larger than those on economy-wide indicators, such as
GDP and total consumption. The reason is obvious, as
integration will re-enforce economic linkages among
the countries. In the short run, U.S. total merchandise
exports and imports would be 3 and 2.3 percent higher,
respectively, than the base under RIAA-1, and 5.6 and
4.6 percent higher, respectively, under RIAA-2 (table
2). Deviations of increases in U.S. total merchandise
exports and imports between the two alternative RIAA
scenarios, or the net effects of U.S. participation in an
FTAA, are more significant than those for U.S. GDP.
That is, if the United States joins the FTAA, U.S.
exporters can enjoy an additional 2.6-percent increase
in exports and U.S. consumers can enjoy a 2.3-percent
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Deviations from base foreign assets 
In the United States
(The base foreign assets are normalized to one)increase in imports, compared with the first scenario
(RIAA-1) in which the United States stays out of the
FTAA. As U.S. total exports grow more rapidly than its
total imports in both scenarios, the U.S. trade deficit
would become smaller.
U.S. agricultural exports and imports grow more
rapidly than total merchandise trade under both
scenarios. Compared with the base, U.S. agricultural
exports and imports would increase, in the short run,
by 6 and 3.2 percent, respectively, under RIAA-1, and
7.9 and 6.4 percent, respectively under RIAA-2. That
is, if the United States joins the FTAA, U.S. farmers
can achieve an additional 2-percent increase in agricul-
tural exports and U.S. consumers will benefit from an
additional 3-percent increase in agricultural imports.
As agricultural exports grow rapidly, the share of U.S.
agricultural exports in total merchandise trade will rise
by 1 percentage point (from 8.6 to 9.6 percent of U.S.
total merchandise trade) due to U.S. participation in
the FTAA. With relatively high tariffs on agricultural
imports within the hemisphere, agricultural trade had
suffered more than other sectors before the regional
trade reforms. Once tariffs are eliminated or reduced
through a hemisphere-wide integration, the sectors
with high import barriers earlier will experience rapid
growth in trade. Fast growth in agricultural imports
does not necessarily hurt U.S. farmers’ interests.
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Larger U.S. agricultural export growth and agricultural
resource reallocation result in higher farm incomes as
the result of U.S. participation in the FTAA.
In both scenerios, U.S. agricultural exports would
increase more in the short run (the first 3 to 5 years) and
medium run (the first 15 years), compared with the long
run (the first 20 to 30 years). That is, gains in U.S. agri-
cultural exports observed in the short or medium run
may partially cease in the long run. Under the RIAA-2
scenario, for example, U.S. agricultural exports reach
their highest level during the first 15 years. After that,
U.S. agricultural exports fall slightly (1 to 1.5 percent)
in the following 5 to 20 years, compared with the
highest level obtained in the early period. 
We mentioned earlier that the gains for U.S. agricul-
ture generated from regional integration are mainly
A Dynamic Evaluation of the Effects of Western Hemisphere 
Integration on the U.S. Economydue to more efficient allocation of productive
resources. Since U.S. technology and, hence, agricul-
tural TFP would not be significantly improved due to
an RIAA alone, gains from regional integration are
negligible, with respect to long-term U.S. economic
growth.6 On the other hand, the developing economies
in the Western Hemisphere would enjoy gains gener-
ated from the more efficient use of resources as well
as improvements in TFP due to an RTA. Furthermore,
given that some countries in the hemisphere, such as
Argentina and Brazil, have a comparative advantage in
agricultural production, these countries’ agricultural
products would compete with U.S. products in third-
country markets since these countries are retaining
their growth in agricultural exports in the long run.
Such competition is observed in both scenarios, since
close economic linkages with the United States would
allow the developing countries to benefit more from
catching up with the advanced U.S. agricultural tech-
nology. For example, in RIAA-2, Argentina’s and
Brazil’s agricultural exports would increase 3.8 and
7.7 percent, respectively, more than in RIAA-1 in the
long run (table 2).
The competition in agricultural exports (presented in
this study is in terms of aggregated agricultural
commodities) between the United States and other
countries in the hemisphere would take place mainly
in third-country markets in the model, that is, the Rest
of World. Even so, agricultural trade between the
United States and its neighboring countries in the
hemisphere actually increases, especially if the United
States joins the FTAA. (If the United States is a
member of the FTAA, its agricultural exports to the
hemisphere are about 9 percent higher in both the
short and long run than if the United States is not a
member.) This implies that, with a relatively rapid
growth in other economies in the hemisphere, closer
economic relationships between the United States and
its neighboring countries would create more trade
opportunities for U.S. agricultural exporters. In
contrast to U.S. total agricultural exports in third-
country markets, in which market gains would
eventually cease, U.S. agricultural exports to the coun-
tries in the hemisphere might experience continuous
growth even in the long run.
Summary and Conclusions
The economic integration in the Western Hemisphere
can be viewed as another step in a sequence of trade
liberalization policies that most countries in the region
have being pursuing in the last decade. The United
States will continue to enjoy gains from more open
economic policies, and these gains will be larger if it
joins a future hemisphere-wide integration agreement. 
Taking into account the close linkage between open
trade and economic growth, developing countries in the
hemisphere would benefit more from a further hemi-
sphere-wide integration, which would allow them to
increase trade with the United States. As most of these
countries have a comparative advantage in various
types of agricultural production and agricultural trade,
U.S. agricultural exports may face increased competi-
tion in the long run. Competition in agricultural trade
between the United States and other countries in the
hemisphere would take place mainly in third-country
markets, while trade between them would rise, espe-
cially if the United States joins an FTAA.
The direct effects of an FTAA on the United States,
measured mainly by GDP growth, are modest, given
that the United States is an advanced and open
economy. The gap in U.S. gains between membership
and nonmembership in the FTAA is not large. On the
other hand, the indirect effects of an FTAA, that is, the
effects on U.S. investment abroad or U.S. financial
capital outflow to neighboring countries, are much
stronger than the direct effects caused by increased
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6This does not imply that U.S. agricultural TFP will not grow in
the future. As many econometric studies (for example, Gopinath
and Roe, 1997) have shown, growth in U.S. agricultural TFP is
mainly driven by U.S. technological research and development
activities, TFP might not necessarily be affected by an RTA in the
Western Hemisphere.investment within the United States. The United States
is a wealthy country, with a comparative advantage in
world financial capital markets. Hence, to determine
whether the United States actively participates in a
hemisphere-wide integration agreement, the longrun
effects of an FTAA on the U.S. economy, beyond the
increased opportunities in regional trade, should be
taken into account. 
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O
n the spectrum of economic integration defined by
economists, the European Union (EU) represents
the most intensive integration among countries. Since
its formation as the European Economic Community in
1957, its name has evolved as the degree of integration
among member countries has steadily progressed.
Union signifies the march toward ever-deepening 
political, economic, and social policy harmonization
among member countries. The contemplated inclusion
of many of the Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEEC’s), therefore, entails much more than the typical
regional trade agreements (RTA’s) discussed elsewhere
in this report. In addition to eliminating trade barriers
among its members, common to other RTA’s, EU
enlargement entails harmonization of trade barriers
against third countries (indicative of customs unions)
and, more important, the harmonization of domestic
sectoral policies leading to common prices, a common
budget to finance agricultural and other policies, and
ultimately, a common currency. 
Conventional comparative static economic analyses of
RTA’s focus on terms of trade and on resource alloca-
tion effects and whether there is trade creation or trade
diversion, and hence, whether welfare improves or
declines due to the RTA. Trade-creation and trade
diversion do not refer to the volume of trade pre- and
post-RTA formation. Trade-creating RTA’s are
presumed to increase the welfare of the importing
country of the RTA, while trade-diverting RTA’s are
presumed to reduce the welfare of the importing
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CEEC Accession to the EU:
A General Equilibrium Analysis
Peter S. Liapis and Marinos E.Tsigas
This chapter examines the economic implications of European Union enlargement
on EU members, the United States, and the rest of the world. Our findings include
the following: economic welfare in the enlarged EU may improve, due mainly to
improved terms-of-trade for the Union; extension of the CAP to agricultural
producers in the new member countries may cause a substantial increase in the
CAP budget; further reforms in the CAP may lead to a welfare improvement for
the European Union but they may not reduce substantially transfers to new
member countries; the economy-wide impact for the United States may be positive
and small; agricultural producers in the United States, however, may be hurt.country. Theoretical models with few sectors and/or
countries do not indicate whether an RTA will be
welfare-enhancing for its participants, much less for
the excluded countries. Whether an RTA is welfare-
enhancing depends, in part, on the relative demand and
supply elasticities of the importing country, the cost
structure of member and competing third countries,
and the tariff level before the formation of the RTA.
The presumption, however, is that RTA’s are more
successful the nearer together member countries are,
because transport costs would not dissipate the gains
from trade. Also, successful RTA’s are more likely
among countries with similar levels of factor endow-
ments and development. Both these criteria, especially
physical proximity, bode well for EU expansion. 
The level of development of the EU and the CEEC’s,
however, is quite dissimilar, so the expansion may lead
to welfare losses if trade diversion dominates. For
example, the 1993 GDP of the seven CEEC’s (that is
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) was only 3 percent of
the EU level, while their population was 26 percent,
suggesting low factor productivity. But the CEEC’s are
land-abundant: their total agricultural land area is 38
percent of the agricultural land area in the EU. Their
agricultural and food production technology is labor-
intensive, utilizing more than 22 percent of their labor
force compared with less than 6 percent in the EU.
Agriculture is also a more important sector to the
CEEC’s, contributing 11 percent to their GDP,
compared with 3 percent for the EU.
An additional complicating factor in a theoretical
model-based determination of the welfare effects of
EU enlargement is that it involves not just changes in
border policies, but in domestic policies as well.
Consequently, whether the EU’s eastward enlargement
will be welfare enhancing or not is a question that we
must address with a numerical economic model as we
do below.
One of the key building blocks of the EU has been its
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP is pred-
icated on high domestic prices, protected by high
tariffs and other barriers against third countries, and
facilitated by extensive use of export subsidies to
reduce surplus production stimulated by the artificially
high domestic prices. Member countries of the EU
guarded their agricultural sectors while liberalizing
their manufacturing sectors during multilateral negoti-
ations in the GATT. This approach resulted in a highly
protected and distorted agricultural sector, a sector
where the CEEC’s may have a comparative advantage
and which employs a larger portion of its productive
factors relative to the EU.
Current EU members must balance the financial costs
of eastward enlargement (that is displacement costs to
import-competing sectors and budgetary costs of
carrying out agricultural and structural policies) with
the political insurance of stable democratic neighbors
to the east. The open-ended support provided to agri-
cultural producers in the past resulted in budgetary
problems which, along with pressures from third coun-
tries during the Uruguay Round, finally led the EU to
reform the CAP in 1992. Potential EU expansion and
additional budgetary costs have prompted the EU
Commission to propose further CAP reforms in its
Agenda 2000. One proposal is to further reduce
support prices from the levels attained with the 1992
CAP reform. 
The political impetus for accession is equal, if not
stronger, in the CEEC’s. The policy changes that the
CEEC’s have undergone as they shifted from centrally
planned to market-driven economies have been exten-
sive. Their economies declined substantially during the
transition, as did those of their trading partners,
forcing them to find alternative markets following the
formation of the Newly Independent States and Baltics
(NIS/B). The CEEC’s must continue to undergo
further changes to join the EU and these changes will
have economywide implications. But these countries
see both political and economic gains. Accession to
the EU will anchor their continued drive to democracy,
and even though they will be joining a highly distorted
RTA and they may experience economic losses from
nonoptimal allocation of resources, they view the
potential financial transfers as important contributors
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Plus, accession provides them with the potential for
increased foreign direct investment and an easy entry
into the markets of a large, rich neighbor.
As a prelude to accession and to help solidify the new
democracies, the EU signed Association Agreements,
commonly called Europe Agreements, between 1991
and 1995, with each of the potential CEEC entrants.
The main purpose of these agreements is to promote
closer economic and cultural cooperation.
The EU has announced the timetable for negotiations
with the “fast track”1 CEEC’s. Although the CEEC’s
come to the table without a great deal of negotiating
power, the anticipated high budget costs of EU
enlargement have brought about pressures to further
reform the CAP in conjunction with enlargement. 
For third countries, including the United States, the
concern about EU enlargement is not so much the
potential of losing the CEEC markets because these
countries are very small traders. For example, U.S.
exports to the CEEC’s in 1992 were less than 1
percent of total exports, as was the case for U.S. agri-
cultural exports. Third-country concerns are with their
potential exclusion from trade in the enlarged block,
that is, CEEC’s displacing their exports to the EU, 
and the potential displacement of their exports in 
third markets given the subsidies that the CAP
provides to agriculture. The potential changes in
trading patterns may also have terms-of-trade effects,
which may reallocate resources among sectors in third
countries. However, neither the United States nor other
third countries have much scope to influence the
outcome of the enlargement negotiations. 
Here, we examine the economic implications of EU
enlargement on current and new EU members; its
implications for the CAP budget; the implications of
EU enlargement coupled with CAP reforms; and the
implications of EU enlargement on the U.S. economy
and the rest of the world. We find that: (1) economic
welfare in the expanded EU of 22 countries may
improve by about $1.5 billion, due mainly to improved
terms of trade for the EU; (2) extension of the CAP to
agricultural producers in the new member countries
may cause a substantial increase in the CAP budget
and a substantial net transfer (of about $16.1 billion)
from the current EU members to the new EU
members; (3) further reform in the CAP (e.g., 20-
percent cut in agricultural producer subsidies) may
lead to a substantial welfare improvement for the EU
but may not reduce transfers to new member countries
substantially; (4) the economywide impact for the
United States may be positive, but small (up to $241
million); (5) agricultural producers in the United States
may be hurt (e.g., relative returns to land decline), but
consumers benefit from lower import prices; (6) the
economywide impact for the sum of all other countries
may be negative but small ($103 million); (7) the
Asian and African economies, may be the only ones
hurt by the EU expansion, due mainly to a negative
terms-of-trade impact.
Economic Framework and 
Simulation Design
The implications of CEEC accession are assessed in
the context of an economywide global trade frame-
work that has 8 regions and 16 traded commodities.2
We use the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)
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2Our specification is: the United States; EU-12 (the 12 EU members
prior to the 1995 expansion); EU-3 (Austria, Finland, and Sweden
which joined the EU in 1995); CEEC-7 (Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia); the
Newly Independent States and Baltics (NIS/B); Middle East and
Northern Africa (MEA); Countries of European Free Trade Area
(EFTA); and the rest of the world (ROW). There are four primary
agriculture sectors (wheat, other grains, nongrain crops, and live-
stock), and four processed foods sectors (meat products, dairy
products, other processed food products, and beverages and tobacco).
The rest of the economy is represented with eight sectors (forestry,
pulp and paper; coal; oil; gas; petroleum and coal products; chemi-
cals, rubbers, and plastics; other manufactures; and services).
1Cyprus and five CEEC countries, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, are in this group.model to assess the effects of CEEC accession to the
EU. GTAP is a global trade applied general equilib-
rium framework, which is fully documented in Hertel
(1997). We focus on the effects of accession on the
United States, participating countries, and agriculture
and food industries.
One of the most contentious issues regarding CEEC
accession is its impact on the costs of the CAP. To
consider this issue in our analysis, we modified the
GTAP model by including a budget component. We
determine the budget expenditures required to finance
the CAP given our policy assumptions, and the tax rate
needed to generate the necessary revenue to balance the
budget. Even though most of the EU’s budget revenue
is derived from value-added tax, for computational ease
we impose a tax on income. Our results do not depend
on the method used to generate the revenue. 
Our model is based on 1992 data. The GTAP data have
information on tariffs and export subsidies established
by the Uruguay Round Agreement (URA), and
domestic support rates for 1992 (McDougall, 1997).
For the EU, however, the URA commitments do not
reflect the lower domestic prices resulting from the
1992 reform of the CAP. To reflect the impact of the
CAP reform, we use recent border policies for agricul-
ture in the EU and CEEC-7 (Hertel et al., 1997). Table
1 shows all supply and export subsidies and import
tariffs in our data. These data suggest that the EU
subsidizes agriculture more than the CEEC-7. For
example, while the EU provided about 43 percent
export subsidy to its wheat exporters, the CEEC-7
taxed wheat exports to the tune of about 17 percent.
Support for nonagricultural sectors, however, is higher
in the CEEC-7 than in the EU. For example, while the
EU imposed tariffs of about 7.9 percent on manufac-
tured goods, the CEEC’s imposed a tariff of about 8.6
percent. Supply subsidies in the EU suggest that as a
result of CEEC accession, producer prices in agricul-
ture would increase more than those in manufactures.
This change in relative prices contributes significantly
to our results.
Our CEEC accession simulation consists of: (1)
removing all trade barriers between the 7 CEEC
(CEEC-7) countries in our model and the 15 EU
member countries (EU-15); (2) harmonizing CEEC-7
output subsidies and import protection, with respect to
other countries, with that of the EU-15; and (3) partici-
pation of CEEC-7 in the EU budget. The CAP has some
production-limiting policies such as land set aside for
grains and oilseeds and a milk quota. We do not impose
these policies on the acceding CEEC’s because it is not
clear that the set-aside program will be imposed on the
new entrants, nor is it known what their quotas may be.
Furthermore, our dairy sector includes processed prod-
ucts whose production is not constrained.
To assess the impacts of further CAP reform, we
conduct a second simulation where CEEC accession is
coupled with a 20-percent reduction in producer
support for agricultural commodities in the EU (a
frequently mentioned target).
Simulated Effects of CEEC 
Accession to the EU
Output and Resource Effects
Table 2 shows estimated impacts of CEEC accession
on output supply in percentage change, as well as
1992 values of supply for selected regions. For third
countries, including the United States, the largest
impact of CEEC accession is on their agricultural
sectors. In most cases, supply of agricultural
commodities is reduced, but changes are less than 1
percent. Even in the EU-15, CEEC-7 accession has a
minuscule effect on supplies, especially in nonagricul-
tural sectors. Output changes the most in agricultural
sectors, where supplies fall from 0.5 to 2 percent. But,
for the CEEC-7, accession expands output, especially
in the agricultural sectors. These results are not
surprising, given the relatively large change in CEEC
prices following accession.
An important result is the change in composition of
output between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors
within a country and the shifts in production between
countries. EU enlargement leads to expansion of the
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nonagricultural sectors in third countries, but the 
effects are inconsequential. Following CEEC accession,
nonagricultural output in the EU-15 expands, albeit
moderately. The change in the composition of output in
the CEEC-7, however, is more dramatic. In contrast to
other countries, nonagricultural production declines. At
post-accession relative prices, the CEEC-7 become
more specialized in agricultural production and produce
more of the world’s supply, while more of the nonagri-
cultural products are provided by other regions.
Sectoral allocation of resources does not change very
much in the nonparticipating countries. In the United
States, CEEC-7 accession leads to a slight shift in
resources out of agricultural sectors. In the EU-15,
resources flow out of agriculture as demand for these
factors declines. In the CEEC-7, the large expansion in
agricultural output attracts resources, which are with-
drawn from other sectors in the economy. Relative
returns to land, an indicator of how the agricultural
sector is affected, decline in the United States and the
EU by 1.75 and 3.66 percent, respectively.
Trade Effects
CEEC accession has very little effect on total trade
despite the fact that CEEC-7 imports expand by 30
percent. This relatively large expansion has almost no
impact on total world trade (the volume and value of
total global trade increases less than 1 percent),
because the CEEC-7 countries account for a very
small share of world trade. 
Following CEEC accession, third-country agricultural
exports decline, while nonagricultural exports are
hardly affected. For the United States and ROW, the
fall in agricultural exports, except for dairy products,
is small, but for the NIS/B, the fall in agricultural
exports is more substantial (table 3). These results
suggest that the already shifting trade patterns between
the NIS/B and CEEC’s (following the transition
period) will continue after accession.
The specialization in production that occurs in EU-15
and CEEC-7 is manifested in their exports. As a result
of CEEC accession, the CEEC-7 become more
CEEC Accession to the EU: A General Equilibrium Analysisspecialized in agricultural production and their exports
of these products expand; the EU-15 become more
specialized in manufactures and they expand their
exports of those products (table 3). 
EU enlargement is trade-diverting in agricultural prod-
ucts as EU-15 imports from third countries are
displaced by imports from CEEC-7 (table 4). U.S. agri-
cultural exports to EU-15 decline as a result of
accession, with the largest declines occurring in live-
stock and livestock products—the sectors with the
largest increases in output in CEEC-7. Similarly,
exports to EU-15 from other third countries also
decline, and CEEC-7 exports (except other food prod-
ucts) to EU-15 expand. EU-15 imports of other food
products and nonagricultural goods from third countries
are little affected, but imports of these commodities
from CEEC-7 fall substantially, reflecting the fact that
output of these sectors declines in CEEC-7. 
Following accession, U.S. and other third-country
agricultural exports to the CEEC-7 decline signifi-
cantly, with the exception of wheat (table 5). The fall
in demand for agricultural imports from third countries
is not surprising given the large increases in CEEC-7
output. Import demand for wheat in CEEC-7 expands
mostly to satisfy feed demand of the expanded live-
stock, meat, and dairy sectors. Increased demand for
other food products is also satisfied by increased
imports from all regions, including the United States.
In contrast, expanded demand for manufactures is
satisfied by increasing imports from the United States
and EU-15 at the expense of NIS/B and ROW. In other
grains and nongrains, EU-15 exports to CEEC-7
expand while exports from third countries contract. 
The expanded EU is also a competitor to the United
States in the agricultural markets of third countries. U.S.
agricultural exports to these countries decline while
those from the EU expand. Even in the U.S. import
market, EU exports displace those from other countries.
U.S. imports of agricultural commodities, from all
regions, increase by less than 0.5 percent, except for
other grains, meat, and dairy products, which increase
by 2, 4, and 5 percent as world prices of these products
fall due to expanded subsidized EU exports.
The net effect of CEEC accession on trade is that all
regions, except CEEC-7, have an increase in their
trade balance, that is, the value of exports increases
more than the value of imports. For the United States,
the trade balance increases by $193 million (1992
dollars), for the ROW it increases by $209 million,
while the other regions enjoy small increases in their
trade balance. The largest impact is on the trade
balance of the EU-15 and the CEEC-7. The EU-15
enjoy an increase of $14.7 billion, while the increase
in import demand for nonagricultural products leads to
a decline of $15.2 billion for the CEEC-7.
The overall terms of trade for the United States
improve negligibly as the prices of imported
commodities fall more than the prices of exports. The
terms of trade of the CEEC-7 improve dramatically as
they are now exporting under higher prices to the EU-
15. The terms of trade of the EU-15 decline slightly as
the prices of their imports increase.
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and Welfare 
CEEC-7 accession to the EU results in a substantial
(21-percent) increase in the region’s household
income; household income in EU-15 and the other
regions does not change. Consequently, household
demand in the CEEC-7 expands substantially, espe-
cially in manufactured goods.
The bulk of EU’s budget is devoted to supporting the
CAP through the European Agricultural Guidance and
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and to providing transfers to
disadvantaged member states or regions through the
Structural and Cohesion Funds. Our estimate of EU
budget costs focuses on the EAGGF component but
does not include compensatory payments from the
recent CAP reform. However, many argue that
compensatory payments should not be granted to
CEEC farmers, so excluding these payments may not
do serious damage to estimates of costs. However,
payments from the Structural and Cohesion Funds,
which could be substantial, are also not included.
Allocation of these funds will more than likely be a
political decision (Baldwin et al., 1997), which is
outside the scope of our analysis. In this regard, we
underestimate expenditures. But our budget includes
expenditures on export subsidies as well as subsidies
on domestic production. In this regard, we may be
overestimating budget costs because EU-15 subsidies
for CEEC-7 domestic production may be excluded in
the accession agreement. Hence, it is not clear whether
we overestimate or underestimate budget exposure due
to accession.
Table 6, part A, summarizes the welfare impacts of
CEEC-7 accession to the EU. Budgetary costs seem a
legitimate cause for concern, as CEEC-7 accession
leads to a net transfer of $16.1 billion (1992 dollars)
from the EU-15 to CEEC-7, 35 percent of the EU’s
agricultural budget for that year. The CEEC-7
contribute $3.2 billion to the EU budget, but they
receive $4.2 billion to subsidize their exports and
$15.1 billion to subsidize their domestic producers.
Our results are similar to those generated by Baldwin
and others.
The welfare impact of CEEC accession is positive for
the world as a whole, the CEEC-7, and the United
States; there are welfare losses, however, in the EU-15
and the sum of remaining regions. World welfare,
measured by equivalent variation, increases by $1.6
billion. The United States gains $241 million; other
third countries combined lose about $103 million. In
the United States, lower production and export levels
for subsidized agricultural and food commodities lead
to efficiency gains, which account for the majority of
U.S. welfare gains; there is a positive terms-of-trade
impact, but it is very small. We expect, however, that
the efficiency gains from lower agricultural production
and exports would be actually smaller because of agri-
cultural policy reforms in 1996. The net welfare impact
for the United States would still be positive though. We
confirmed this hypothesis using a simulation without
supply and export subsidies in the United States.
The largest beneficiary of accession is the CEEC-7,
with a welfare gain of $17.7 billion, most of which is
due to the income transfer from the EU-15. The
residual welfare impact, a gain of $1.5 billion, may be
decomposed to: (1) substantial efficiency losses from
resources moving into the highly subsidized food and
agriculture sectors, and (2) a substantial improvement
in its terms of trade, which dominates efficiency losses.
The EU-15 lose $16.1 billion in welfare, most of
which is due to the income transfer to the CEEC-7.
The residual welfare impact, a loss of $76 million,
may be decomposed to: (1) substantial efficiency gains
from resources shifting out of the highly subsidized
agricultural sector to the less subsidized nonagricul-
tural sector, and (2) a substantial deterioration in the
terms of trade of the EU-15, which dominates effi-
ciency gains.
Economic welfare declines by $103 million in all other
regions combined. It is, however, the Asian and
African economies that are hurt by the EU expansion,
due mainly to a negative terms-of-trade impact.
A welfare improvement for the world as a whole from
CEEC-7 accession is mainly due to the agricultural
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Policies are assumed to be those in place in 1992. The
sum of efficiency gains from lower agricultural
production and exports in all other regions is larger
than the efficiency losses in CEEC-7 from higher agri-
cultural production and exports. If we considered
agricultural policy reforms that have taken place in
several countries since 1992, we would expect the
welfare impact for the world as a whole to be smaller,
but still positive.
The results presented above regarding changes in
production and trade do not materially change following
further CAP reform (i.e., reduction of producer support
by 20 percent). But, further CAP reform substantially
improves global welfare (table 6, part B).
Lower prices imposed under this scenario lower CAP
budget costs. Net transfers to the CEEC-7 from the EU-
15 with this scenario are $14.3 billion, almost $2 billion
less than in the previous scenario. In addition, lower EU
prices lead to higher global welfare, up $6.8 billion
compared with $1.6 billion without CAP reform.
In the United States, the new price scheme leads to
larger welfare gains. As in the previous simulation,
efficiency gains, though smaller, result from lower
agricultural production and exports. However,
improvement in the U.S. terms of trade is substantially
larger than in the previous simulation, and this leads to
a larger welfare improvement.
The welfare loss of the EU-15 is $6 billion less than in
the previous simulation. Not only is the income
transfer to the CEEC-7 lower, but the residual welfare
impact is now positive. There are substantial efficiency
gains in the EU-15 due to lower agricultural and food
support, but these efficiency gains are eroded by a
deterioration in its terms of trade.
Even though the CEEC-7 accede to an EU with lower
agricultural support, their welfare gains are reduced
only $1.5 billion from the previous simulation. The
residual welfare impact is greater than in the previous
simulation because, as expected, efficiency losses
under reduced agricultural support are smaller.
Global welfare improves substantially from CEEC-7
accession under a reformed CAP because agricultural
supports are reduced in the EU-15 itself. Relative to
the earlier simulation, in this simulation, larger effi-
ciency gains in EU-15 dominate smaller efficiency
losses in CEEC-7 and smaller efficiency gains in all
other regions.
Conclusions
Our results suggest that the EU enlargement will be
welfare-enhancing for third countries. For the United
States, enlargement means that agricultural exports to
the CEEC’s and EU-15 fall modestly, while nonagri-
cultural exports expand. U.S. agricultural exports to
third countries also decline as exports from the
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the United States is positive, and there are small
welfare gains. U.S. welfare gains are even larger with
further CAP reform.
Our results indicate that CEEC accession is trade-
diverting in agricultural products. Upon accession,
CEEC’s will have a comparative advantage in the agri-
cultural sectors while nonagricultural sectors will
contract. Furthermore, EU enlargement will impose
substantial costs to the EU agricultural budget. In
terms of resource allocation and supply changes, as
expected, we found that all of the adjustment is in the
CEEC-7: its agriculture expands and manufactures
shrink. Accession has a small effect on total trade of
the EU-15 and the CEEC-7. 
Global welfare increases $1.6 billion with EU
enlargement, $6.8 billion with further reform of the
CAP. In this case, efficiency gains from CAP reform
in the EU-15 and reduced transfers to the CEEC lead
to smaller welfare losses for the EU-15, while total
welfare for the CEEC’s is only $1.5 billion less than
in the base scenario.
The results presented are conditional on the modeling
framework and the base year. During 1992, the
economies of the CEEC’s were in transition-induced
decline. The percentage changes in output may be less
dramatic given a more recent base year. Similarly, we
assumed that the agricultural sectors of the CEEC’s
were not constrained by output-reducing policies such
as land set-aside or quotas. If these policies are imposed
on the new entrants, output effects will be mitigated.
However, our results are similar to those in other
studies, suggesting that the limitations are not serious. 
References
Baldwin, Richard E., Joseph F. Francois, and Richard
Portes. “EU enlargement: Small costs for the west,
big gains for the east,” Economic Policy, April. pp.
126-176, 1997.
European Commission. “Agenda 2000: For a stronger
and wider Europe,” Strasbourg/Brussels, Press
release IP/97/660, 16 July, 1997.
Hertel, T. W., editor. Global Trade Analysis: Modeling
and Applications. Cambridge University Press,
1997.
Hertel, T. W., M. Brockmeier, and P. Swaminathan.
“Sectoral and Economywide Analysis of Integrating
Central and East European (CEE) Countries into the
European Union (EU): Implications of Alternative
Strategies,” European Review of Agricultural
Economics, Vol. 24, No. 3/4, 1997.
McDougall, R.A., editor. Global Trade, Assistance, and
Protection: The GTAP 3 Data Base Center for
Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University, 1997.
Economic Research Service/USDA Regional Trade Agreements and U.S. Agriculture/AER-771 U  65
CEEC Accession to the EU: A General Equilibrium AnalysisIntroduction
T
he removal of trade barriers between the United
States, Canada, and Mexico under the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has had
positive but generally small impacts on U.S. agricul-
ture through 1996 (USDA, 1997). More important for
the region’s agriculture than NAFTA are the major
farm program reforms that have been adopted by all
three members of the trade bloc, which have increased
the market orientation of North American agriculture.
Farm program reforms have been driven mostly by
domestic budgetary pressures and broad, economy-
wide changes in members’ economic policies that are
not directly related to NAFTA. To a lesser extent,
NAFTA has also motivated reforms, because free trade
within the region makes some types of farm support
programs costly or ineffective, and creates pressures to
harmonize institutions and regulations. 
Domestic policy changes have had a greater impact on
the region’s agriculture than NAFTA. They also affect
how regional agriculture will respond to NAFTA in the
long term. By strengthening market signals, policy
reforms increase farm producers’ responsiveness to
changing prices due to NAFTA, leading to potentially
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Abstract
Farm Policy Reforms and Harmonization
in the NAFTA
Mary E. Burfisher, Sherman Robinson, and Karen Thierfelder
The NAFTA agreement is being implemented at the same time that the United
States, Canada, and Mexico are adopting major reforms of their domestic farm
support programs. This paper analyzes the interaction between trade and domestic
policy reforms. Domestic policy changes have had a greater impact on the region’s
agriculture than NAFTA. They also affect how regional agriculture will respond to
NAFTA in the long term. By strengthening market signals, policy reforms increase
farm producers’responsiveness to changing prices due to NAFTA, leading to poten-
tially greater specialization and trade, and larger welfare gains than under the former
support programs. New farm programs also result in more trade creation and less
trade diversion due to NAFTA than would have occurred under former programs. In
the United States, NAFTA is expected to increase agricultural production and trade.
Free regional trade effectively limits the ability of NAFTA members to maintain
independent farm programs because the pressures of market arbitrage tend to unify
prices. The recent decoupling of most support by NAFTA members is compatible
with the trade pact. greater specialization and trade, and larger welfare
gains than under the former support programs. New
farm programs will also result in more trade creation
and less trade diversion due to NAFTA than would
have occurred under former programs. NAFTA and
farm program reforms together will result in substan-
tial structural change in the region’s agriculture. It 
is their combined impacts that may account for the
perception that NAFTA has significantly affected the
region’s farm sectors. The regional pact is likely to
contribute to the goals of the upcoming mini-round 
for achieving more open world markets, and more
market-oriented global agriculture. By adopting less
trade-distorting farm programs and liberalizing the
regional agricultural market, the North American
countries are already addressing, and resolving, some
of the issues that will be on the agenda in the
upcoming, multilateral World Trade Organization
(WTO) talks on agriculture. 
NAFTA’s Comprehensive Treatment 
of Agriculture
The NAFTA agreement, essentially three binational
agreements among the United States, Canada, and
Mexico, came into effect on January 1, 1994. It incor-
porates the Canadian-U.S. free-trade agreement
(CUSTA) implemented on January 1, 1989, and adds
binational agreements between the United States and
Mexico, and Canada and Mexico. A small trilateral
component establishes institutional mechanisms for
administering NAFTA and resolving disputes.
NAFTA’s treatment of agriculture is comprehensive
and, with a few exceptions, provides for the eventual
full liberalization of agricultural trade in the region. In
addition to tariffs and quotas, NAFTA addressed
export subsidies, import safeguards, rules of origin,
and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements. 
Between the United States and Canada, tariffs on most
agricultural products were phased out over a 10-year
period, and were completely eliminated by January 1,
1998. As specified in the original CUSTA, NAFTA
allows Canada to permanently maintain restrictions on
imports of dairy, poultry, and eggs from the United
States. These restrictions, originally specified as
quotas, were later redefined as tariff-rate quotas
(TRQ’s) to comply with the rules of the WTO. A TRQ
permits a specified quantity to be imported duty free,
with quantities above that quota to be assessed a tariff
at pre-NAFTA rates. The United States maintains
TRQ’s on imports of sugar, dairy products, and
peanuts from Canada. 
Between the United States and Mexico, NAFTA elimi-
nated all agricultural import quotas and most tariffs.
Remaining tariffs on sensitive products, such as U.S.
imports of wheat, rice, and horticultural crops, were
permitted phase-out periods of 5 to 15 years. For some
commodities, extended protection over the 5- to 15-
year time period is in the form of TRQ’s, in which
over-quota tariffs are gradually reduced over the tran-
sition period. U.S. imports of peanuts, sugar, and
frozen orange juice and Mexican imports of corn,
beans, and dry milk are covered by TRQ’s for the full
15-year period. Special safeguards, or “snap-back”
tariffs, allow specified quantities to be imported at
preferential NAFTA rates, with excess quantities
assessed at tariffs that “snap-back” to the lower of
either the June 1991 most-favored-nation (MFN) rate
or the current MFN rate. For U.S. horticulture, special
safeguards are designed as seasonal TRQ’s. 
In the Canada-Mexico agreement, Canada accorded
Mexico the same treatment as the United States under
CUSTA, including Canada’s continued import protec-
tion on dairy, poultry, and eggs. Mexico specified long
phase-out periods for the same commodities as in the
U.S.-Mexico agreement. As a reciprocal measure,
Mexico permanently retained its import protection
from Canada’s supply-managed commodities—
poultry, dairy, and eggs. 
Export subsidies between the United States and Canada
were banned under CUSTA. Under NAFTA, export
subsidies are permitted if the importing country agrees
to them, or the importer is benefiting from subsidies
from other countries. This treatment has enabled the
United States to continue to extend GSM credit guaran-
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ures be scientifically based, nondiscriminatory and
transparent, and that they restrict trade only minimally.
Farm Program Reforms 
Strengthen Market Signals
Domestic agricultural programs in the NAFTA coun-
tries have undergone fundamental change since 1994.
In general, domestic reforms have both lowered
support levels and “decoupled” payments by making
them independent of farmers’ production decisions or
market conditions. At the same time that these reforms
have made the region’s agriculture more market-
driven, NAFTA has contributed to changes in regional
agricultural market conditions. 
The 1985 Food Security Act, the first large-scale U.S.
farm program reform, reduced target prices, froze
payment yields, and introduced some planting flexi-
bility. Farm legislation in 1990 reduced payment acres
and further increased planting flexibility. In April
1996, the United States adopted the Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act,
which fundamentally changed the U.S. farm support
program. The FAIR Act replaced the longstanding,
crop-linked, deficiency-payments/supply-management
program that covered wheat, rice, feedgrains, and
upland cotton with a program of fully decoupled,
temporary contract payments based on land acreage
enrolled in the former deficiency payments program.
Payments were capped at about $36 billion over
1996-2002, and were scheduled to decline over the 7-
year program. The FAIR Act also eliminated the
Acreage Reduction Program (ARP), gradually elimi-
nated dairy price supports, and modified U.S. peanut
and sugar programs.
Canada’s new generation of farm programs, introduced
in 1991 under the Farm Income Protection Act (FIPA),
mostly affected grains and oilseeds, Canada’s major
export crops. Producer subsidies for grains, provided
mainly as freight subsidies under the Western Grain
Transportation Act (WGTA), were eliminated by August
1995; this support was replaced with two voluntary
revenue insurance programs to which producers and the
Federal and Provincial Governments contribute. The
Gross Revenue Insurance Program (GRIP), available to
grains and oilseed producers, has already been discon-
tinued due to its high costs. The Net Income
Stabilization Account (NISA) extends risk management
support to all grains, oilseeds, and some horticulture.
Canada continues to support poultry, dairy, and eggs
through supply management programs that rely on
production and import quotas to maintain farm prices
at levels based on the costs of production. Because
these programs require trade restrictions, Canada
exempted these sectors from free trade under NAFTA.
Butter and skim milk prices are additionally supported
through marketing board purchases; export subsidies
are financed through producer levies. Direct payments
to dairy producers ended in 1996. 
Mexican agricultural policy reforms began in the late
1980’s. Before that, Mexico supported its agriculture
through subsidized inputs, guaranteed producer prices,
food processing subsidies, retail price controls, and
high import barriers. In 1988, Mexico sharply lowered
tariff protection and converted most import quotas to
tariffs following its accession to the GATT. However,
import licensing remained an important instrument for
price support, particularly for corn, a staple crop
produced by Mexico’s large subsistence farm sector.
In 1991, Mexico began to lower agricultural input
subsidies and to reduce the pervasive role of the
government in purchasing, storing, and distributing
agricultural commodities. Mexico reduced subsidies
to corn and wheat millers and eliminated most retail
food price controls. Guaranteed producer prices and
government purchases were continued only for corn
and beans. 
In anticipation of NAFTA, Mexico adopted the
PROCAMPO program in October 1993. PROCAMPO
is a 15-year, direct payments program that compen-
sates producers for the loss of input subsidies, price
support, and import protection. It was designed to
provide transitional, mostly decoupled income support
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undergo structural change in response to market condi-
tions. Farmers who continue to produce receive annual
PROCAMPO payments based on historical acreage in
nine specified crops. In 1996, Mexico announced the
Alliance for the Countryside (Alianza para el Campo),
a major initiative to improve agricultural productivity
that includes PROCAMPO and other programs. 
Effects of NAFTA and Farm 
Program Reforms 
Model Scenarios
We analyze how farm program reforms and NAFTA
affect regional agriculture using a multi-country,
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the
United States, Canada, and Mexico. The model
focuses on sectoral resource allocation, employment,
production, and trade. It solves for relative prices,
wages, and the real exchange rate that equilibrate
product markets, factor markets, and the balance of
trade among the three countries. The model includes
substantial agricultural detail, including specific
modeling of pre- and post-NAFTA farm programs. The
base year of the model is 1993.
Four scenarios compare the effects of trade and
domestic policy changes (table 1). The first two
scenarios compare the effects of NAFTA under pre-
NAFTA farm programs with the effects of NAFTA
under the decoupled and/or reduced farm support
introduced in all three countries since 1993. In the first
scenario, we implement NAFTA (free trade in all
sectors, with exclusions for some farm products), but
assume pre-NAFTA farm programs remain at 1993
levels of expenditure. In the second scenario, we
assess the effects of NAFTA trade policy liberalization
against a different base, one that assumes that
domestic farm program reforms are already in place, at
1996 levels of expenditure. In the United States, the
domestic reforms eliminate deficiency payments and
introduce decoupled contract payments. In Mexico,
decoupled PROCAMPO payments replace the guaran-
teed price for corn and farm input subsidies. Canada
reduces farm subsidies, increases revenue insurance
payments, and maintains supply-management
programs. These two NAFTA scenarios suggest that
farm program reforms increase the flexibility of
producers to respond to changing prices under
NAFTA. In the new farm-program environment, the
change in the sectoral structure of agriculture is
greater, and welfare gains are larger compared with the
effects of NAFTA under pre-NAFTA farm programs. 
In scenario 3, we analyze the effects of farm program
reforms alone (implemented simultaneously in all
three countries). In the United States and Canada,
domestic farm program reforms are shown to have
much greater effects on agriculture than trade liberal-
ization. In scenario 4, both farm program reforms and
NAFTA are implemented in all three countries. This
scenario shows the combined, long-term effects of
trade and domestic farm policy reforms on North
American agriculture. 
Farm Policy Reforms Magnify 
NAFTA Effects 
In all three countries, NAFTA has a greater effect on
agriculture under the new farm programs than under
pre-NAFTA farm programs. One measure of NAFTA’s
impact is the change in factor employment: the
number of workers, acres of land, and value of capital
stock initially employed in agriculture that must find
new employment, in agriculture or elsewhere, after
changes in agricultural policies. Under both old and
new programs (scenarios l and 2), NAFTA has a
greater impact on Mexican agriculture than on U.S.
and Canadian farm sectors, reflecting Mexico’s greater
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higher pre-NAFTA trade barriers.
In Mexico, employment effects of NAFTA are
substantially greater under the new farm programs
than the old—labor employment changes 1.3 percent
under the old programs and 5.1 percent under the new
(table 2). However, the effects of NAFTA on Mexico’s
land use are slightly lower under the new farm
programs—this is an example of how one country’s
farm program can affect resource allocation in its trade
partner. In scenario 1, free trade exposes Mexican
wheat production to the more heavily subsidized U.S.
production, and Mexican land use devoted to wheat
drops sharply after NAFTA. Under the new farm
programs, U.S. wheat production is lower because
deficiency payments have already been eliminated,
and Mexican wheat production is less affected by
import competition under free trade. 
In the United States, NAFTA results in greater adjust-
ment in land use with the new, decoupled farm
program than with the former farm program. Labor
and capital exhibit negligible differences between the
scenarios. In Canada, labor adjustment to NAFTA is
marginally greater under its new program than under
its pre-NAFTA farm support program (0.6 percent vs.
0.5 percent). 
Why does the extent of agricultural adjustment differ
in the two scenarios? Under Mexico’s former, guaran-
teed price program, producers and consumers faced
fixed prices for corn. Corn millers were compensated
with input subsidies for purchasing corn at the artifi-
cially high, guaranteed price. Likewise, in the United
States, the former deficiency payments programs for
wheat, corn, and other program crops largely insulated
producers from NAFTA effects on their markets. In
these fixed-price sectors, farm output could change
only marginally due to NAFTA, in response to some
of the adjustments in more market-oriented farm
sectors that compete with program crops for land,
labor, and capital. Under the new farm programs
(scenario 2), producers respond to market price
signals, which are affected by NAFTA. In contrast,
Canadian WGTA subsidies were coupled to output, but
Canadian producers still responded at the margin to
changes in relative prices due to market shocks such as
NAFTA. Under Canada’s revenue insurance programs,
which we assume to be a fixed transfer to household
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initial level of output is lower since subsidies have
been removed. 
New Farm Programs See 
Greater Welfare Gains 
The flexibility introduced by farm program reform
leads to larger welfare gains under NAFTA (table 3).
Under decoupled farm programs, resources are more
flexible in moving into sectors that become more
remunerative under free trade, and out of sectors that
face competitive pressures from imports. This flexi-
bility is particularly important for Mexico because it
results in a welfare gain from NAFTA, instead of the
welfare loss that would have occurred under Mexico’s
guaranteed price programs. 
Under both old and new farm programs (scenarios 1
and 2), Mexico’s terms of trade decline because of
NAFTA. One reason is that Mexico’s pre-NAFTA
import barriers were slightly higher than those of its
North American partners, causing Mexico’s imports to
increase more than its exports as those barriers were
lifted. Mexico’s high trade dependency on its North
American partners results in a large increase in import
demand when trade barriers are removed. Some
analysts have cited the expected deterioration in
Mexico’s terms of trade due to NAFTA as an argument
against regional trade agreements (Bhagwati and
Panagariya, 1996). In scenarios 1 and 2, we find that
terms-of-trade losses lead to net welfare losses only if
there are distorting domestic policies in place that
prevent an efficient reallocation of resources in
response to trade reforms. Under Mexico’s new,
decoupled farm programs, NAFTA leads to net welfare
gains. The United States and Canada also achieve
larger welfare gains under NAFTA with reformed farm
programs than under former farm programs. 
Farm program reforms within NAFTA also benefit
nonmembers. In the context of domestic reforms,
NAFTA supports trade creation and minimizes trade
diversion for all three participants. 
Farm Program Reforms Reduce Effects of
NAFTA on Farm Program Costs
Expenditures on farm programs coupled to farm output
are affected by NAFTA (table 4). In scenario 1, we
assume that U.S. deficiency payments for wheat, corn,
feed grains and other program crops remained in place
under NAFTA. Assuming fixed target prices, we
analyze how the deficiency payment costs would have
changed as a result of the effects of NAFTA on market
prices. Under NAFTA, deficiency payment costs
would have declined because of increased demand
from Mexico for crops such as corn and wheat. Total
U.S. farm program costs, including expenditures on
deficiency payments, dairy programs, and other
programs, would have declined by 1.4 percent
(scenario 1). Likewise, Canada would have experi-
enced slight changes in farm program expenditures
under NAFTA. Assuming Canada’s pre-NAFTA
subsidy levels had been maintained, total farm
program costs would have increased 0.1 percent. The
increase is based on increased output of subsidized
crops, and increased export subsidy costs associated
with the dairy price management program. 
In contrast, Mexico’s farm program expenditures
would have increased dramatically following free
trade, if Mexico had maintained its guaranteed price
program (scenario 1). Under this program, the govern-
ment guaranteed a fixed price for domestic corn
production, maintained import quotas (with an esti-
mated tariff equivalent of 83 percent in 1993), and
subsidized corn millers to offset the high cost of
domestic inputs. Faced with cheaper corn imports
from the United States under NAFTA, these subsidy
expenditures would have increased substantially,
raising total farm program expenditures by 126
percent. Such a dramatic increase in program costs
suggests that Mexico needed to restructure its farm
program support in a free trade environment. 
Farm Policy Reforms Have Greater Effect
Than NAFTA on Region’s Agriculture
In the United States and Canada, the effects of farm
program reforms alone (scenario 3) are greater than
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(table 4). For the United States, even large changes in
its agricultural trade with NAFTA partners translate
into relatively small changes in farm output, compared
with the effects of domestic policy reforms—U.S.
agricultural trade is geographically diversified so
North American trade accounts for only a small share
of production. 
For the United States, NAFTA increases agricultural
output, imports, and exports under both old and new
programs. The increases help offset some of the
contractionary pressures that new farm programs intro-
duce in the farm sector. NAFTA and farm policy
reform combined cause a slight (less than 1 percent)
reduction in farm output and relatively small changes
in exports and imports.
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and the new farm programs have significant impacts
on their farm sectors (scenario 4). The combined
effects of both of these shocks may account for the




Although the three NAFTA members significantly
changed their farm programs, some coupled programs
remain, including the U.S. sugar, dairy, and peanut
programs, and Canada’s supply management programs
in dairy, poultry, and eggs. Regional free trade makes
coupled farm programs difficult to sustain, since arbi-
trage within NAFTA can increase the costs of
domestic price supports and export subsidy programs,
or can make them ineffective in raising domestic
prices. Consequently, the remaining coupled programs
have either received special treatment under NAFTA
or have become trade irritants. In some instances,
disputes have led to the successful negotiation of bilat-
eral solutions, while in others, disputes have been
taken outside NAFTA to the WTO. 
Canada’s supply management programs remain viable
because NAFTA permitted Canada to continue to
control imports of dairy, poultry, and eggs from its
NAFTA partners and the rest of the world. While import
controls are permitted (the United States failed to
rescind them in a WTO action), Canada’s dairy export
subsidies have become a trade irritant within NAFTA.
In 1997, the United States brought a complaint against
them in the WTO, and in 1998 requested that the WTO
investigate the dairy support program. 
U.S.-Canadian grain trade has resulted in a number of
trade-related disputes since NAFTA’s inception.
During a dispute about the surge in Canadian wheat
exports into the United States in 1993-94, the United
States expressed concern about the ineffectiveness of
the U.S. Export Enhancement Program in raising U.S.
domestic wheat prices. In the absence of controls over
wheat imports from Canada, U.S. export subsidies
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they succeeded, would increase costs because the
United States would in effect be subsidizing both U.S.
and Canadian wheat exports. The dispute resulted in
the formation of a Canada-U.S. Joint Commission on
grains that recommended greater coordination of
cross-border trade, grading and regulation, infrastruc-
ture, domestic programs, and export programs and
institutions. In early 1998, in response to continued
tension over bilateral grain trade, the two countries
established a pilot program to help U.S. wheat enter
Canada, monitored by the Canadian Grain
Commission. The program, intended to protect
Canadians from the potential introduction of karnal
bunt, responds to U.S. complaints about the difficulty
of selling wheat in Canada. 
The United States has retained import controls over
sugar imports from both Canada and Mexico; the
controls on Mexican sugar will be phased out after
2008. The NAFTA agreement permits Mexico to
export a gradually increasing quantity of its net surplus
production, sugar production minus consumption of
sugar and high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS), to the
United States. This agreement prevents Mexico from
substituting sweeteners for sugar in its domestic
consumption to increase its sugar available for export.
Mexico’s sugar industry has struggled with increased
domestic use of HFCS, much of it imported from the
United States. HFCS imports dampen the domestic
price of sugar, but duty-free exports to the United
States cannot increase. Mexico has begun to subsidize
its sugar exports to non-U.S. markets to support its
domestic price and imposed a tariff on U.S. HFCS
imports. The United States may approach the WTO to
resolve the HFCS conflict with Mexico. 
Despite some important, commodity-specific trade
disputes among the North American partners, they have
also achieved a substantial degree of policy harmoniza-
tion. Under NAFTA, the three countries have reconciled
many divergent standards and regulations. The resolu-
tion of phytosanitary disputes in citrus, for example, is
credited with having had a greater impact on stimulating
U.S. exports of fresh citrus to Mexico than tariff reduc-
tions, and contributed to U.S. acceptance of live hog
and avocado imports from Mexico. Under CUSTA, for
example, Canada and the United States have worked
toward harmonizing beef inspection.
NAFTA and Multilateralism
NAFTA farm policy developments are likely to rein-
force the goals of the 1999 WTO mini-round in
agriculture to increase the transparency of farm policies
and reduce their trade-distorting effects. NAFTA
members have already adopted less trade-distorting
farm programs because of domestic budgetary pres-
sures and a broad public policy shift toward more open
markets and reduced government intervention.
Increased trade within the NAFTA region has pressured
members to resolve remaining conflicts among their
farm support programs and regulations. Some of these
solutions, as for the U.S.-Canadian grain trade, are ad
hoc, while others are a permanent resolution of prob-
lematic trade issues. As a consequence, NAFTA is
already addressing some of the same issues that will be
on the agenda at the 1999 multilateral WTO talks on
agriculture. At the same time, the WTO continues to
serve as a venue for resolving some NAFTA disputes,
indicating that strengthening both the regional and
multilateral processes can be mutually reinforcing.
References
Bhagwati, Jagdish, and Arvind Panagariya.
“Preferential Trading Areas and Multilateralism:
Strangers, Friends, or Foes?” In Jagdish Bhagwati
and Arvind Panagariya, eds. The Economics of
Preferential Trade Agreements. Washington, DC:
American Enterprise Institute, 1996. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service. NAFTA. Report No. WRS-97-2.
Washington, DC, 1997. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service. Provisions of the Federal Agriculture
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996. Agriculture
Information Bulletin No. 729, 1996. 
74 U Regional Trade Agreements and U.S. Agriculture/AER-771 Economic Research Service/USDA
Farm Policy Reforms and Harmonization in the NAFTAAfter NAFTA was enacted between Canada, the
United States, and Mexico, Chile was the first country
to ask for consideration to be included. The U.S. horti-
cultural industry has not voiced any opposition to
Chile’s inclusion. Chilean fruit already enters freely
into U.S. markets. A free trade agreement could open
Chilean markets for U.S. horticultural products, which
now have only limited access.
Chilean noncitrus fruit and U.S. fruit production sched-
ules are complementary. Chilean noncitrus fruit has
shown a growing presence in the U.S. market, espe-
cially during the winter months when tariff rates are at
their lowest due to the lack of direct competition. 
Chile harvests much of its fruit from November
through March, and these winter imports have allowed
the United States to have a year-round supply of fresh
noncitrus fruit. The United States has become a major
market for a number of Chilean products, such as
grapes, cherries, peaches, pears, nectarines, plums,
apricots, avocados, and apple juice. 
As a result of its seasonal advantage, Chile is a major
supplier to the United States of winter fresh fruit and
an important supplier of juices. Fresh and frozen fruit
imports from Chile totaled 504,888 tons and fruit juice
imports totaled 41.8 million gallons in 1996/97. On
average, Chile provides 19 percent of the total volume
of U.S. fresh and frozen fruit imports, with nearly
three quarters arriving between November and March.
Chile does not supply the U.S. market with many
vegetable products. Mexico and other South American
countries provide the bulk of these imports. 
Chilean fruit sales (fresh and processed, including
wine) to the United States more than doubled from
$262.7 million in fiscal 1988/89 to $613.1 million in
1996/97. Despite yearly fluctuations during the 9-year
period, the volume of imports has increased 31 percent
for fresh and frozen fruit, more than tripled for fruit
juices (353 percent), and increased more than 15 times
for wine (1,462 percent). 
U.S. trade disputes with other countries and periods of
bad weather have helped expand the U.S. market for
Chilean fruit. The U.S. anti-dumping action against
New Zealand’s kiwifruit exporters, which began in
1992, resulted in Chile’s share of U.S. kiwifruit
imports increasing from 5 percent in 1988/89 to 74
percent in 1996/97, making Chile the largest foreign
supplier for the United States. 
In addition, Chile has been a major supplier of
avocados to the U.S. market. While Mexico is the
world’s largest avocado producer, 66 percent of U.S.
fresh avocado imports come from Chile. Phytosanitary
restrictions have kept Mexican fresh avocados from
entering the United States since 1914. Beginning in
July 1993, Mexican shipments were allowed into
Alaska, and in November 1997 to 19 Northeastern and
Midwestern States during the winter months. Chilean
avocado exporters now face increased competition
from Mexico with the partial lifting of this ban. 
Increases in Chilean imports due to bad weather in the
United States are, by nature, temporary. Increased
shipment of Chilean oranges maintained U.S. fresh-
orange supplies when a hard freeze in California in
December 1990 reduced the 1990/91 U.S. crop 40
percent from the previous season. A similar situation
with the U.S. avocado crop in 1989/90 largely
accounted for the sharp rise in Chilean avocado
imports that year. 
U.S. exports of fruits and vegetables to Chile have
been minimal. Despite having grown more than 20-
fold in the past 9 years, U.S. fresh fruit exports to
Chile totaled only 297 tons in fiscal year 1996/97.
Fruit juice exports increased from 1,230 gallons in
1988/89 to 386,603 gallons in 1996/97. The United
States had a horticultural trade deficit of $622 million
with Chile in fiscal 1996/97. 
Until mid-1997, Chile maintained phytosanitary trade
restrictions that effectively limited U.S. fresh fruit
exports into its country. In preparation for the talks to
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Appendix 3
Chile Entering NAFTA:
Implications for U.S. Horticultural Trade
Susan Pollack and Agnes Perezenter NAFTA, however, Chile lifted certain bans.
Beginning in November 1997, it has allowed five
California-produced fruits—table grapes, kiwifruit,
oranges, grapefruit, and lemons—to be imported.
Chile still limits access to most other fresh fruit from
the United States.
Because of the present disparity in horticultural trade
between the United States and Chile, U.S. horticultural
products would most likely benefit from a free trade
agreement. Because of its small population, Chile
would remain a small market for U.S. horticultural
products, but could still provide some marketing
opportunities for fresh U.S. summer and fall fruit
producers. If Chile would further open its markets,
U.S. growers could sell stone fruit—peaches, plums,
nectarines, cherries—as well as apples to Chile during
its winter months. Chilean consumers could benefit
from year-round availability. 
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Introduction
F
oreign direct investment (FDI) has become a more
visible topic because of its rapid growth in the last
two decades. Among members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
who account for most of the world’s FDI and trade,
FDI outflows increased by five times whereas trade
grew by three times from 1981 to 1996 (fig. 1). Yet
nations have developed far more comprehensive agree-
ments for trade than for FDI. Initially there was the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
which had a global focus. Then several groups of
countries developed separate regional agreements such
as the European Union (EU) and the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Although trade-
oriented, these RTA’s can affect the pattern and
volume of FDI as well.
Here, I examine why firms pursue FDI in certain
countries and explore the relationship between FDI
and RTA’s. Researchers have focused on the determi-
nants of FDI, but few have studied what effects RTA’s
may have on FDI. I first examine the determinants of
FDI for manufacturing industries and for agricultural
industries specifically. I then explore how RTA’s affect
these determinants.
Abstract
Regional Trade Agreements and Foreign
Direct Investment
Thomas Worth
This paper reviews previous research on why firms pursue foreign direct investment
(FDI) in certain countries and explores the relationship between FDI and regional
trade agreements (RTA’s). Researchers have focused on the determinants of FDI,
but few have studied what effects RTA’s may have on FDI. The first part of this
paper examines the determinants of FDI for manufacturing industries in general and
for the agricultural industries specifically. The second part of the paper explores
how RTA’s affect the determinants of FDI. Some important theoretical reasons why
a firm might choose to invest in a foreign country are to avoid paying tariffs, to take
advantage of lower factor prices, and to better serve a foreign market. Empirical
studies on the locational determinants of FDI generally conclude that the last reason
is most important. Most FDI migrates to countries with a high per-capita GDP (or
high growth rate of GDP) and a large market size. The single greatest influence
RTA’s have on FDI is through their effects on market size and on GDP. RTA’s,
through trade liberalization, combine fragmented markets into a single large one
and they generally increase the growth rate of member countries’GDP.Determinants of FDI
The interaction of regional trade agreements and
foreign direct investment became a concern in the
1960’s with the formation of the European Economic
Community (EC). More recently, with the formation of
the European Union (EU) and the 1992 Single Market
initiative, this concern has re-emerged. Still, very few
studies have specifically addressed the interaction of
RTA’s and FDI. Researchers, however, have been
studying the determinants of FDI since the early
1960’s. Lessons learned from these studies can shed
some light on how RTA’s affect FDI. 
Determinants of FDI for
Manufacturing Industries—
Theoretical Studies
All firms must decide where best to locate their
production. There are several theories on how firms
make this decision. Ultimately, firms are seeking to
maximize their profits, whether by investing abroad or
expanding domestic production and exports. The
earliest theories explain FDI as capital seeking its
highest return. Therefore, capital should flow from
developed, capital-abundant countries to less-devel-
oped countries (LDC’s) where capital is scarce and
should earn a higher return. However, the capital-
abundant United States has greater FDI flows to
developed countries than to LDC’s (fig. 2). This is the
case with other developed countries as well.
Explanations of why FDI takes place between devel-
oped countries focus both on firm characteristics and on
industry characteristics. Each theory explains a motiva-
tion for FDI, but none is able to explain all instances of
FDI. By grouping many theories into an “eclectic para-
digm” composed of three groups (ownership
advantages, internalization advantages, and locational
influences), a useful framework emerges. Many empir-
ical studies are based on the eclectic paradigm.
Theories in the first group, “ownership advantages,”
posit that a firm will invest abroad only if it possesses
some kind of advantage over its foreign competitors.
Usually, this advantage is an intangible asset such as a
well-recognized brand name or a superior technology.
The advantage must be substantial enough to over-
come the additional costs of operating in an unfamiliar
foreign country.
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Figure 1
Trade volume and FDI flow, OECD countries
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Source: "International Direct Investment Yearbook" OECD, various years.
Figure 2
FDI outflows from the U.S.
Billion$Another group of theories focuses on “internalization
advantages.” These theories address the question of
why firms engage in FDI rather than licensing or in
some way providing their intangible assets for foreign-
owned firms to use. One reason a firm may pursue
FDI is to increase the firm’s market power, allowing it
to earn a higher return. Foreign direct investment may
also be the least expensive way to safeguard intangible
assets. For example by keeping direct control of a
foreign producer, the firm is better able to ensure the
quality of its foreign production and thus protect the
reputation of its brand name. It is also easier for the
firm to prevent technological advantages from leaking
to foreign competitors.
The last group of theories, referred to as “locational
influences,” tring to explain why FDI flows to a
particular country rather than another, or not at all.
One theory is that FDI is “tariff jumping”: firms may
find it cheaper to produce their output in a foreign
country rather than to export their domestic production
and pay a tariff. Other factors that may influence the
destination of FDI are market size, factor prices, and
cultural similarity.
RTA’s affect locational influences but do not generally
affect ownership or internalization advantages. One of
the few theories developed about RTA’s and FDI
predicts that an RTA should increase FDI into the inte-
grated area as firms seek to take advantage of an
expanded market now able to support projects with
larger fixed costs. This occurs even if the integration
involves lowering internal barriers without increasing
external barriers. In other words, an increase in FDI is
not necessarily due to tariff jumping. This might
explain the surge in the early 1990’s of FDI into the
EU, which has generally lowered internal barriers
without increasing external barriers.
Blomström and Kokko (1997) provide a heuristic, but
more comprehensive, analysis of how RTA’s affect
investment. First, they separate the effects of RTA’s
along two dimensions; the indirect effects on FDI
through trade liberalization, and the direct effects from
changes in investment rules connected with the RTA.
Trade liberalization has two opposing effects on FDI.
Lowering intraregional tariffs can lead to an expanded
market and an increase in FDI. But, lowering external
tariffs can reduce FDI to the region if tariff-jumping
investments are scaled back in favor of exports.
The effect of an RTA will vary by industry and
country. Those industries with direct investments
based on ownership or internalization advantages have
less incentive to change their level of investment in
response to a change in external tariffs than do indus-
tries engaged in tariff jumping investments. Countries
with the strongest locational advantages will receive
most of the FDI oriented toward serving the regional
market. Countries with weak locational advantages
will see little change in their level of incoming FDI as
a result of the RTA. In fact, they may experience FDI
outflows as firms relocate production to the most
competitive country in the regional agreement.
RTA’s may have provisions explicitly protecting and
facilitating FDI, such as a national treatment standard
for foreign investments or a guarantee against expro-
priation of those investments by the foreign
government. To the extent that the provisions improve
the investment climate, FDI will increase. Even if the
change in investment policy is not large, the effect
may be large because the change is negotiated in the
context of an RTA, giving it a credibility that it other-
wise would not have.
Blomström and Kokko predict that the effect of an
RTA depends on two factors—the attractiveness of a
country as a site for FDI and the magnitude of that
country’s liberalization of trade and investment poli-
cies. For instance, a country with strong locational
advantages undergoing a significant liberalization of
trade and investment in an RTA will see the largest
increase in FDI. What this framework does not tell us
is how significant the liberalization of policies needs
to be to affect FDI. Nor does it tell us which locational
advantages are most important for attracting FDI. At
this point the issue becomes an empirical one.
Economic Research Service/USDA Regional Trade Agreements and U.S. Agriculture/AER-771 U  79
Regional Trade Agreements and Foreign Direct InvestmentDeterminants of FDI for
Manufacturing Industries—
Empirical Studies
Studies on the locational determinants of FDI flows in
the manufacturing industries generally arrive at similar
conclusions. The most influential locational advan-
tages for outflows of FDI from the United States are
per capita GDP, the growth rate of GDP, and market
size. This fits with the general observation that most
FDI flows to developed countries. FDI not bound for
developed countries goes to the few LDC’s with large
markets and high growth rates such as China, Mexico,
and Malaysia.
Factor prices appear to play a secondary role in deter-
mining the destination of FDI. Lower capital costs (in
the form of lower interest rates) attract FDI. Lower
labor costs also attract FDI but to a lesser extent. This
is likely due to the fact that manufacturing industries
tend to be capital-intensive. Labor claims a smaller
share of total costs than does capital.
The fact that market size has a greater influence on
FDI flows than do factor prices suggests that most FDI
in the manufacturing industries is market-seeking. It is
oriented toward serving local or regional markets
rather than using a country as an inexpensive produc-
tion site for exports to other parts of the world.
Trade barriers do not seem to significantly influence
FDI from the United States. Studies either find a
weakly positive effect or no effect at all. By contrast,
Japanese FDI appears to be sensitive to trade barriers
or the threat of trade barriers. One study reports that
Japanese firms are more pessimistic about protec-
tionism than are U.S. firms. When asked about the EU,
66 percent of Japanese companies surveyed expected
the EU to strengthen its external trade barriers. Only
44 percent of U.S. companies had the same expecta-
tion. This is likely due the to fact that Japanese
exporters have faced more source-specific trade
barriers, such as voluntary export restraints of automo-
biles, than have U.S. exporters. Although Japanese
companies are more concerned about protectionism in
the EU than are U.S. companies, that concern is not
central to their decision to invest. In a separate survey,
most Japanese firms did not cite trade barriers as a
major reason for not investing in the EU. 
Determinants of FDI for 
Agricultural Industries
FDI in the agricultural industries (processed foods and
related products) claimed 6 percent of total U.S. FDI in
the manufacturing industries in 1996. Agricultural FDI
follows patterns similar to other manufacturing indus-
tries. The agricultural industries are capital-intensive
and undertake FDI (rather than licensing) to maintain
quality, protect a trademark, and take advantage of
economies of scale. Most U.S. FDI flows in the food
and agricultural industries are bound for Europe.
As with manufacturing, per capita GDP, growth rate of
GDP, and market size are the major determinants for
FDI in the agricultural industries. The costs of labor
and capital inputs are less important. This suggests that
agricultural FDI is undertaken to serve a market rather
than to create a platform for exports.
The effect of trade barriers and FDI in agricultural
industries is unclear. Several studies do not find a
consistent effect of trade barriers on agricultural FDI.
One study suggests that trade barriers may lead to
more FDI through indirect means. An increase in
protection appears to increase the sales of foreign affil-
iates, which may eventually lead to an increase in FDI.
Another factor influencing agricultural FDI is “cultural
distance.” FDI tends to go to countries with a similar
language or system of laws. This is similar to the
behavior of other manufacturing industries in that they
agglomerate in countries where previous FDI and trade
has been highest. A strong level of intellectual prop-
erty protection appears to encourage FDI as well.
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The most significant RTA to U.S. agricultural indus-
tries is the EU. The majority of agricultural FDI is
bound for the EU. FDI into the EU has increased
dramatically with the formation of the EU in 1992,
with most of it (78 percent) coming from the United
States and Japan.
The EU has attracted FDI because its trade liberaliza-
tion policies enhanced GDP growth and expanded
market size. The EU transformed a group of fragmented
markets into a single integrated market, and its size is
still growing with the recent addition of several coun-
tries and more on the horizon. The formation of a
common market is expected to add 5 percent to the
average growth rate of the EU member countries for the
next several years. Several studies find that membership
in the EU is a positive factor in attracting FDI.
The effects of regional integration are not uniform
across the region. RTA members with stronger loca-
tional advantages than others attract most of the FDI.
In the case of the EU, Britain is the most common
destination for FDI from the United States. Britain’s
chief advantages, versus other EU members, are a
large home market, cultural similarities, low factor
costs, and U.S. firms’ extensive experience there from
earlier investments.
Another effect of the EU is a change in the structure of
FDI across the integrated region. Some U.S. food
companies have reduced the number of production
plants in Europe while the total value of their
European assets has grown. This indicates that the
firms are consolidating their production into a smaller
number of sites, presumably to take advantage of
economies of scale.
It is unlikely that trade barriers, or the threat of trade
barriers, has played a significant role in the recent
surge of U.S. FDI into the EU. The “1992” Single
Market initiative has centralized a fragmented system
of trade barriers. EU members are not as free to make
unilateral restrictions on imports from nonmember
countries as before.
The effect of NAFTA on FDI appear minor for the
United States, Canada, and Mexico. Canada and the
United States had liberal trade and investment regimes
before NAFTA. Mexico had restrictive trade and
investment policies, but many of those restrictions
were relaxed in advance of NAFTA in 1989. 
The reduction of Mexico’s trade and investment
restrictions in 1989 led to a tripling of the U.S. invest-
ment position in Mexico from $4.9 billion in 1989 to
$15.2 billion in 1993. Just like the EU, prospects for a
high rate of GDP growth in Mexico attracted U.S.
FDI. This was especially true for agricultural FDI,
which is primarily market-seeking. Unlike the EU,
Mexico started out with restrictive investment policies
and then relaxed them. This certainly played a major
role in attracting U.S. FDI.
Even though Mexico relaxed its investment restrictions
in 1989, there were still concerns. In a 1991 survey, 25
percent of firms in the U.S. food industry felt that
Mexico’s intellectual property protections were too
weak for them to transfer their newest or most effec-
tive technology to Mexico. NAFTA is intended to allay
those and other investment concerns. Since the enact-
ment of NAFTA in 1994, however, U.S. FDI into
Mexico has grown very little. This is partly due to
Mexico’s currency devaluation in 1995 and low rate of
growth. Some studies point out that U.S. firms had
already made their investments in advance of NAFTA
when Mexico unilaterally relaxed its investment and
trade provisions. One study estimates that U.S. agri-
cultural FDI into Mexico is 0.91 percent higher in
1996 than it would have been without NAFTA.
Since the enactment of NAFTA, FDI into Mexico from
other countries has increased even though U.S. FDI has
remained flat. This indicates that the investment policy
changes, not market growth, attracted non-U.S. FDI.
One explanation is that Mexico’s inclusion in NAFTA
gave its recently liberalized investment and trade regime
greater credibility in the eyes of foreign investors.
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comprehensive than the EU and NAFTA.
MERCOSUR—which consists of Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay—began liberalizing trade in
1991 and established a customs union in 1995. It
provides for free trade between the member countries,
but several significant industries are excluded. Unlike
the EU and NAFTA, some external barriers to trade
increased with the adoption of the RTA. The effect of
MERCOSUR on FDI appears to be small. FDI to
Argentina increased dramatically after 1991, but a
majority of the increase was due to the privatization of
public enterprises. Brazil did not experience an
increase in FDI until 1994 when it implemented
macroeconomic reforms. FDI to Paraguay and
Uruguay has been lagging. MERCOSUR in its present
form will have only a small impact on future FDI to
the region.
AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) is unique in that
large increases in FDI and trade in the region have led
to the agreement instead of the other way around. By
2003, tariffs will be down to 0-5 percent for the
“included” industries. The “excluded” industries, a
majority, are exempt from the tariff cuts. Although far
from comprehensive, AFTA is projected to signifi-
cantly boost GDP growth in the region. To the extent
the AFTA increases GDP growth, FDI flows into the
region will be enhanced as well.
AFTA does not significantly change the investment
policies of its member countries. Despite this, FDI
flows into the region have increased dramatically in
the last 5 years. This supports earlier findings that
market size and growth are the most important factors
influencing FDI.
Conclusion
RTA’s can affect FDI both directly through investment
provisions and indirectly through trade liberalization.
The evidence so far suggests that it is the changes in
per capita GDP, GDP growth, and market size—factors
influenced by trade liberalization—that most affect the
flow of FDI into a region. This applies to both agricul-
tural and nonagricultural industries. The degree to
which a trade agreement affects these factors will
determine the extent to which it affects FDI.
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Regional Trade Agreements and Foreign Direct InvestmentU.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in global food
processing industries reached $32 billion in 1995
(table 1). Over 75 percent is in the EU, NAFTA, and
MERCOSUR, the world’s major trading areas served
by regional trade agreements (RTA’s). This box
describes the growth in FDI since 1980, the growth in
FDI in the top EU countries, the product mix in FDI,
and how U.S. FDI in the Western Hemisphere interacts
with U.S. trade in processed foods.
U.S. foreign direct investment in the global processed
food industry nearly quadrupled from 1980 to 1995
(table 1). U.S. FDI to the EU food industry surged in
the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. U.S. FDI to the
MERCOSUR and NAFTA food industries grew in the
early 1990’s, but from a lower base. Nearly 41 percent
of the investment stock in 1995 was in the EU, a
declining share from 1990. About 25 percent was in
NAFTA and 11 percent was in MERCOSUR, signifi-
cantly higher than in 1990.
Membership in an RTA does not necessarily bring
FDI. FDI to RTA’s is often concentrated in a few coun-
tries. More than half of the U.S. FDI in the EU (15)
processed food industry is in the UK, France, and
Germany (table 2). Canada received 63 percent of U.S.
FDI in NAFTA, and Brazil received 62 percent of U.S.
FDI in MERCOSUR.
The European Union is the largest free trade area, and
has grown in membership since its inception in 1957.
The UK, Ireland, and Denmark were the first additions
to the original EC-6, followed by Greece. The next
additions were Spain and Portugal. The most recent
round brought a reunified Germany, Sweden, Finland,
and Austria. Growth patterns of U.S. foreign direct
investment show that only Spain and Ireland appear to
have attracted FDI upon joining the EU. Reunification
of Germany may have enhanced U.S. FDI to Germany’s
processed food industry, but EU charter member France
had an influx of FDI in the same period as Germany.
The type of investment has also shifted. In earlier
decades, most U.S. FDI was in export products from
the host countries or in processing such as flour mills
or vegetable oil refineries. Processing investment
continues in the 1990’s, but increased investment is
geared to production of bakery products, beverages,
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Appendix 4
U.S. Foreign Direct Investment 
in the Global Processed Food Industries
H. Christine Bollingand other more highly processed consumer products
for use in the host country (table 3).
U.S. FDI and Trade in 
Processed Foods
Is U.S. FDI a substitute or complement for U.S. trade
in processed food products? Both U.S. exports of
processed foods and sales from U.S. affiliates have
increased since the 1980’s, with global sales exceeding
U.S. processed food exports. The choice between trade
and FDI is product-specific and depends on many
factors (table 4). If trade and FDI are indeed substi-
tutes, there would be polarity; products with large
exports would have hardly any FDI and, products with
considerable FDI would rarely be exported. The pairing
of FDI and trade among Western Hemisphere countries
(Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina) with known
U.S. FDI shows that the pairing is not so clearcut. 
For many large exports between the United States and
Canada/Mexico, trade and FDI are complementary.
U.S. exports to Canada indicate that many heavily
traded products (U.S. exports greater than $100
million), such as chocolate and vegetable products, are
used as intermediate products in the host country. U.S.
poultry product, U.S. vegetable oil, corn milling, and
dairy product exports are also used as intermediate
products for further processing in Mexico. Meat and
seafood products are unique. Multinational companies
also decide that a specific product will be produced in
a particular plant, leading to specialization in produc-
tion lines between the United States and Canada. 
U.S. affiliates are often the source of major ($100
million) import products, such as fruit juices and
chocolate products from Brazil. On the other hand,
many products from U.S. affiliates generate little or no
trade ($50 million) because of high transportation
costs, high tariffs, or import bans. Dairy and poultry
products often have high trade barriers. Flour milling
and other cereal products are most economically
produced close to the consumer. These products lend
themselves to FDI. 
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C
oncurrent with the development of the GATT
multilateral trading system, there has been been a
significant increase in the number of regional trading
blocks. Over the period 1947-94, 109 regional trading
agreements (RTA’s) were reported to the GATT, nearly
equal to the number of countries that are contracting
parties (CP’s) to the multilateral trade treaty.1 Since
1995, at least 16 new RTA’s have been reported to the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor body
to the GATT. Nearly all WTO members are parties to
at least one RTA—European RTA’s account for the
majority of these agreements, while Japan and Hong
Kong are not members of any formal RTA’s.2
Is the proliferation of RTA’s, especially over the last
10-15 years, an indication that countries are turning to
regional initiatives to achieve world trade liberaliza-
tion? Or are RTA’s actually an impediment to this
process? To answer these questions, this article exam-
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Abstract
Agriculture, GATT, and Regional Trade
Agreements
Sharon Sheffield
Concurrent with the development of the GATT/WTO multilateral trading system,
there has been a significant increase in the number of regional trading blocs.
Nearly all WTO members are parties to at least one RTA, which raises the ques-
tion: Is the proliferation of RTA’s an indication that countries are turning to
regional initiatives to achieve trade liberalization, or do RTA’s actually impede this
process? Concerning agriculture, both the GATT and RTA’s have only recently
begun to more fully liberalize trade, and further progress in this area is needed.
Instead of asking whether RTA’s inhibit or facilitate world trade liberalization, it
might be useful to consider other ways (such as strengthening WTO rules on RTA’s
and compliance mechanisms) to ensure that RTA’s are trade creating, not diverting.
1Since the GATT is technically a treaty, its signatories are referred
to as contracting parties. The World Trade Organization, on the
other hand, is an organization to which the contracting parties to
the GATT became members in 1995. Therefore, in reference to the
GATT, countries are referred to as Contracting Parties, while when
discussing the WTO, they are designated as members.
2Both belong to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum
(APEC). Since it is not a formal RTA, it has not been reported to
the WTO. However, it is included in this study since its signatories
have indicated their intent to liberalize trade within the region in
the next century.ines the coexistence of RTA’s and the GATT—
specifically, how the GATT treats RTA’s under Article
XXIV and how Article XXIV has been applied. GATT
and RTA provisions on agriculture are compared to
examine how (or if) either approach has liberalized
agricultural trade. Finally, the larger question of
whether RTA’s are stumbling blocks or building blocks
to trade liberalization is addressed.
What Does the GATT Say About
Regional Trade Agreements?
When the GATT was being developed, the contracting
parties envisioned the need for rules to regulate
regional trade. Although such agreements are preferen-
tial in nature and represent an exception to the GATT
cornerstone of most-favored nation (MFN) treatment,
countries were tolerant (even supportive) of RTA’s
since they were viewed as leading to increased trade
and therefore a more efficient allocation of resources.3
The political realities of post-war Europe and plans for
greater European integration were also factors behind
the general acceptance of RTA’s. At the same time,
there was an attempt to fashion the provisions for
RTA’s in very precise legal language in order to
prevent complete circumvention of GATT rules.
Despite this intent, the language contained in the
GATT on the formation of customs unions (CU’s) and
free trade agreements (FTA’s) turned out to be
ambiguous, and most FTA’s and CU’s are not fully
consistent with provisions of the GATT.
Article XXIV of the GATT contains the primary provi-
sions covering CU’s, FTA’s, and interim trade
agreements (ITA’s)4, and is based on three primary
criteria: (1) trade barriers must not increase from
levels prior to the formation of a CU or FTA
(XXIV:5), (2) all internal trade barriers (including
quantitative restrictions) must be eliminated (XXIV:8),
and (3) all CU’s, FTA’s, and ITA’s must be reported to
the GATT to determine if conditions (1) and (2) are
met, and to allow CP’s to provide input (XXIV:7). The
latter is achieved through the formation of a working
party on regional trade, in which any interested
country can participate.5
Although the provisions of Article XXIV seem
obvious and clear cut, their ambiguity is revealed in
their application. For example, XXIV:5 is unclear as to
whether the concept of “trade barriers” applies to indi-
vidual tariff lines (or to a specific trade measure) or to
the tariff schedule as a whole (calculated, for example,
on a trade-weighted average). Moreover, it is not clear
if this provision refers to applied rates or to bound
rates, both of which are contained in a country’s
schedule of commitments. 
Second, XXIV:8 requires the elimination of all internal
barriers6 on “substantially all trade.” The purpose of
this provision is to prevent countries from setting up
preferential trade arrangements that exempt less
import-competitive sectors, and to facilitate the trade-
creation effect of the RTA. However, no consensus has
been achieved as to what constitutes “substantially all
trade”—is it qualitative (sectoral) or quantitative
(share of intra-member trade covered) or both? Most
RTA’s have excluded, at least initially, some sensitive
sectors. 
Concerning ITA’s, XXIV:5(c) requires a plan and
schedule for the formation of a CU or FTA “within a
reasonable amount of time.” Again it is unclear what
constitutes a reasonable amount of time for implemen-
tation. XXIV:7(b) contains language that enables the
CP’s to review this plan and schedule, to determine
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3Viner’s (1950) work on trade creation/diversion questioned this
assumption.
4An interim trade agreement refers to an interim agreement that is
necessary for the formation of a CU or FTA.
5Since 1996, the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements
reviews all notifications relating to RTA’s.
6Except where permitted under Article XI—general elimination of
quantitative restrictions; Article XII—balance of payments; Article
XIII—administration of quantitative restrictions; Article XIV—
exceptions to non-discrimination; Article XV—exchange
arrangements; and XX—general exceptions. whether or not the formation of the CU/FTA is
feasible, and to make recommendations on its imple-
mentation. The parties intending to create a CU/FTA
cannot proceed without taking these recommendations
into account. However, in many cases, the working
parties were unable to complete their examination of
the ITA before the CU or FTA was enacted, thereby
reducing the efficacy of this provision.
Another factor contributing to the perceived weakness
of Article XXIV is that most CU’s and FTA’s do not
fully meet its criteria. Hoekman and Kostecki (1995)
point out that a political decision was made early on
not to examine the formation of the European
Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 too closely,
since the six countries making up the EEC had threat-
ened to withdraw from the GATT if the EEC was
found not to be in conformity with Article XXIV
(some countries felt the formation of the EEC raised
trade barriers). As the EEC did not fully meet the
criteria of Article XXIV, a precedent was set for other
RTA’s. In fact, since the formation of the EEC in 1957,
almost no GATT working party on regional trade
agreements has resulted in unanimous agreement that
Article XXIV criteria were met.7
With the proliferation of RTA’s during the 1980’s and
1990’s and the problems with application of Article
XXIV cited above, the GATT CP’s recognized the
need to clarify Article XXIV’s criteria. The result was
the “Understanding on the Interpretation of Article
XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994” (“Understanding” for short), drafted during the
Uruguay Round (UR) of negotiations. The
Understanding reiterates that, to be consistent with
Article XXIV, all CU’s, FTA’s, and ITA’s must satisfy,
among others, the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6
(compensation for tariff increases due to the formation
of a CU), 7, and 8 of that Article. 
It also outlines how the evaluation of trade barriers
before and after the creation of a CU (as contained in
paragraph 5(a)) should be conducted. First, tariffs and
related charges will be compared “based upon an
overall assessment of weighted average tariff rates and
of customs duties collected.” The WTO Secretariat is
instructed to compute trade-weighted average tariff
rates, using data on applied (not bound) tariff rates
provided by CU members for a “previous representative
period.” The definition of a “previous representative
period” is left open for interpretation. Also concerning
paragraph 5, the Understanding states that the “reason-
able amount of time” mentioned in point (c) should
“exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases.” 
One area that the Understanding does not address is
the definition of “substantially all trade.” In the
preamble, members recognize that the gains from
greater integration are reduced if “any major sector of
trade is excluded” from the elimination of internal
trade barriers, but there is no further clarification of
how to determine if this requirement has been met.
Agriculture and RTA’s
Although the GATT requires that CU’s and FTA’s
remove trade barriers on internal trade, the “hole” (to
use Hoekman and Leidy’s terminology) opened by the
phrase “substantially all trade” has allowed many
RTA’s to exclude agriculture from total liberalization
(or use a staged reduction in trade barriers).8 The
primary exceptions to this are the EU, the Australia-
New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER)
Agreement, and the Baltic FTA between Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania, all of which currently have no
internal agricultural trade barriers. 
Although RTA’s have taken different approaches to
reducing barriers to agricultural trade, nearly all main-
tain some degree of protection, especially for sensitive
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7As of January 1995, only 6 RTA’s have been found to be
compliant with Article XXIV by unanimous agreement of the
working party. Of these 6, only 2 are presumed to still be in opera-
tion (Czech-Slovak CU and the Caribbean Community and
Common Market).
8It should be noted, of course, that the GATT itself contains many
holes as far as agriculture is concerned.products (table 1). The EU and EFTA FTA’s with other
countries (and each other) generally exclude trade in
most agricultural products from complete liberaliza-
tion, and market access opportunities in the EU and
EFTA markets are limited through the use of tariff-rate
quotas and other mechanisms. The CEE FTA’s
(CEFTA, Czech-Slovak CU) are moving in the direc-
tion of removing internal barriers on agricultural trade,
although not as quickly as originally envisioned.
RTA’s in the Western Hemisphere have made greater
progress in removing internal agricultural trade
barriers, although it should be noted that some of these
barriers were removed only after implementation. The
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
instantly removed tariffs on a number of agricultural
products, and uses a staged reduction and eventual
elimination of many of the remaining trade barriers.
Most tariffs on agricultural trade between the United
States and Canada expired on January 1, 1998 (as
contained in the earlier Canada-U.S. FTA), while
Mexico has a longer transition period (15 years
maximum) to phase out most of its trade barriers with
the United States and Canada. The Southern Common
Market (MERCOSUR) has removed nearly all intra-
regional tariffs, and the only agricultural product
exempt from complete liberalization is sugar.
Road to World Agricultural Trade
Liberalization Paved by RTA’s or
Multilateral Agreements?
Do RTA’s in fact result in freer agricultural trade? In
other words, have RTA’s gone further than multilateral
trade negotiations (MTN’s) in liberalizing agricultural
trade? A related and more general question can also be
asked: Are RTA’s a path or an impediment to multilat-
eral trade liberalization?
To answer the first question, it is necessary to compare
the path RTA’s and MTN’s have taken in liberalizing
agricultural trade. The earliest RTA’s, such as the EEC
and EFTA (and the FTA’s between them), did little to
liberalize world agricultural trade. While it is true that
the EEC removed all internal barriers to agricultural
trade, it also raised external barriers and is generally
viewed as trade diverting for agricultural products (see
studies by Vollrath; Liapis and Tsigas; and Leetmaa,
Jones, and Seeley in this report). EFTA excludes most
intra-trade in agricultural products from complete
liberalization.
At the same time, the GATT from its inception has
treated agriculture differently from most other sectors,
by allowing the use of quantitative restrictions and
trade-distorting subsidies. Moreover, the first three
negotiating rounds (1949, 1951, 1956) after the
GATT’s creation did little to liberalize agricultural
trade. On the other hand, the formation of the EEC in
1957 turned out to be a major setback for MTN’s on
agriculture, as the EEC proved to be a main impedi-
ment to greater liberalization in the Dillon (1961-62)
and Kennedy (1964-67) rounds. While other CP’s may
have been less than enthusiastic about bringing agri-
culture fully under GATT disciplines, nevertheless, the
EEC was a formidable opponent to agricultural trade
liberalization.
Agricultural trade liberalization was relatively limited
until recently, both in terms of regional and multilat-
eral trade initiatives. The Uruguay Round of MTN’s
(1986-94) was the first multilateral breakthrough in
bringing agricultural trade under the same GATT disci-
plines faced by other sectors. The Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture prohibits the use of
nontariff barriers (with a few exceptions), reduces
tariff levels, and disciplines trade-distorting domestic
and export subsidies. New negotiations to continue the
reform process are scheduled for 1999-2000. 
Most RTA’s formed in the last 10 years have included
agriculture in the removal of internal trade barriers, or
have made progress in reducing or prohibiting the
introduction of new trade barriers. Agricultural trade
between the United States and Canada reached a high
degree of liberalization in 1998, with the removal of all
tariffs. MERCOSUR has removed all internal agricul-
tural barriers (with the exception of sugar), and its
common external tariff results in a lower rate of protec-
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APEC, an informal regional trade initiative, has set the
year 2010 (2020 for developing countries) as a goal for
complete trade liberalization. One reason for the
greater degree of coverage of agricultural products in
recent RTA’s (compared with earlier ones) is that these
agreements provided a way for like-minded countries
to pursue more rapid agricultural trade liberalization at
a time when multilateral trade talks (Uruguay Round)
were foundering during the late 1980’s.
Given the almost concurrent progress made at both the
regional and multilateral level, it is difficult to say if
RTA’s have gone further than MTN’s in agricultural
trade liberalization. While recent RTA’s have gone
further than earlier ones in reducing trade barriers, it
took MTN’s to bring one of the largest RTA’s, the EU,
under stricter discipline. And, as Hoekman and Leidy
point out, the same factors that block (or stimulate)
trade liberalization in MTN’s can also be strong in
RTA’s (see appendix on U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area
Agreement). It is not coincidental that the agricultural
and food products with the highest rates of protection
in WTO members’ schedules of commitments are the
same products excluded from complete liberalization
in most RTA’s.
The second question, “are RTA’s a path (building
blocks) or an impediment (stumbling blocks) to multi-
lateral trade liberalization,” is best addressed by
examining the relative merits of regional and multilat-
eral trade approaches that have been debated in the
literature. Although the issue of regionalism versus
multilateralism is discussed in very general terms, it
should be clear that the analysis pertains as much to
agricultural trade as it does to trade in other sectors.
One perspective, put forth by Jagdish Bhagwati
(1991), among others, it that RTA’s are a dangerous
development in the world trading system and a distrac-
tion from the goal of multilateral trade liberalization.
Bhagwati sees RTA’s as purely preferential agree-
ments, which lower trade opportunities for third
countries and are generally trade diverting. Moreover,
he cites evidence from political economy studies that
suggests strong motives for producer groups to push
for RTA’s. Winters (1996) has echoed this concern,
writing that multilateral trade liberalization could stall
if producers get what they want from RTA’s (trade
diversion makes bad economics, but good politics).
On the other hand, Bergsten (1997) and others have
argued that RTA’s benefit multilateral trade liberaliza-
tion. One reason for this, Bergsten believes, is that
RTA’s put pressure on other countries to liberalize.
Blackhurst and Henderson (1993) have written that
regional integration brings benefits through lower
transaction costs, larger markets, and therefore more
effective competition, which provides an incentive for
greater integration/liberalization. The empirical work
in this study appears to support this observation, as
the U.S. agricultural sector benefits from inclusion in
trade agreements but is less well off when remaining
outside regional integration. Since countries have an
incentive to join RTA’s, the results increasingly
become multilateral.
Others point out that RTA’s and the GATT multilateral
system can be mutually beneficial. For example, some
RTA’s are based on WTO/GATT mechanisms and
provisions, which help to solidify GATT trade rules.
On the other hand, RTA’s have enabled countries to
move more quickly to reform their trade regimes (for
example, RTA’s were out in front in liberalizing
government procurement and trade in services),
leading to multilateral liberalization in those areas. The
challenge, as several observers have noted, is how to
move from the regional level of liberalization to the
multilateral forum (“switching to the multilateral horse
once the race begins,” as Winters put it), and at the
same time, ensure that RTA’s do not harm nonmem-
bers through trade diversion.
While both sides of the “building/stumbling block”
argument make valid points, a third approach, which
takes a pragmatic look at the experience of RTA’s and
the GATT, is also helpful to consider. Blackhurst and
Henderson have posited that RTA’s are neither inher-
ently good nor bad, but that the effect of RTA’s on the
world economy depends on the motive in forming it,
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(are trade barriers removed?, are other countries able
to join?). Most economists would probably agree that
an RTA open to any interested country and that fully
dismantles trade barriers (in the vein of the “open
regionalism” of APEC) is a step forward in trade liber-
alization, and preferable to an RTA that makes
membership to outside countries difficult, retains
internal trade barriers, and is based primarily on polit-
ical considerations, which would likely lead to a
retaliatory response from nonmembers.
Following this line of thought, some observers of
RTA’s and trade liberalization have turned their atten-
tion to identifying ways to make RTA’s less trade
distorting, as well as factors that inhibit true liberaliza-
tion in either the regional or multilateral context. One
approach is to examine Article XXIV not only in terms
of its provisions on RTA’s, but to consider ways to
make compliance with those provisions more likely. 
While the UR Understanding provided some clarifica-
tion of how XXIV:5 (tariff levels on the whole cannot
increase after formation of an RTA) should be applied,
some economists feel that looking at pre- and post-
RTA tariff levels is the wrong indicator, since trade
diversion is still possible even if tariffs are reduced.
McMillan (1993) and others have proposed using trade
levels as a better indicator of whether or not trade
diversion occurs because of an RTA. However,
Hoekman and Leidy point out that looking at trade
data alone makes it difficult to determine causality,
and have suggested that policy-based indicators should
also be examined. Other proposals to strengthen
Article XXIV criteria include requiring an open acces-
sion clause that would minimize the possibility of
trade diversion and the “hub and spoke” effect of
multiple RTA’s (for example, the web of agreements
between the EU, EFTA, and the Central and East
European countries), and the use of the lowest pre-CU
tariff rate as the common external tariff (a proposal of
Bhagwati’s).
Second, and equally as important (if not more so), is
the issue of compliance with WTO/GATT rules (not
only Article XXIV, but more recent agreements such
as on agriculture, technical barriers to trade, sanitary
and phytosanitary measures, and rules of origin).
While none of the RTA’s reported to the GATT
was unanimously accepted as fully compliant with
Article XXIV, none was found to be in violation, and
there have been very few disputes brought to the
WTO/GATT based on Article XXIV noncompliance.9
As pointed out earlier, some have attributed this weak-
ness in application to the political decision made not to
hold the EEC too strongly to Article XXIV rules.
However, without any credible threat of surveillance
and possible sanction, an RTA has little incentive to
comply with Article XXIV. 
The Understanding addresses the need for greater
emphasis on the notification and review process,
which if implemented, could lead to greater pressure
for RTA’s to comply. So far, the WTO Committee on
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), which was
formed in 1996, has devoted much of its time to devel-
oping a systematic approach to RTA notification and
reviews, as well as identifying areas where greater
clarification is required.10 At the same time, the CRTA
has also had to examine a backlog of new or existing
RTA’s reported since the formation of the WTO. It is
too early to say if the CRTA will be able to play the
kind of watchdog/surveillance role identified above,
given the amount of work and the difficulty in
addressing these issues (many of which are very
contentious); however, it appears that the Committee is
moving in the right direction.
92 U Regional Trade Agreements and U.S. Agriculture/AER-771 Economic Research Service/USDA
Agriculture, GATT, and Regional Trade Agreements
9Only three cases have involved Article XXIV noncompliance, all
involving the EU as the respondent and relating to preferential
agricultural trade arrangements with developing countries. In all
three cases, adoption of the panel results was blocked by the EU
and its trading partners (the disputes took place before the WTO
dispute resolution mechanism was developed).
10Issues identified in WT/REG/W/12 include: differences in WTO
regulatory framework for CU’s and FTA’s, overlapping dispute
settlement systems, legal implications of overlapping membership
in RTA’s, enlargement of CU’s, notification under the Enabling
Clause, definition of the term “substantially all trade,” and assess-
ment of RTA’s in which one or more members does not belong to
the WTO.As the empirical evidence presented by other studies
in this report demonstrates, RTA’s are not necessarily
the trade-diverting “poxes” on the world trading
system that Bhagwati has described, and can be
building blocks to greater liberalization. However,
these results also support Blackhurst and Henderson’s
contention that the terms of the RTA’s formation and
how it changes over time are important determinants
of whether or not it will be trade creating or diverting.
As a result, it may make sense to move beyond the
“building/stumbling block” paradigm to look at ways
in which GATT rules on RTA’s and compliance with
those rules can be strengthened to ensure that RTA’s
are more likely to create trade rather than to divert it. 
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Table 1—Selected reciprocal RTA’s and agricultural provisions
RTA  Created Current Members  Agricultural provisions 
Europe
European Union (EU) 1957 (EEC-6) Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,  No internal trade barriers. Common
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,  Agriculture Policy (unified trade 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, policy and support) 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom
European Free Trade  1960  Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Agriculture is excluded from removal of
Association (EFTA)  Liechtenstein  internal trade barriers 
Central European Free  1992 Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Scheduled to fully liberalize agricultural 
Trade Area (CEFTA)  Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania trade in 1998, postponed until 2000
Czech-Slovak  1993 Czech Republic and Slovakia Existing agricultural trade barriers not
Customs Union completely removed, but new barriers
cannot be introduced
EU-EFTA FTA’s 1973 Bilateral FTA’s between EU Trade concessions on agriculture were
and individual EFTA members  negotiated on product-by-product basis;
EFTA adopted EU sanitary and 
phytosanitary regulations
EU-CEE Association  1992 EU and Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Separate protocol for agriculture: 5-year
(“Europe”) Agreements Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, phase-in for most concessions, limited to
Czech Republic, Slovakia tariff decreases and quota increases.
Trade in some products, such as grains, 
is not liberalized 
EFTA-CEE FTA’s 1993 EFTA and Hungary, Poland, Romania, 10-year transition period for elimination
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia of tariffs and quantity restrictions (QRs)
on products covered by the agreement
(processed agricultural products)
Baltic FTA 1996 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania Internal agricultural trade was liberalized 
on January 1, 1997
Baltic FTA’s with 1992, 1993 Bilateral FTA’s between Norway and Processed agricultural products are 
Norway, Switzerland and Switzerland with Estonia, included, unprocessed agricultural 
Latvia, and Lithuania  products are covered in a separated 
bilateral arrangement
EFTA FTAs with  1992 (Turkey)  EFTA and Turkey: FTA by 2002 
Israel and Turkey 1993 (Israel) includes processed agricultural products
and fish products; in both cases, bilateral
arrangements for agricultural trade with 
EFTA members apply 
Western Hemisphere
Southern Common  1991 Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay Nearly all intra-regional tariffs removed,
Market (MERCOSUR) only agricultural product exempt from
liberalization is sugar. Established
common external tariff, ranging from 
0-20 percent for agricultural products 
(avg. 10 percent)—generally lower 
than previous tariff levels
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Table 1—Selected reciprocal RTA’s and agricultural provisions--continued
RTA  Created Current Members  Agricultural provisions 
Western Hemisphere
U.S.-Israel FTA 1985 U.S., Israel Agriculture is covered, but Israel 
was granted the right to protect 
infant industries, particularly in 
agriculture. 1996 Agreement 
designed to further liberalize ag.
trade particularly U.S. products 
facing nontariff barriers 
North American Free  1994 Canada, Mexico, United States Agricultural trade treated bilaterally:
Trade Agreement  (CUSTA—
(NAFTA) 1988) Most agricultural tariffs between Canada
and U.S. eliminated by Jan. 1, 1998
(as contained in the Canada-U.S. FTA);
restrictions on sensitive products remain 
(grains, meat, eggs, sugar containing 
products, fruits and vegetables);
agreement not to use export subsidies 
in bilateral trade and not to increase 
or introduce new tariffs
15-year phase-out of all tariffs, 
quotas, and licenses that are barriers
to U.S.-Mexican agricultural trade
15-year phase out of tariffs, quotas,
and licenses for most Canadian-
Mexican agricultural trade
All 3 countries agreed to use their 
WTO schedules to discipline domestic 
support and export subsidies 
Asia
Closer Economic  1983  Australia and New Zealand Free trade in agricultural products
Relations (CER) 
Agreement 
Association of  1991 Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,  Transition to FTA with common external
Southeast Asian  Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, tariff  planned by 2003. Since 1994,
Nations Free Trade  Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar  coverage includes agricultural products
Area (AFTA)
Multi-Regional
Asia-Pacific  1989 Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile,  Goal of free trade in agricultural products
Economic Cooperation  China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan,  by 2010 for developed economies 
Forum (APEC)  Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua  and 2020 for developing economies
New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, 
United States; Peru, Russia, and 
Vietnam became members in 1997
Agriculture, GATT, and Regional Trade AgreementsIn 1985, Israel became the first country to sign a bilat-
eral Free Trade Area Agreement (Agreement) with the
United States. Israel, isolated from regional trade by
the Arab boycott, sought to integrate itself into the
global economy in an effort to overcome the limita-
tions of its small domestic market. U.S. interest in the
Agreement was sparked by a readiness to further trade
relations in general, and by the awareness that the
EEC-Israel free trade agreement of 1975 had been
partially responsible for a reduction in U.S. merchan-
dise and agricultural exports to Israel.
The U.S.-Israel Agreement’s principal goal was the
elimination of all duties on trade between the two
countries. The Agreement applied not only to tariffs
but also to licenses, subsidies, and other trade restric-
tive measures for both agricultural and industrial
products. While the agreement phased out tariffs on
nonagricultural products, eliminating all duties by
January 1, 1995, Article VI of the agreement permitted
each country to maintain nontariff barriers for the
protection of sensitive, domestically produced, agricul-
tural products. Israel maintained levies and fees on a
wide range of agricultural products and placed quotas
and bans on others. 
The Agreement is a dynamic document and under
regular scrutiny. It provides a consultative mechanism
between the parties and in 1996, the United States and
Israel agreed on a 5-year program of gradual and steady
liberalization of Israel’s market for food and agricultural
products. One objective of the 1996 Agreement on Food
and Agriculture (AFA) was to provide for immediate
access for all U.S. farm products, which was to have
been achieved by January 1, 1995 under the 1985
Agreement. However, this was not achieved, as
nontariff barriers (NTB’s) and technical barriers to trade
continue to hamper U.S. access to the Israeli market. On
the other hand, the reduction in duties and setting of
tariff-rate quotas (TRQ’s) for nearly 100 products has
helped increase certain U.S. exports such as frozen fruit
and breakfast cereals to Israel.
In addition to its GATT multilateral trade commit-
ments and its agreement with the United States and the
European Union (EU), Israel also has trade agreements
with Canada, Turkey, Slovakia, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, European Free Trade Association states, and
Jordan. With respect to all other countries, Israel
substituted steep tariffs for NTB’s and is now reducing
these tariffs. Israel’s import liberalization program and
new trade agreements have diluted U.S. advantages
under the bilateral Agreement. 
U.S. Agricultural Trade with Israel
In the 5 years prior to the Agreement (1980-84),
Israel’s total agricultural imports averaged $827
million; and in the 5 years following (1986-90), $965
million per year. The U.S. share of Israel’s agricultural
imports averaged 38 percent in the 5 years prior to the
agreement and dropped to 29 percent in the following
5 years. The EEC share rose from 29 percent to 42
percent. Bulk commodities dominate U.S. agricultural
exports to Israel, with 93 percent of the total value
prior to the agreement and 87 percent in the following
5-year period. 
U.S. agricultural imports from Israel have historically
been relatively low, averaging $55 million in the 5
years prior to the Agreement and $80 million in the 5
years following. This represents 0.3 percent of total
U.S. agricultural imports and about 6 percent of
Israel’s agricultural exports. Two-thirds of total U.S.
agricultural imports from Israel are consumer-oriented
goods such as dairy products, biscuits, and wafers,
which grew 44 percent following the Agreement,
while horticultural imports from Israel doubled. The
data show that trade growth has not been reciprocal
but rather that the Agreement benefitted Israel more. 
Motives for the Agreement 
On Food and Agriculture 
The substantial nontariff barriers on agriculture in
Israel led to the 1996 Agreement on Food and
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Appendix 5
U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement
Michael Kurtzig and Daniel PickAgriculture. In addition, the 1996 AFA was negotiated
in an effort to reconcile the inconsistencies between the
1985 Agreement and the global trade rules that resulted
from the Uruguay Round of the GATT. The Uruguay
Round and Israel’s membership in the newly formed
WTO required the Government to transform into tariffs
all administrative or nontariff barriers to trade; these
had been allowed by the U.S.-Israel Agreement. 
Many products that were banned or subject to small
quotas are now covered by TRQ’s or tariffs under the
1996 AFA. The AFA is comprehensive and provides
for immediate and meaningful access for U.S. farm
products. The AFA categorizes products as: (1) those
free from duty or other restrictions, (2) those imported
duty-free within a specified TRQ, and (3) those subject
to preferential tariff treatment. The AFA reduced duties
and established TRQ’s for nearly 100 U.S. products
and allowed the free entry of many U.S. products. The
AFA is to last for 5 years, at which time the two
governments commit to seek further improvements. 
Obstacles to free trade between the United States and
Israel remain, however, including national treatment,
weights and measures, kashrut (Kosher) certification,
and violation of Article 6 of the 1985 Agreement
regarding products not produced domestically. In
1994, Israel established the Israeli Kosher Meat Import
Law prohibiting all imports of non-kosher meat. The
ban is administered in violation of both the 1985
Agreement and WTO’s “national treatment” provisions
(Article 8 of the 1985 Agreement and GATT article
III) as non-kosher meat is already produced and sold
in Israel. The 1997 Trade Estimates Report for Israel
estimates that once the kosher certification problem is
resolved and U.S. slaughterhouses meet the veterinary
requirements imposed by Israel’s religious authorities,
the potential market for U.S. beef and beef products
could be $25-$100 million annually. In early 1998,
however, the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) approved an
amendment to the basic law—Freedom of
Occupation—that makes the current ban on imports of
nonkosher meat permanent. In this case, neither the
1985 Agreement nor the 1996 AFA was of any help in
lifting this nontariff barrier. 
Israel’s labeling and standard weights requirement has
been a persistent problem for the United States. Israel
requires that many household products be sold in fixed
package sizes (e.g., 200, 400, or 500 grams) using
metric weights and measures. This requirement effec-
tively precludes exports of many U.S. products, as
does the lack of an English translation for certain regu-
lations and Israeli standards of certification. In the
1994 Trade Policy Review of Israel done by the
GATT, Canada, which also has a free trade agreement
with Israel, raised similar issues of packaging,
marking, and labeling as obstacles to their trade with
Israel. Such trade barriers hurt U.S. exports of impor-
tant value-added products—in particular, prepared
vegetables, fruits, and pasta. However, in mid-1998,
Israel undertook to cancel all weights and measures
standards on food, which is expected to take effect
later in the year. However, until that happens, pack-
aging and labeling standards will continue to prevent
the importation of a broad range of U.S. foods, with a
potential value of $20-$40 million. These imports are
not expected to detract from domestic producers’
market share; they are likely to shift the source of
supply from the EU to the United States.
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n 1988, the United States and Japan signed an
agreement to phase out Japan’s quota system for
beef imports. Since 1991, Japan’s beef trade has been
limited only by Japan’s sanitary barriers and ad
valorem tariffs. The 1988 agreement culminated a
series of negotiations about Japan’s beef imports and
defused what had been a major source of trade friction.
The size and value of Japan’s beef imports as well as
the length and intensity of the negotiations make this a
leading example of bilateral problem-solving in agri-
cultural trade. This article examines the nature,
benefits, and costs of the negotiations and examines
the relationship of this bilateral case to multilateral
negotiations. While the costs of attaining the beef
agreements were high, the benefits in terms of
improved agricultural trade performance for the United
States seem to be considerable. Rather than being a
strategy in competition with multinational negotia-
tions, the U.S.-Japan beef negotiations should be
viewed as a successful outgrowth of and complement
to the multilateral trade framework of the GATT.
Japan’s Beef Market
Japan’s cattle had been primarily used as draft animals
until the 1950’s and 1960’s when field cultivation
shifted to motor power. But Japan’s field cultivation
farm community retained the Japanese draft breed—
Wagyu—as a beef animal, and many of Japan’s small
farmers kept 1 or 2 cattle to market for slaughter.
Grain feeding, introduced about 1960, allowed cattle
fattening to proceed beyond the bounds of Japan’s own
feed sources, which are quite limited because of the
lack of pasture and feedgrain crops. Wagyu meat
marbles well, with fat tissue interspersed in the muscle
so that the meat is very tender. Grain feeding to
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U.S.-Japan Agreements on Beef Imports:
A Case of Successful 
Bilateral Negotiations
John Dyck
Over more than 20 years, successive rounds of bilateral negotiations between 
the United States and Japan opened the Japanese market to beef imports. These
negotiations were grounded in the GATT rules and linked in important ways to
simultaneous multilateral trade negotiations. U.S. beef trade with Japan flourished
in the aftermath of the U.S.-Japan beef agreements. The United States maintained
its large share of a growing market as managed trade under the quota system was
replaced by free trade. The agreements opened a beef market now worth over $1
billion in exports each year to the U.S. industry, and should be viewed as a major
success for bilateral negotiations within the multilateral GATT framework.
Abstractachieve a high degree of marbling quickly became so
intensive that Wagyu meat was raised with a much
longer fattening period than in other parts of the
world. At the same time, milk consumption was rising
fast in Japan, leading to the development of a large
dairy herd based on Holstein animals. Beef from
Wagyu animals was supplemented by beef from the
steers and unbred heifers of the dairy herd, which were
also intensively fattened. 
Japanese consumption of beef grew quickly from a very
small base, beginning in the 1960’s. The Government
retained control over beef imports, and beef prices in
Japan became quite high by international standards
because supply was limited to the high-cost domestic
production. Beef was regarded as a luxury commodity.
Japan’s Trade Rules
After acceding to the GATT in 1955, Japan blocked
the entry of many products under the “balance of
payments” clause (Article XI) of the GATT. When
Japan disinvoked this justification in 1963, it kept its
quota on beef imports as one of the “residual import
restrictions” no longer clearly permissible under the
GATT. The Government originally administered
import quotas primarily to orchestrate beef prices in
the Japanese market. The Livestock Industry
Promotion Corporation (LIPC), a government-owned
corporation established in 1961, promoted orderly
growth in Japan’s livestock product markets, moni-
toring price bands for meats and intervening in the
market when prices became too high or too low. The
LIPC had important trade functions, administering
Japan’s variable levy on pork imports and acting as the
principal importing agent for beef. 
Japan has long been completely free of foot-and-mouth
disease, a viral disease that affects cattle and swine. To
avoid possible infection from meat imports, Japan
imposes a ban on imports of fresh, chilled, and frozen
beef from countries where the disease may be present.
In the 1960’s, 1970’s, and 1980’s, this limited its
imports to the small number of areas that were foot-and-
mouth free. Thus, the opportunities offered by Japan’s
beef imports—and the destabilizing effect of bans or
disruptions of the imports—were shared by essentially
three supplying countries: the United States, Australia,
and New Zealand.
Imports grew in the early 1970’s (fig. 1). However,
when cattle raisers’ feed costs soared as part of the
global feed crisis of 1973-74, the LIPC imported no
beef at all for almost a year in 1974-75, fearing that
Japanese producers’ returns would be squeezed
between high feed costs and beef prices that would be
lower if imported beef also had to clear the market.
The ban meant that foreign beef producers suddenly
were deprived of an important market.
Challenges by Exporting Countries
According to Coyle (1983), “in the late sixties and
early seventies, the import quotas on beef and citrus
were high on the U.S. list of items requiring ‘prompt
and favorable’ action by Japan.” In 1975, after
resuming quota imports, Japan announced a system of
annual amounts to be imported from the exporting
regions of Oceania and North America. This regional
allocation of what had been a global quota disturbed
100 U Regional Trade Agreements and U.S. Agriculture/AER-771 Economic Research Service/USDA
U.S.-Japan Agreements on Beef Imports: A Case of Successful Bilateral Negotiations











Japan's beef imports, 1960-97
(excludes imports outside quota categories)
1,000 tons
Actual imports are Jan-Dec., carcass weight equivalent (USDA)
Quota levels are April/March, shipped weight divided by .7 (ABARE)exporting countries, especially when Japan cut in half
a previously announced quota amount for Australian
origin in 1976. 
Negotiations with both the U.S. and Australian
Governments resulted in expansion of certain cate-
gories of the quota in 1976 and 1977. The U.S. pressed
for larger amounts under the quota for hotel use, and
for a quota for “high-quality” beef, which was defined
as grain-fed beef. A 1-year interim agreement in 1977
was followed in 1978 by a more comprehensive, 4-
year agreement under the auspices of the Tokyo Round
of multilateral negotiations under the GATT. The basis
of this agreement was achieved as part of the Strauss-
Ushiba understanding (between the United States
Special Trade Representative and Japan’s Minister for
External Economic Affairs) that settled a number of
outstanding issues between the United States and
Japan in the Tokyo Round. 
The 1978 agreement defined annual, global quotas for
each Japanese fiscal year, 1979-82. Although the total
quota for 1979 was little higher than the actual imports
for 1973 (the year with the highest imports until then),
and total quota growth over the 1979-82 period was
only 500 tons, the 1978 agreement provided a guar-
antee of minimum annual imports, ending the risk to
exporters of unilateral reduction or cessation of the
trade by Japan. In addition, the United States secured a
commitment that a rising portion of the quota would
be filled only by high-quality beef.
Because the U.S., Australian, and New Zealand
commercial beef sectors compete with each other for
the Japanese market, it is easy to imagine a scenario of
diplomatic competition by the exporting countries’
governments to negotiate the biggest possible piece of
the pie for their exporters. Japan showed an early pref-
erence for explicit geographic quotas: so much for
Australia, so much for the United States, etc. But the
exporting countries sharply rejected this approach. In
these and later negotiations, the U.S. and Australian
Governments realized a common interest in expanding
general access to Japan’s market. However, they chose
to negotiate separately with Japan, while exchanging
information frequently. 
When the 1978 agreement lapsed (at the beginning of
1983), a new agreement was difficult to reach. After
nearly 2 years of discussions, the U.S. and Japan
agreed in 1984 in the Beef-Citrus Understanding of that
year that the beef import quotas for 1984-87 would
expand the high-quality portion by 6,900 tons per year .
Later in 1984, a bilateral agreement between Australia
and Japan expanded the total quota by 9,000 tons per
year for the same years. The Australian-negotiated
increase in the total quota was not in addition to the
U.S. increase, so that much of the 9,000-ton increase
was to be made up of high-quality beef. The 1984
agreement also dealt with citrus imports (including
negotiating an end to grapefruit juice quotas).
The 1984 U.S.-Japan agreement committed Japan to
“introduce a new measure¼to facilitate consultations
between foreign suppliers and Japanese users.” This
led to the establishment of a subquota for the
Simultaneous-Buy-Sell (SBS) system, which allowed
direct negotiations between purchasers and sellers, so
that companies could negotiate the size, quality, price,
and timing of a purchase. This represented a consider-
able relaxation of the quota rules from the tender
system employed by the LIPC in the rest of the quota,
which could not easily accommodate immediate agree-
ment between a specific user and a specific seller
about a beef shipment. The SBS system was open to
imports from all origins.
By 1984, there was a certain pattern to the revision of
Japan’s beef import rules. Although there was some
domestic pressure for greater importation of beef, the
dominant pressure for liberalization came from the
Governments of the United States and Australia. Prior
to both the 1978 and 1984 agreements, negotiations
were described at the time as intense, stretched over 2
years, and were not in place until over a year after the
previous agreement expired. The United States, in both
cases, secured concessions primarily for high-quality
beef, which is the U.S. specialty. Australia worked for
increases in the total quota. In both cases, these agree-
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ments were realized in negotiations by the U.S.
Special Trade Representative (Strauss in 1978, Brock
in 1984) in the context of widespread tension about
Japan’s trade with its number-one export destination,
the United States. Both agreements were for 4 years,
and operated primarily through the state trading
regime of the LIPC.
1988 Beef-Citrus Agreement
As the 1984 agreement reached its end in 1987,
interest in Japan’s agricultural import markets,
including the beef market, was high. The surge in the
value of the yen after 1985 sharpened the disparity
between costs of food inside the protected Japanese
market and in the rest of the world. Japan’s burgeoning
exports of nonagricultural goods led to very large
current account surpluses with the United States, and
to calls from the U.S. side for Japan to allow greater
agricultural imports in order to lessen the trade imbal-
ance. Within Japan, the Keidanren, an organization
speaking for major Japanese businesses, called for
greater agricultural liberalization. The Japanese
Government appointed high-level committees of advi-
sors, chaired by Haruo Maekawa, which issued reports
in 1986 and 1987 calling for freer access to agricul-
tural imports, among other policy recommendations.
The Forum for Policy Innovation, a group of scholars
interested in agriculture, openly advocated ending
Japan’s quantitative restrictions as early as 1978.
While popular and political support for maintaining
Japan’s agricultural import barriers precluded unilat-
eral liberalization by Japan, the argument that such
barriers were burdensome to the economy as a whole
was heard widely within Japan in the late 1980’s.
Pressure from outside Japan was particularly strong in
1987 and 1988. The United States had pursued a case
against Japan through the GATT since 1983, calling
for Japan to give up its quotas on 12 categories of
agricultural imports, including processed beef (but not
chilled and frozen beef). By 1987, a GATT panel had
ruled informally against Japan, which sought to block
the formal adoption of the panel’s report. This failed
and, in February 1988, the GATT formally decided
that Japan should remove import quotas on 10 of the
12 categories. The ruling showed how vulnerable other
Japanese quantitative restrictions, devised before the
disinvokation of the balance-of-payments justification,
were to international rejection. 
After the expiration on March 31, 1988, of the 1984
agreement, bilateral negotiations on the level of Japan’s
import regime were difficult. The United States,
Australia, and New Zealand complained to the GATT
that Japan’s restrictions on beef imports were unfair
and in violation of GATTArticle XI:I; panels were set
up to hear the complaints of the United States and
Australia. Given the growing external and internal
pressure against the barriers to agricultural trade, it was
regarded as likely that a new agreement would expand
imports of beef. There were some expectations that
U.S.-Japan negotiations would again result in an
enlargement of the amount of high-quality beef to go
into Japan under a new sequence of quotas. 
However, in June 1988, the U.S.-Japan Beef-Citrus
Agreement negotiated a phase-out of the quota system,
from 1988-90, and allowed Japan to impose higher
tariffs in 1991 and afterward. The 25 percent tariff
effective in 1990 and before was to be replaced by
tariffs of 70 percent in 1991, 60 percent in 1992, and
50 percent in 1993 and afterward. The U.S. opted for
completely commercial trade, with no LIPC involve-
ment, and no high-quality beef requirements. These
provisions flew in the face of warnings from some
quarters that the U.S. share of the Japanese beef market
depended heavily on these levers. As in 1978 and 1984,
other governments followed up in the wake of the U.S.
action; subsequent agreements between Japan and
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada basically followed
the pattern of the U.S. agreement, and the GATT cases
pending against Japan’s policies were withdrawn.
The U.S.-Japan agreement also committed Japan to
phasing out its quotas on oranges and orange juice, and
to lowering tariffs on eight other horticultural products.
As with beef, all these trade liberalization measures
applied to other exporters. The annual trade value of the
U.S.-Japan Agreements on Beef Imports: A Case of Successful Bilateral Negotiationsproducts addressed in the 1988 agreement was $1.54
billion, with beef comprising 72 percent of the total.
Gains From the Bilateral 
Beef Agreements
It is difficult to establish by how much U.S. beef
exports to Japan increased or U.S. beef prices rose as a
direct result of the agreements, especially the 1988
agreement. It is unlikely that, in the absence of the
agreements, Japan would have opted to increase
imports unilaterally, or that the kind of beef actually
imported after the quota’s end would have been the
choice of the LIPC anyway. It is more likely that the
pattern of trade in beef shown by Japan’s import statis-
tics since 1987 has been heavily influenced by the
trade rules it negotiated with the United States and
other countries in the 1970’s and 1980’s.
The 1978 and 1984 agreements compelled imports of
grain-fed beef. Such imports were not likely to have
entered in large quantities in the absence of the agree-
ments. Japanese domestic production was entirely
grain-fed beef. Given that the LIPC was primarily
interested in protecting Japanese beef producers, it
likely would have had a predilection for importing
grass-fed beef, for uses (such as hamburgers and meat
processing) that would not directly displace Japanese
beef. The effect of the high-quality beef sub-quotas
negotiated in 1979 and 1984 was thus to force grain-
fed beef, largely supplied by the United States, into a
market that otherwise might have been closed. Besides
the immediate advantage of greater sales, there may
have been a longer-term effect of increasing awareness
of U.S. meat qualities and business practices among
Japanese companies, and, vice versa, of the Japanese
tastes and business practices among U.S. meat compa-
nies and producers. 
The imposition of the SBS system, negotiated by the
United States in the 1984 agreement, served even
more directly to familiarize the Japanese and foreign
meat companies with the needs of the Japanese
market and the abilities of exporting firms. U.S.-
origin beef achieved considerable success in the SBS
subquota, and the 3-year phase out period provided
for in the 1988 agreement involved steady expansion
of the SBS system. 
Behind the U.S. abandonment of the quota system in
1988 was a calculation that the system’s advantages to
the United States, which as Japan’s most powerful
trade partner enjoyed bargaining strength in deter-
minnig quota sizes and composition, were outweighed
by other factors. 
First, it was believed that free trade would give more
advantage to U.S. beef exports than the quota system
could. The quota system distorted trade by influencing
the types of beef imported and the timing of imports.
For the U.S. beef industry, the lack of flexibility and
transparency was a major detriment. The LIPC, a
quasi-government agency, decided what and when to
import based on criteria that were in part unobserv-
able. As a protector of Japan’s high-quality beef
supply, the LIPC had an interest in seeing that
imported beef was a cheap, generic commodity, not
differentiated by quality. 
Second, the slow and painful process of renegotiating
the quota system was a burden for the United States,
and shifting to a permanent, fully open system would
relieve the United States of this negotiating burden and
let it focus on other issues.
Trade results from 1988 and after suggest that the U.S.
position to completely eliminate quotas benefited U.S.
beef exports. Japan’s imports of U.S. beef and offals
rose by almost 90 percent in value (compared with
1987) as the quota was phased out, 1988-1990. The
increase of 95 billion yen ($650 million, at the 1990
exchange rate—see figure 2) in the beef trade created
a new plateau for U.S.-Japan trade that has been
sustained or exceeded since then. Volume increased by
over 50 percent in the same period. Total Japanese
imports of beef rose by over $1 billion (158 billion
yen, at the 1990 exchange rate, from the end of 1987
through 1990—fig. 3), with increases in non-beef
commodities adding still more trade. The U.S. share of
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of 61 percent of total Japanese beef import value (fig.
4—those imports formerly under quota plus the
imports formerly brought in under the “offal” cate-
gory). The U.S. share for the total package of goods in
the 1988 agreement has also remained relatively
steady. While the country shares of Japan’s market for
imported beef changed relatively little, there were
major shifts in the corporate makeup of the trade with
Japan. The 1988 agreement was followed by a period
of great activity as Japanese and U.S. firms made
investments in or established joint ventures and
alliances in North America and Oceania. 
The Japanese import market, freed from LIPC involve-
ment, turned strongly toward imports of grain-fed beef
(as Australia shifted some of its exports into grain-fed
beef) and toward chilled, rather than frozen, beef (fig.
5). Chilled beef could compete more effectively with
fresh Japanese-raised beef, and commanded a higher
price. U.S. firms quickly developed and adopted
methods of sending chilled beef to Japan by ship,
rather than by air, reducing the transport cost substan-
tially. The pronounced shift in the quality of imports
illustrates the distortive nature of the quota/state
trading system on trade before the agreements. In the
1978 agreement, the United States had deliberately
forced a quality shift by negotiating a high-quality
(grain-fed) beef subquota. In 1988, by forcing the
removal of the quota altogether, the United States
opened a door to another quality shift—chilled beef
from the United States (Australian shippers had
already shifted to significant chilled trade before the
1988 agreement).
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Figure 2a
Value of U.S. beef and beef offal
imports by Japan, 1970-96 
1,000 US$
Figure 2b
Volume of U.S. beef and beef offal
imports by Japan, 1970-96 
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Includes other minor commodities whose tariffs were lowered in 1988.
Source: Japan Exports and Imports
Figure 3
Japanese imports of beef and citrus 
Billion yenThe 1988 Beef-Citrus Agreement was imitated outside
Japan. South Korea revoked its balance-of-payments
justification for trade barriers in 1989, and the series
of bilateral agreements on beef imports that it signed
with the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and
Canada echoed parts of the agreements with Japan. An
SBS system was set up and expanded, at the insistence
of the United States. The Korean quotas were non-
discriminatory about origin and type of beef. Korea’s
trade partners pressed repeatedly for a complete end to
the quotas, and there were few U.S. voices in support
of Korea’s quota because of the successful U.S.
performance after Japan’s quota was phased out. While
the end of the Korean quota system (set for 2001) was
negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round (UR) settle-
ment, the negotiations about it during the UR were
often bilateral, and the details are contained in a side
agreement with the United States formally attached to
Korea’s UR schedule.
Finally, other commodity spillovers can be credited in
part as benefits of the U.S.-Japan Beef-Citrus
Agreement. Although the beef agreements did not
address Japan’s trade barriers to pork imports, U.S.
pork exports to Japan grew strongly after 1988 as a
trade in chilled pork developed. Shipments of chilled
pork used the technology and marketing channels that
were opened up by shipments of chilled U.S. beef in
the aftermath of the agreement. U.S. exports of chilled
meat surged after the 1988 agreement, and this devel-
opment likely occurred earlier than it would have if
the beef quota system had been maintained.
Costs of the Bilateral Beef
Agreements
A major cost of the agreements was the negotiating
time and negotiating leverage expended on them.
Substantial amounts of time were required from staff
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Office of
the Special Trade Representative, and the U.S.
Embassy in Tokyo. U.S. elected officials faced
repeated pressure from constituents to get greater
access to the Japanese market. Other bilateral issues
between the United States and Japan had to share the
negotiating time and leverage with the beef issue. 
Negotiating the beef issues induced political friction in
Japan. Beef is a high-profile commodity in Japan, both
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Figure 4
U.S. share of Japan's imports affected by
beef-citrus agreements
Percent of total import value









Source: Japan Exports and Imports
Figure 5
Beef imports by Japan
Billion yenfor producers and consumers. As with rice, voices
within Japan emerged that suggested consumers could
gain from freer imports, but farmers’ protests against
any liberalization of trade dominated the debate. As a
result, Japan’s Government found it costly to negotiate
the agreements, especially the 1988 agreement.
Japanese political leaders had to expend a lot of their
influence to ensure acceptance of the agreements. U.S.
successes on beef may have limited forward move-
ment on other issues, because Japan’s leadership had
to be pushed hard to make concessions on beef.
Another cost of the 1988 agreement was the conces-
sion made by the United States in allowing Japan to
raise its beef tariffs from 25 percent to 50 percent after
an interim 2-year period with even higher rates.
Particularly in 1991, the first year after the quota was
eliminated, the 70 percent tariff seemed to depress
imports from year-earlier levels. Subsequent negotia-
tions in the Uruguay Round secured a reduction of
Japan’s beef tariffs from 50 percent in 1994 to 38.5
percent in 2000, accompanied by a safeguard mecha-
nism that allowed snapback to the 50 percent rate in
case of surges in imports.
The end of the quota also hurt trade that had sprung up
to circumvent the quota. The United States dominated
one such category, so-called “diaphragm beef,” which
enjoyed a low tariff and no quota control because the
Japanese classified it as beef offal (on the basis that it
was not attached to a bone in the animal, although it is
a muscle meat). After the quota, this trade shrank in
volume and value, but remained substantial.
Japan’s beef production would likely have been
larger without the increased beef trade generated by
the beef agreements. Beef production in Japan is
heavily grain-based, and relies on imports of feed-
grains and oilseed meals. The largest supply source
of these feedstuffs has usually been the United States
and imports of beef reduced this volume from levels
that otherwise would have been reached. However,
beef exported to Japan from the United States and to
a lesser extent from Australia was grain-fed, and
increased beef exports to Japan led to greater animal
feeding in those countries. To a large extent, the loca-
tion, but not the amount of feeding, was changed by
the agreements. The value added to the feed inputs
by cattle raising and beef production shifted from
Japan to the beef-exporting countries.
Bilateral Approach and Multilateral
Approach
It is tempting to compare the bilateral approach with
the multilateral GATT/WTO negotiations, and to
consider the benefits and disadvantages of each.
However, in the case of beef in Japan, the two
approaches cannot be separated. Japan’s controls on
imports were globally acceptable to begin with
because they were accepted in the GATT. When Japan
gave up the underlying rationale for this acceptance in
1963 (by revoking its reliance on the balance-of-
payments clause), the clock began ticking on its
controls, with expectations that an increasingly rich
country would reduce and eliminate them in order to
credibly ask for freer access for its own exports to
other markets. The 1978 beef agreements were negoti-
ated simultaneously with the Tokyo Round of the
GATT, and U.S.-Japanese negotiations on beef and the
Tokyo Round were intimately connected—Japan’s
access rules on beef were one of the key issues to be
settled before the Round could be completed, and
became part of the agreement ending the Round. 
While there was no formal linkage of the 1984 bilat-
eral negotiations to GATT multilateral talks, U.S.
complaints to the GATT in the early 1980’s about
specific Japanese trade practices not related to beef
surely were one form of leverage that influenced
Japanese decisions on beef. The 1988 agreement was
negotiated after the beginning of the Uruguay Round,
and in the context of the U.S. Government’s professed
commitment to completely free trade in agriculture.
Thus, the U.S. preference for a complete end to quotas
was based on a larger policy agenda, as well as
strategic considerations related to beef markets.
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enced the outcome of the Uruguay Round. The boom
in Japanese imports and U.S. exports of beef began
immediately after the 1988 agreement, and showed its
sustainability through 1993, when the Round was
concluded. For U.S. agriculture, the successful
performance of U.S. exports after this bilateral agree-
ment, which allowed free trade to U.S. competitors as
well as to U.S. exporters, could have rallied U.S.
support for free trade in the Uruguay Round.
A report to Congress by the U.S. International Trade
Commission (ITC) in 1988 explored the possibility 
of a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement with
Japan, a proposal raised by the U.S. Ambassador to
Japan, Mike Mansfield, and U.S. Senator Robert
Byrd. Ambassador Mansfield made a statement that
“...we should at least study the shape of a free trade
agreement” because “the U.S. should switch from
approaches which politicize trade issues, exacerbate
friction, raise emotional stakes, erode public support
here for American objectives and risk undermining
both countries’ commitment to the alliance. We have
no alternatives at present to our piecemeal approach
which could last—but should not—into the next
century” (ITC, 1988). The ITC report, however, found
substantial support for bilateral negotiating strategies
among the experts it polled, with success in the beef
and citrus negotiations singled out. Respondents also
pointed out the threat of GATT action as influential in
concluding disputes such as those over beef and
citrus. While the beef agreements with Japan stand as
successful achievements of bilateral negotiation, they
arose out of and benefited from multilateral negotia-
tions and agreements.
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T
he Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum is made up of 21 diverse Pacific Rim
economies (table 1), including the United States, and
represents a significant regional market for U.S. food
and agriculture trade. In FY 1997, the APEC region
accounted for more than 60 percent of U.S. agriculture
and food exports and 50 percent of imports. Over the
past 10 years, APEC has accounted for practically all
the growth in U.S. non-bulk exports. The region
covers North America, East Asia including China,
Southeast Asia, Oceania, and Chile. Russia, Vietnam,
and Peru joined in 1998, increasing the membership
from 18 to 21 economies.
APEC, initiated in 1989, has a relatively short history.
It is an outgrowth of other loose-knit fledgling Pacific
Rim institutions, the most influential being the busi-
ness-oriented Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
(PECC), founded in 1980 by Australia and Japan. (See
box for a comparison of APEC and the WTO.) 
Growth in Intra-APEC Farm Trade 
So Far Not Attributable to APEC 
In the APEC region, intra-regional agricultural trade, a
measure of integration, has grown significantly in the
last 15 years. The APEC region now rivals the EU
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Abstract
Economic Integration and Open
Regionalism in APEC:
The Gains for U.S. Agriculture
William Coyle and Zhi Wang
The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum could assume a more
pivotal role in the integration of the Pacific Rim, which is a market for more than
60 percent of U.S. agricultural exports. In 1994, APEC announced in its “Bogor
Declaration” a plan to achieve free trade in 2010 for developed members and in
2020 for other members. Its free-trade plan calls for open regionalism, allowing
benefits from trade liberalization undertaken by members to accrue not only to
APEC members but to non-APEC members as well. In this paper, we analyze open
regionalism in a dynamic context. Even though the gains for the United States from
open regionalism are less than they would be under an exclusive free trade area,
open regionalism may be preferable because it is nondiscriminatory and because it
creates pressure on non-APEC economies to liberalize their policies to maintain the
competitiveness of their economies. From a U.S. perspective, inclusion of agricul-
ture is critical: more than 75 percent of U.S. welfare gains from APEC would come
from agriculture, mainly due to high initial rates of protection in East Asia.Economic Research Service/USDA Regional Trade Agreements and U.S. Agriculture/AER-771 U  109
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with respect to intra-regional agricultural trade; 68
percent of APEC’s agricultural exports in 1995 went to
other members of APEC, compared with almost 70
percent in the EU, and the share has been rising
steadily. But the integration so far is not attributable to
the APEC institution, but instead to economic growth,
policy reform, and the freer play of comparative
advantage. Economic growth in the region has
outpaced the world average by about 30 percent for
about 10 years through 1997. The Asian financial
crisis has slowed growth in the last two years, raising
uncertainty about future performance. While many
APEC economies around the Pacific Rim have liberal-
ized both domestic farm policies and agricultural
trade, sometimes on their own initiative, and some-
times as the outcome of bilateral, regional, or
multilateral trade negotiations, the Asian financial
crisis may slow some of these efforts in the short term.
Examples of liberalization efforts affecting countries
in the region but independent of APEC are:
• The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), signed in 1993. It will be fully imple-
mented by 2008. Tariffs are being cut and markets
opened for agriculture and other sectors. Free trade
in agriculture between the United States and Mexico
will be achieved by the year 2008, with most
barriers removed by the end of 2003. 
• Australia and New Zealand’s free trade agreement,
Closer Economic Relations (CER), signed in 1983.
The agreement has brought limited benefits for agri-
cltural trade because both nations have had relatively
open borders for agriculture, and because their major
agricultural markets are outside the region.
• New Zealand’s unilateral reforms affecting agricul-
ture and other sectors beginning in 1984. New
Zealand farmers adjusted through a period of a
rising currency, high interest rates, and depressed
commodity prices. With the adjustment period
complete, New Zealand’s farm sector parameters are
now largely set by the macroeconomic environment.
• The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’
(ASEAN) free trade agreement signed in 1994, with
a commitment to adopt a Common Effective
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Differences and Similarities Between
APEC and the WTO
While the World Trade Organization is a new institu-
tion, it is an outgrowth of an agreement reached in
1947 among 23 countries. APEC was born in 1989.
Both institutions have important differences, as well as
significant similarities. A major difference is the sheer
size of the WTO, with 132 members, and a large
permanent staff of more than 450 at its Geneva head-
quarters and a budget of about $80 million. APEC is a
smaller regional institution, with 18 members and no
significant bureaucracy, only a small secretariat in
Singapore of about 30, mainly temporary staff,
seconded for a few years at the expense of member
governments. Its operational budget is $2-3 million,
and its “headquarters” moves around the region. Much
of APEC’s business is handled by the country hosting
the annual ministerial meeting, which rotates among
members: the United States in 1993, Indonesia in
1994, Japan in 1995, the Philippines in 1996, Canada
in 1997, Malaysia in 1998, and New Zealand in 1999. 
The similarities may be more important than the
differences. Trade negotiations in both start with a
political commitment, and members must agree on
principles and agendas. Consultations are undertaken
to reach reciprocity (WTO) or comparability (APEC);
“offers” are made in the WTO, “national action
plans” are submitted in APEC. The principle of
comprehensiveness, is promoted in both organiza-
tions, bringing agriculture into the WTO as well as
into APEC. Flexibility is allowed through exceptions
such as “blue box” policies and the backloading of
textile quota phaseouts under the Uruguay Round,
and allowing members to deal with sensitive sectors
in different ways and at different times in APEC.
Finally, the principle of most favored nation treatment
is important in both. APEC adheres to the practice of
open regionalism, which conveys the benefits of
APEC reforms to all trading partners, making APEC’s
programs consistent with WTO principles.
Source: Fred Bergsten, “The Case for APEC: An
Asian Push for World-wide Free Trade,” in The
Economist, Jan. 6, 1996. Preferential Tariff of 0-5 percent by 2008. The
timetable later was accelerated to 2003. ASEAN
includes Brunei, Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
(Burma and Laos not yet members of APEC.) 
• Policy reforms in China and Taiwan, in conjunction
with WTO accession talks, resulted in a number of
changes such as China’s reducing its average tariff
on agricultural goods from more than 30 percent in
1991 to 20 percent in 1997. 
• Increased integration of agriculture and food trade
between Hong Kong and China since Hong Kong
reverted to China in July 1997. 
• Implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement
began in 1995, with a 6-year phase-in period
through 2000 for developed countries, and through
2004 for developing countries.
• Several bilateral agreements between the United
States and Japan, Korea, and Taiwan since the mid-
1980’s that liberalized trade in beef, citrus, tobacco
products, and other non-bulk commodities.
Collectively these measures increased the value of
farm exports to East Asia by other APEC economies
by billions of dollars.
The Bogor Declaration of 1994
APEC could assume a far more pivotal role in future
Pacific Rim integration than it has since its inception
in 1989. About 6 months after the Uruguay Round
Agreement was signed, APEC leaders issued their
“Declaration of Common Resolve” in Bogor,
Indonesia, on November 15, 1994, announcing that
members would adopt the long-term goal of free and
open trade and investment in the Pacific Rim region.
This goal would be pursued by reducing barriers to
trade and investment and by promoting the free flow
of goods, services, and capital within the region. 
APEC members pledged to pursue regional free trade
on a most favored nation (MFN) basis and to promote
the notion of open regionalism, allowing the benefits
from trade liberalization undertaken by members to
accrue to nonmembers as well. Developed economies
would fully liberalize their economies by 2010 and
other members by 2020. At the Osaka Ministerial
Meeting in November 1995, APEC members 
reaffirmed the free trade goal, calling for comprehen-
sive treatment, including controversial sectors like
agriculture, but flexibility in dealing with various trade
sectors in meeting this goal. Action plans were tabled
at the Manila Ministerial Meeting in November 1996
for implementation beginning in 1997. Peer pressure is
the vehicle for ensuring comparability in commitments
among the 21 economies as members pursue
“concerted unilateral liberalization,” but in consulta-
tion with and under the scrutiny of other members.
Action plans are updated and revised periodically at
the annual Ministerial meetings. 
With regard to agriculture, these initial action plans in
some cases offered accelerated or broader implementa-
tion of commitments made under the Uruguay Round
Agreement. For example, Australia agreed to complete
the reduction of bound rates for agricultural products
by January 1999 instead of 2000. China, not a member
of the WTO but quite active in APEC, announced at
the last APEC Ministerial meeting in Vancouver that it
would make significant tariff cuts on industrial and
agricultural products by 2005. Other economies prom-
ised to accelerate trade-facilitating measures that
would enhance food and agricultural trade, such as
liberalizing of foreign investment in the transportation
sector (Chile) and in expediting inspection procedures
for highly perishable trade (South Korea).1
APEC’s Vision of 
Open Regionalism
The APEC plan for regional free trade is distinguished
from other regional trade liberalization efforts by the
ambiguous concept of “open regionalism,” described
in the APEC Eminent Persons Group’s 1993 report.
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1Unpublished memorandum by Jeff Clark, Economic Research
Service, U.S. Dept. Agri., January 5, 1996.Commissioned in 1992, the Eminent Persons Group
was to “enunciate a vision for trade in the Asia Pacific
region...” and described open regionalism in their
recommendations to leaders on regional trade liberal-
ization, later adopted in the Bogor declaration:
¼the [APEC] members would set a goal of
achieving free trade in the region and indicate
that they prefer to do so through further global
liberalization but would pursue a regional
path, on a GATT-consistent basis, if the
favored strategy were not achievable. This
would operationalize APEC’s concept of
“open regionalism” or “open economic associ-
ation” in a new and effective manner.2
Open regionalism, according to the report, would
“obviate any charges that [APEC] was ‘going
regional’,”3 a particular concern given the inconclusive
status of the long drawn-out Uruguay Round negotia-
tions at that time. 
Pros and Cons of 
Open Regionalism
Detractors of APEC’s open regionalism argue that the
benefits from APEC liberalization should accrue only
to members or to nonmembers who reciprocate with
similar liberalization measures. According to this view,
the nondiscrimination principle embedded in the open
regionalism concept should be applied conditionally
by APEC to avoid possible exploitation by “free
riders,” like the EU.4
Advocates of open regionalism argue that the liberal-
izing nation is the greatest benefactor from such
action; non-APEC economies that “free ride” APEC’s
free trade measures by not offering reciprocal policy
reform would benefit less than the member economies.
Remaining distortions would hamstring nonmember
countries’ ability to compete and take advantage of the
opportunities in APEC. Therefore, what other
economies do or not do is less important than what
APEC members do. The APEC forum serves to
encourage members to move forward on the open
regionalism agenda. 
Is it naive to think that an economy will undertake
liberalization without reciprocity? New Zealand did
just that, unilaterally undertaking extensive agricultural
policy reforms in 1984. Left to face the market, New
Zealand farmers, after a difficult adjustment period,
have prospered. The recent Asian financial crisis also
demonstrates the importance of an economy’s openness
regarding trade and foreign investment. Some of the
most severely affected economies in Asia now face
pressure from the International Monetary Fund as a
quid pro quo for loans to undertake banking and trade
policy reforms to encourage economic recovery in a
globalized world economy.
APEC’s Open Regionalism 
in Perspective
Given APEC’s controversial objective of free trade
through open regionalism, we evaluate its implications
for the U.S. economy and agriculture, and compare it
with two alternatives: an exclusive APEC free trade
area and multilateral free trade in which non-APEC
economies undertake the same reform as APEC
members. How does open regionalism compare with
these other approaches with respect to impacts on
national welfare,5 trade creation and diversion, agricul-
tural trade, farm income, and prices? What are the
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5We measure changes in national welfare by changes in household
consumption, evaluated at base year prices.
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2Report of the Eminent Persons Group to APEC Ministers, A
Vision for APEC, Towards an Asia Pacific Economic Community,
October 1993, pp. 27-28.
3Ibid., p. 28.
4Trade Policy Forum, Asia-Pacific and Western Hemisphere
Regional Initiatives: Cooperation for Increasing Competition,
Background Paper for Experts Roundtable, Pacific Economic
Cooperation Council, 12th General Meeting, Santiago, Chile, Sept.
29, 1997, p. 17.impacts on APEC partners and economies outside the
region? And what is the distribution of gains and
losses across U.S. economic sectors in general and for
agriculture in particular? 
We use a recursive, dynamic, computable general
equilibrium model to address these questions. The
model incorporates four sources of economic growth:
labor force growth, accumulation of physical capital,
changes in the skill composition of the labor force, and
total factor productivity (TFP) growth. The labor force
growth rate is set exogenously. Capital stock in each 1-
year simulation period equals the last period’s capital
stock plus total investment minus depreciation. No
optimal behavior is assumed for investment and capital
accumulation. All net investments in the previous
period are assumed to become new production capital
in the next period. The increase in the skilled labor
force is based on the growth in the stock of tertiary
educated labor in each region estimated by the World
Bank (Ahuja and Filmer, 1995), which indicates
changes in the numbers of those qualified for employ-
ment as professional and technical workers. TFP
growth rates are obtained from econometric estimates
by the World Bank (Thomas and Wang, 1993, Martin
and Mitra, 1996).
In the model’s base scenario, the world economic
growth path from 1992 to 2025 is generated, driven by
the four sources of growth and assuming full imple-
mentation of the Uruguay Round and NAFTA and that
China and Taiwan do not participate in the Uruguay
Round liberalization process. Domestic agricultural
support in the United States is assumed to be reduced
by 95 percent as a result of the provisions of the 1996
FAIR Act, and domestic support in other OECD coun-
tries and in newly industrialized Asian economies is
assumed to be lowered by 40 percent.
Three other scenarios are compared with the base
scenario: an APEC free trade area (FTRA); the case 
of open regionalism (OPEN), featuring APEC trade
liberalization on an MFN basis; and global trade liber-
alization under which non-APEC economies undertake
policy reform in the same way as APEC (FULL).
Liberalization means reducing import protection and
export subsidies in the developed and newly industrial-
ized economies of APEC (the United States, Canada,
Japan, Australia, Korea, and Taiwan) to zero by 2010,
and removing all import barriers in all other APEC
economies (Mexico, China, and ASEAN) by 2020.
China and Taiwan will not benefit from the elimina-
tion of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement since they are not
members of the WTO. Protection levels decline at a
constant annual rate. All exogenous forces driving
economic growth are the same as in the base scenario.
The only differences among the three scenarios and
the baseline are changes in each country’s trade policy.
The model is a highly stylized simplification of the
world economy that is far from perfect (Wang, 1997a).
Liberalization of the service sector is not modeled. The
size of parameters, such as elasticities of substitution
and initial rates of protection, are uncertain. Therefore,
the numbers reported in this paper need to be inter-
preted with caution: they can be viewed as indicative
but not as precise forecasts. 
The three scenarios revealed several important
outcomes: 
• Welfare rises regardless of liberalization approach.
The results from the recursive dynamic CGE
analysis show that with all three liberalization
approaches—an exclusive free trade area, open
regionalism, and multilateral free trade—the overall
welfare impacts are positive. They vary somewhat
in magnitude, with global gains smallest for the
APEC free trade area option and largest for multilat-
eral free trade (fig. 1). Increases in welfare in the
United States and the rest of APEC from open
regionalism are somewhat less than both the free
trade area and multilateral options, but the differ-
ences are small (fig. 2). According to the simulation
results, APEC welfare rises in the range of $144-
$197 billion above baseline levels for the three
options in 2010 (a 0.64- to 0.88-percent increase)
and from $238 - $363 billion in 2020 (a 0.78- to
1.19-percent increase) (fig. 3). The jump between
2010 and 2020 is explained by the elimination of
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economies and the liberalization-induced higher
rates of economic growth from 2010 to 2020. The
range of our welfare estimates ($144-$363 billion)
are somewhat larger than the results ($130-$300
billion) from other APEC free trade simulations
based on similar policy coverage because of the
dynamic features of our model that account for the
accumulating effect of rising income and investment
levels from trade liberalization.6 Nevertheless, our
results show that the percentage welfare gains for
APEC and the world under all three simulations are
still quite modest (table 2, left panel, Real
Consumption). 
• Agriculture makes a major contribution to overall
gains in all three alternatives. According to our
simulations, agriculture contributes 55 to 70 percent
of the total welfare gains from liberalizing merchan-
dise trade in APEC. For the United States, the share
is even higher at 75 to 85 percent.7 The large share
from agriculture is mainly due to high initial protec-
tion rates for food and agricultural products in East
Asia. Agriculture is a major sector of unfinished
business from the Uruguay Round (table 3, fig. 4).
With the freer play of comparative advantage after
APEC trade liberalization, more efficient resource
allocation across the region would lead to signifi-
cant increases in import demand for food and
agricultural products, particularly in East Asia.
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6Peter A. Petri, “Computable General Equilibrium Studies of
APEC: Preliminary Review,” unpublished paper distributed at the
PECC XII meeting in Santiago, Sept. 29, 1997.
7Based on additional simulation that decomposes the welfare
contribution from agriculture.• Trade creation dominates trade diversion in three
liberalization scenarios.8 As expected, trade diver-
sion occurs in the case of the APEC free trade area,
$107 billion in 2010 and $162 billion in 2020, but
trade creation still dominates. In the case of the
APEC free trade area, total real exports increase
significantly for all APEC members, but decline for
non-APEC economies. Economies within APEC
trade more among themselves. Within APEC, trade
increases 24 percent from the base scenario in 2010
and 32 percent in 2020. But trade between APEC
and non-APEC economies declines by 4 and 5
percent, respectively.9 Trade diversion is not an
issue with open regionalism except for North
America, which imports slightly less from non-
APEC economies because the initial barriers for
APEC members are somewhat higher than in the
EU and other OECD economies.
• ROW unable to “free ride” on trade expansion
from APEC’s open regionalism. Under open
regionalism, exports from non-APEC economies to
the APEC region increase by just 4 and 5 percent in
2010 and 2020 ($49 and $87 billion), less than the
APEC to non-APEC export expansion of 9 and 14
percent ($120 and $262 billion). Total exports from
non-APEC economies would actually fall, except
for slight growth in the EU (table 2, right panel,
Exports). If non-APEC economies were to liberalize
their markets also, then their exports would expand
almost as fast as in the APEC economies. The
remaining protection in the non-APEC region taxes
their own production and exports, thus reducing
their competitiveness in world markets under open
regionalism. This would furnish an incentive for
non-APEC economies to follow APEC’s lead in
liberalizing their own markets.
• U.S. agricultural exports would rise in all three
cases, the least under open regionalism. The
increase in U.S. net agricultural exports would be 18
percent higher under the multilateral option than
under open regionalism, and 30 percent higher
under the free trade area scenario. Australia and
Canada, the other major net agricultural exporters in
the APEC region, would experience a similar pattern
of benefits. Net agricultural exporters outside the
region would benefit from open regionalism and
from multilateral liberalization even more because
some important non-APEC economies have rela-
tively more abundant agricultural land resources
than APEC members in East Asia. The free trade
area option would divert from exporters outside the
region to APEC economies agricultural trade worth
about $19 billion in 2010 and $41 billion in 2020.
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8Trade creation is the replacement of expensive domestic produc-
tion by cheaper imports from free-trade-area (FTA) members,
resulting from a reduction in trade impediments among FTA
members. Trade diversion is the replacement of cheaper initial
imports from non-FTA members by more expensive imports from
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Notes and data source:  Calculated from the 1992 multi-regional SAM 
estimated by the authors from version 3 GTAP database (Hertel, 1997).
The import protection rates for the food and agricultural sectors in China
and South Asia were negative in version 3 GTAP. They reflected 
government consumer price subsidies on living necessities in those
countries. We eliminated all negative protections and treated them as
consumer price subsidies in the global SAM. Protection rates for food
and agricultural sectors in China and South Asia are based on an earlier
version of the GTAP database except China's crop sectors, which are
tariff equivalent of non-tariff barriers based on Zhang, et al., 1997.• U.S. agriculture would benefit from freer trade
conditions regardless of approach. U.S. farm
production and exports would expand under all
three options because of the further realization of
comparative advantage under freer trade conditions.
All major sectors of U.S. agriculture would expand,
with food grain production expanding the most,
more than 20 percent in 2010 and more than 45
percent in 2020, under each of the three options (fig.
5 and table 4, right panel). Feed grain and livestock
production would expand by similar rates in both
2010 and 2020. The labor-intensive textile and
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decline by about the same percentage in 2010 and
2020 under all three options. 
• U.S. farm prices and incomes would rise. U.S farm
prices would rise under all three options in both
2010 and 2020. U.S. farm income also rises because
of both higher prices and more efficient use of
production resources (fig. 6).
Economic Research Service/USDA Regional Trade Agreements and U.S. Agriculture/AER-771 U  117
Economic Integration and Open Regionalism in APEC: The Gains for U.S. Agriculture
-20 0 20 40 60
2010 2020
Figure 5
The U.S. economy: Changes in production
-40 -20 0 20 40 60
FTRA Open Full












Services118 U Regional Trade Agreements and U.S. Agriculture/AER-771 Economic Research Service/USDA
Conclusions
It may be too early to assess APEC’s bold free-trade
plan because of its distant target dates and uncertain
implementation. However, the plan could give APEC a
much more visible role in encouraging future regional
integration across the Pacific Rim. 
All three options raise global and U.S. welfare above
baseline levels. The multilateral option is the best from
both a global and a U.S. perspective. The open region-
alism approach is second best for global welfare, but
the least attractive for the United States. However, the
differences in welfare gains for the United States from
the three options are not large. The impacts of the three
options on U.S. agriculture also vary, but by little.
Ironically, the economically least attractive option for
the United States, open regionalism, may be the best
choice when both economics and politics are consid-
ered. Economically, it provides benefits not much less
than the other two options and the adjustment cost to
the U.S. economy is almost the same. Politically, open
regionalism has the advantage of being nondiscrimina-
tory with regard to non-APEC members. It is a more
acceptable, less threatening option from the perspec-
tive of the non-APEC world. It also has the advantage
of being an agreement among only 21 parties, not 132
as would be the case for multilateral liberalization
under the auspices of the WTO. 
Economic Integration and Open Regionalism in APEC: The Gains for U.S. Agriculture
0 2 04 06 08 0
2010 2020
0 2 04 06 08 0
FTRA OPEN FULL
Percent change from base
Figure 6






TotalA key point is that the open regionalism scenario
assumes that the rest of the world does not offer recip-
rocal reforms. In reality, as APEC pursues a course of
open regionalism, the rest of the world would likely not
stand still and “free ride,” given the widespread interest
of many countries to participate more fully in global
markets. According to the simulation results, non-
APEC economies would be unable to take advantage of
free access to the APEC region because the remaining
distortions in their own markets would act as a tax,
limiting production efficiency and reducing exports.
Non-APEC economies would have an incentive to
follow the lead of APEC in liberalizing their own
markets so as to remain competitive with the APEC
economies. Therefore, the United States might be better
off under open regionalism than our results indicate,
depending on the policy response from the non-APEC
world. This analysis suggests that APEC’s open region-
alism could very well be a vehicle for promoting not
only regional but also global trade liberalization.
Finally, the results also point out the critical role of
agricultural policy reforms to the overall gains in
welfare in the APEC region, particularly for the United
States. Without liberalization in the region’s agricul-
ture, the United States would have much less incentive
to participate in APEC’s overall liberalization program. 
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T
en Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries1
have applied for membership in the European
Union (EU), which is one of the largest regional trade
agreements (RTA). The EU has a single market with
no internal agricultural trade barriers and a Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP). This prospective enlarge-
ment of the European Union to Central and Eastern
Europe could add as many as 100 million new
consumers to the EU market and double the number of
farmers under the EU subsidy scheme. Since the fall
of central planning, most of the CEE’s have not had
the means to support or insulate their markets to the
extent that the EU does. Maintaining current EU agri-
cultural support levels in an enlarged EU could have
profound effects on both EU/CEE trade and global
(and consequently U.S.) trade.
Here, we discuss three facets of the EU’s enlargement.
First, we discuss the preparations that the EU and CEE
countries have been making toward the anticipated
enlargement, and some of the difficulties that they may
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Enlargement of the European Union to
Central and Eastern Europe:
Obstacles and Possible Consequences 
of Policy Harmonization
Susan E. Leetmaa, Elizabeth A. Jones, and Ralph Seeley
Ten Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) have applied for membership
in the European Union (EU). This chapter analyzes three factors that are expected
to influence how EU farm programs will evolve as the EU expands. First, the wide
disparities between EU and CEEC agriculture, in terms of institutions, policies,
and productivity mean that considerable restructuring will have to occur if integra-
tion is to be successful. Second, farm subsidies under the current CAP are likely to
be unsustainable as membership expands, creating budget pressures for CAP
reform. And, the direction set by the Uruguay Round of the WTO, committing
members to more transparent and less trade-distorting farm supports, is also likely
to influence the evolution of farm programs in an extended EU. Analysis of the
effects of EU expansion under the current program show a likely reduction of the
agricultural trade of third countries, including the United States, with the CEE
countries. CAP reforms will reduce that trade-diverting impact.
1Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria.face in harmonizing their policies. Second, we
describe internal pressures to reform the CAP as the
EU expands. Third, we focus on how the World Trade
Organization (WTO) monitors the expansion of RTA’s
and how WTO regulations could limit the increase in
trade barriers in the minimally protectionist CEE coun-
tries. Last, we provide some quantitative analysis of
various EU policy options for enlargement.
Preparations for Enlargement
Since 1993, the EU has been functioning as a single
market, with no impediments to the internal movement
of goods, services, capital, and people. Regional inte-
gration of the CEE countries into the EU is expected
to include a harmonization of their domestic farm poli-
cies. When the EU admitted the members of the
European Free Trade Area (EFTA—Austria, Finland,
and Sweden) in 1995, they adopted EU agricultural
policies immediately. This differs greatly from the 10-
year transition period granted to Spain and Portugal in
their 1986 accession to the EU. The EU has yet to
decide whether there will be a transition period for the
CEE enlargement, though Franz Fischler, European
Agricultural Commissioner, recently expressed the
possibility of a 3-year phase-in period for compensa-
tory payments, a component of support to EU farmers.
Whether the CEE’s meet the European Monetary
Union’s convergence criteria and when to adopt the
the Euro currency has also yet to be determined.
By adopting the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP), the CEE countries—which have not had the
financial means to provide much financial support to
farmers—will become part of a highly protectionist
customs union that generously supports its farmers.
The CEE countries will benefit from unrestricted
access to EU markets, higher prices, and financial
support for farmers. 
Since implementing the CAP in 1962, the EU has
provided a high level of support to farmers. The EU
implemented highly protectionist policies to ensure
high internal prices. For example, before implementa-
tion of the CAP, the EU was a net importer of wheat.
Now it is of the world’s larger exporters. Because of
high price supports and import protection, internal EU
markets have maintained prices above world levels.
This has encouraged input-intensive farming that has
resulted in high yields. Presently, the EU has some of
the highest wheat yields in the world.
However, the CAP has been costly to maintain.
Government spending to support agriculture is high.
EU consumers support farmers through their taxes, as
well as through food prices that are higher than in more
market-oriented economies, like the United States.
The situation in the CEE’s (post-central planning) is
far different. Incomes are far lower than in the EU.
Except for Slovenia, the governments cannot afford to
support agriculture as the EU has in the past. Many of
the CEE countries have huge agricultural sectors that
despite the advances of recent years, are generally less
developed than those of the EU. 
With completely open borders between EU and CEE
countries, the CEE agro-food sector may find it diffi-
cult to compete with Western European firms,
particularly the food processing industry. Some CEE
food processors have modernized sufficiently to meet
EU product standards, but for most of the CEE food
industry, considerable investment is still needed.
Among raw agricultural products, many meat and dairy
products will have difficulty competing in the EU
market as they do not yet meet EU quality standards.
CEE agricultural sectors will need considerable
restructuring for successful integration into the EU.
The CEE’s need to improve farm productivity,
complete the privatization of state farms and agro-
industry, simplify their government purchasing and
market management practices, increase training in
agribusiness and quality control, and implement
programs that encourage rural development and struc-
tural adjustment.
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Agency for Agricultural Markets, for example),
Romania, and Bulgaria to administer minimum prices,
export subsidies, or other measures often operate in a
nontransparent way, leading to questions concerning
these countries’ compliance with World Trade
Organization (WTO) regulations on state trading. State
policies in Bulgaria and Romania cause significant
distortions in their domestic markets. Procurement of
bulk commodities is still mainly in the hands of state-
owned companies that use their market power to hold
down prices. In addition, these governments continue
to exert some control over retail prices through limits
on processing margins.
The CEE countries will likely be required to adopt all
EU legislation immediately upon becoming EU
members. This involves setting up structures necessary
to make the legislation effective. This alignment of
policies requires the CEE’s to make adjustments
beyond those required by their transition to market
economies. In the agricultural sector, these measures
will affect the movement of live animals, meat and
meat products, fruits, vegetables, and plants, and a
wide range of activities in the farming, production, and
processing industries. The CEE countries will have to
meet EU labeling requirements and quality standards,
including veterinary, sanitary, and phytosanitary stan-
dards. Restrictions on trade between the current EU-15
and its trading partners will then also apply to imports
into the new member countries. This could present
problems for U.S. access to CEE-10 countries, particu-
larly for livestock products. Currently, the EU bans the
importation of U.S. poultry meat and beef treated with
growth hormones. Until these bans are revoked, they
will also apply to imports into any CEE country once
they join the EU.
The EU has taken a multipronged approach in its
preparations for enlargement. It has funded an exten-
sive program of technical assistance for the CEE
region, designing projects to improve agricultural
structures and market mechanisms, food production,
processing and distribution, and infrastructure. The EU
has proposed funds to provide cheap loans, secure loan
guarantees, and develop equity participation programs
in the CEE countries. The 10 prospective member
countries have also signed Association Agreements
(Europe Agreements) with the EU. The Europe
Agreements provide a framework for preparing the
CEE countries for eventual membership, allowing
them time to continue their economic and political
reforms (see box). 
Internal Pressures for Reform
Applying the CAP mechanisms to CEE countries
would be very costly to the EU. Extending the
generous benefits currently provided to EU producers
would significantly increase EU agricultural spending.
It would also stimulate CEE agricultural production
and raise prices in the CEE countries, increasing their
reliance on export subsidies. The EU is already close
to meeting its WTO commitments on the permitted
volume and value of export subsidies. If the CEE’s
need to subsidize the exports of many of their
commodities, they would certainly exceed their export
subsidy constraints. For both of these reasons, the EU
has proposed the Agenda 2000 reforms, further
reducing price support to farmers (reducing the need
for export subsidies) and expanding upon the EU agri-
cultural reforms undertaken in 1992. The United States
views the impending reforms as an opportunity for the
EU to further liberalize its agricultural policies,
building on the accomplishments of the Uruguay
Round agreements.
Of the 10 prospective members, 5 have been selected
to begin negotiating their accession to the EU—
Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, and
Slovenia. If the EU were to admit these first-tier coun-
tries under the current CAP, agricultural production in
those countries could increase dramatically. Currently,
due to government policies and poor quality of
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2Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.production, prices of agricultural commodities in the
Central and Eastern European countries are at, or in
many cases, below world prices. At the same time, the
CAP supports producer prices for most commodities
well above world prices. By adopting the CAP, CEE
farmers would experience large price increases for
most commodities, making them more profitable. Price
differences are the greatest in the livestock sector due
to high EU support and poor quality in the CEE’s.
Additionally, CEE yields lag far behind EU yields
because farmers cannot afford to purchase hybrid seed
or apply much fertilizer. As prices rise, farmers will
have the incentive to increase production and will have
the means to purchase higher quality inputs to ensure
higher quality crops. CEE crop quality will need to
increase to meet the CAP’s minimum quality require-
ments for government intervention purchases.
WTO Reduces EU’s Ability 
To Protect Agriculture
Though the enlargement of the EU is being negotiated
between the current EU-15 members and the 10 poten-
tial CEE members, the rules of the World Trade
Organization will influence the negotiations. The WTO
provides a framework for the long-term reform of agri-
cultural trade and domestic policies. The expansion of
an RTA is governed by Article XXIV of the GATT.
Since the EU is a member of the WTO, it must comply
with WTO rules. According to Article XXIV of the
GATT, (1) members’ external trade barriers must not
increase from levels prior to the formation of the RTA;
(2) substantially all internal trade must be covered; (3)
the RTA must be implemented in a reasonable amount
of time, normally 10 years; and (4) all RTA’s must be
reported to the WTO to determine whether these
conditions are met (for more on Article XXIV, see the
article by Sheffield). The WTO member countries and
the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements will
closely monitor EU expansion. 
The WTO’s Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(URAA) also constrains EU expansion. The URAA,
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Europe Agreements
Ten CEE countries—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia—have signed Association
Agreements (Europe Agreements) with the EU and
have applied for membership in the EU. EU enlarge-
ment is likely to occur in a number of stages, with the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and
Slovenia invited to join first. The Europe Agreements
form the basis for gradual integration of CEE coun-
tries with the EU. The agreements cover five main
areas: political dialogue, economic cooperation, finan-
cial assistance, adoption of EU legislation, and trade
liberalization. The first agreements were signed with
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in 1991, with
mutual trade provisions taking effect the following
year and the entire agreements taking effect in 1994. 
The bilateral trade and cooperation provisions of the
Europe Agreements call for most-favored nation
(MFN) treatment and gradual elimination of selective
quantitative restrictions over a 10-year period, begin-
ning when the agreements go into effect. Separate
protocols cover “sensitive sectors,” including agricul-
tural products, clothing, textiles, coal, and steel. For
agricultural products, most concessions are phased in
within 5 years and involve tariff reductions and quota
increases. For example, beef, pork, mutton, poultry,
and dairy products are subject to a 20-percent tariff
reduction over 3 years, while import quotas will
increase 10 percent per year for 5 years. However,
trade in some commodity groups, such as grains, has
not been liberalized.
The two-way preferences were structured to accelerate
liberalization for CEE exports to the EU. Despite this,
EU exports to the CEE have far outstripped trade in the
opposite direction. In the first years of the agreements,
lack of information and lack of familiarity with EU
procedures prevented the CEE countries from fully
utilizing their allotted quotas. The EU’s quarterly
administration of preferential quotas, which hinders full
utilization of annual quotas where seasonal commodi-
ties are concerned, also limited CEE exports. Finally,
the method of administering tariff-rate quotas places
CEE countries at a disadvantage—the quotas were allo-
cated to EU importers rather than CEE exporters.which took effect in 1995, established limits on export
subsidies and domestic support, and set requirements
for market access for all members of the WTO. Of 
the 10 countries that have applied to become EU
members, only the 3 Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania) are not yet members of the WTO,
though they have observer status and seek to become
members soon. By the time enlargement occurs, all 10
countries should be members of the WTO. Therefore,
they will all have established WTO limits on their use
of export subsidies, domestic support, and market
access, which should help the WTO and other inter-
ested parties make sure that trade barriers to the region
are not increased upon EU membership.
Agricultural policy reform is inevitable for the EU,
regardless of whether it expands or not. The EU is
already close to, at, or over some of its WTO limits for
subsidized exports (which will continue to decrease
until they reach their final levels in 2000). With
enlargement, the WTO limits will play an even larger
role. When the EFTA countries joined the EU in 1995,
the EU and EFTA countries’WTO commitments were
aggregated, netting out all intra-trade between the
acceding countries and the EU. It is likely that the
United States, and some of the other WTO member
countries, will not settle for anything less than that in
the upcoming round(s) of EU enlargement. If so, an
enlarged EU’s WTO export subsidy commitments
could be lower than they currently are in the individual
countries, benefiting the United States and other 
agricultural exporters. However, as in the EFTA
enlargement, the adoption of EU border measures will
likely result in some tariff increases for the CEE’s,
resulting in some compensation negotiations (under
Article XXIV).
How the enlarged EU will meet its WTO subsidized
export and minimum import commitments has become
clearer since the EU released its revised Agenda 2000
policy proposal package in March 1998. The EU is
proposing a cut in support prices for beef (30 percent),
dairy products (15 percent), and grains (20 percent).
Oilseeds, which receive no support price, will receive
the same compensatory payments as grains (which are
lower than those currently in place for oilseeds),
resulting in a decline in support to oilseed producers.
The EU Commission believes that these price cuts will
keep the EU within the bounds of their WTO subsi-
dized-export limits. However, the Agenda 2000
proposals have not been widely embraced by the EU
member countries, who ultimately will have to vote
whether to adopt the reforms or not. Thus, it is likely
that the agricultural policies adopted in the year 2000
could be quite different from the March 1998 Agenda
2000 proposals. 
Analysis of Enlargement
Despite much uncertainty as to how the CEE and EU
economies may change in the coming decade, some
insights into the likely impacts of enlargement can be
gained by analyzing some possible outcomes. Our
analysis complements the analysis of Liapis and Tsigas
(in this report), in that our model has greater agricul-
tural policy detail, provides more detailed results for
the agricultural sector, and can analyze differences
among the CEE countries, while the Liapis and Tsigas
model includes all sectors of the economy, maintains
budget constraints, and can measure welfare impacts. 
Two different scenarios were analyzed for this study:
one where EU policies remain as they are today, and
one in which the CAP is fully liberalized. It is likely
that actual EU reforms will fall somewhere between
these two scenarios. This can be seen in the Agenda
2000 proposals, though it is possible that the EU will
need to undertake further agricultural reform prior to
enlargement. In both scenarios, we analyze the impact
of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—the
three first-tier countries with the largest agricultural
sectors—joining the EU. The two other first-tier coun-
tries—Slovenia and Estonia—combined produce less
than 5 percent of agricultural production in the large
first-tier countries. 
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Livestock Surplus
We assume that the three CEE countries join the EU in
2002 under the current CAP. As in the official USDA
baseline projections3 for the EU, the set-aside rate for
the CEE’s is fixed at 10 percent of arable land. We
assumed that the CEE countries would be subject to
the EU dairy quota. We fixed the quota at USDA’s
projected milk production for each of the CEE coun-
tries in 2001. The dairy quota also constrains CEE
beef production as more than half of the beef produced
is a product of the dairy herd. We assume that the 
EU would not increase intervention purchases and
accumulate stocks beyond the historical average—
accumulation of intervention stocks is viewed as a
short-term strategy for dealing with excess supplies. 
We also assumed that the CEE’s will receive compen-
satory payments, set at their current levels and
adjusted for inflation. This assumption is subject to
some debate. It is possible that upon joining the EU,
the CEE producers will be eligible for intervention and
export subsidies, but will not receive compensatory
payments. These payments were designed to compen-
sate producers for price declines, such as those
experienced by EU producers during the 1993-95
support price declines under the 1992 CAP reform and
by producers in Austria, Finland, and Sweden upon
joining the EU in 1995. However, CEE producers are
unlikely to experience price declines upon application
of CAP provisions. Yet, some in the EU argue that
providing direct aid to farmers in only some member
states would violate the EU principle of “cohesion”
and exclude CEE’s from one of the main income
support instruments of the CAP.
According to our results, under the current CAP, the
largest increases in CEE production would take 
place in the livestock sector, where pre-accession 
price differences are the greatest (figs. 1 and 2).
Consequently, demand for feed grains would increase
in the CEE’s as well, particularly for wheat. Grain
production in an EU-18 (the current EU-15 plus the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) is expected to
decline slightly (less than 1 percent) due to the adop-
tion of the land set-aside by the CEE countries (fig. 3).
At the same time, grain consumption (for feed use) is
expected to increase by about 2 percent. The EU-18
would continue to be a major wheat exporter since we
assume that the EU will be able to export wheat
without subsidy by the time the CEE’s join. However,
due to the expansion of the livestock sector, the
enlarged EU would need to increase its imports of
other feedgrains such as corn. 
We estimate that U.S. wheat exports would decline by
about 1 million tons as increased EU-18 production
would depress world prices, dampening U.S. produc-
tion while stimulating consumption. However, we
estimate that U.S. corn exports would increase by about
1.5 million tons due to the increase in EU demand. 
If the CEE’s adopt EU prices, CEE meat consumption
would decrease by about 13 percent. Due to the large
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consumption, and trade for the period 1998-2007. See USDA,
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Potential changes in grain production, 
consumption, and net surplus
Million tonssurplus in CEE livestock production and the current
EU-15 meat surpluses, internal EU livestock prices will
fall. Thus, we find that while production increases in
the new CEE member states, EU-15 livestock produc-
tion declines by 6 percent annually. At the same time,
the decline in EU livestock prices will increase EU-15
meat consumption slightly (1 percent annually). The
net impact for the EU-18 would be an increase in live-
stock production of 2 percent and a decline in
consumption of about 1 percent. This would result in
surplus meat production of about 4 million tons
(compared with a deficit of about 2 million tons
presently). The bulk of the surplus would consist of
poultry, followed by pork. Because of WTO constraints
on subsidized exports, it is likely that the enlarged EU
will be unable to export all of the excess meat onto the
world market, with little impact on third-country live-
stock markets (including the United States). 
World Price Scenario:
CEE Livestock Growth Dampened,
Grains Increase
In our second scenario, we estimated the impact of
first-tier enlargement in the absence of the CAP. We
assume that the EU will abolish the set-aside require-
ments (as proposed under Agenda 2000), that there
will be no internal EU price supports, and that the EU
will move to world prices for all commodities. We also
assume that EU farmers will not receive compensatory
payments, including producer payments for oilseeds.
The EU may continue to support farmers, but we
assume that the support will be completely decoupled
from production, that is, support payments will not
affect farmers’ planting decisions.
By adopting world market prices, prices for EU
farmers fall to world levels and CEE prices increase in
most sectors, but not to the same extent as they do
under the current CAP scenario. Consequently, produc-
tion gains should be smaller than in the current CAP
scenario except in the arable crops sector, where elimi-
nation of the set-aside requirement will increase
planted area. Additionally, the EU would no longer be
constrained by WTO limits on subsidized exports
because they would be producing at world prices. 
With the elimination of the CAP, CEE livestock
production gains would be less than under the CAP
scenario, as CEE price increases would not be as large
as when adopting EU prices. Consequently, feed
demand would increase less dramatically than under
the CAP scenario. At the same time, EU-15 livestock
production would decline (and consumption would
increase) as EU-15 farmers face lower prices. Overall,
our results suggest that as EU-15 and CEE prices
converge, livestock production will shift from the
former to the latter. The EU-18 would become a net
importer of beef, but would have slightly larger
exportable surpluses of pork and poultry than ERS
projections under current policies suggest. There
would be very little impact on U.S. livestock exports
because EU-18 trade would change only minimally.
Elimination of the set-aside would raise arable crop
production in both the CEE countries and the EU. If
the CAP reforms according to this scenario, the
enlarged EU could increase wheat exports by nearly
15 million tons. Coarse grain production in the CEE
countries is not expected to change, while EU-15
coarse grain production is expected to increase by
about 5 million tons, or just more than 5 percent. As
the price of grain falls in the EU-18, consumption is
expected to increase, particularly in the CEE region
due to an increase in grain feeding at the expense of
meals. Thus, we do not anticipate any increase in
coarse grain exports from the EU-18. In fact, the EU-
18 will still need to rely on corn imports. 
World wheat prices are projected to decline due 
to the large expansion of EU-18 wheat exports.
Consequently, U.S. wheat exports are projected to
decline about 3.5 million tons per year. At the same
time, we estimate that the U.S. corn sector could
increase its corn exports by about 1.4 million tons per
year, though our model is not capable of specifying
whether the exports would go to the EU-18. In 1997,
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corn to the EU-18 countries.
Our analysis focused on bulk commodities. However,
prospects for U.S. agricultural exports to CEE countries
as they integrate with the EU are favorable in the near
term, particularly for high-value products. Rising income
growth resulting from EU membership should increase
overall demand for agricultural products, and U.S.
exports could rise as total exports to the CEE region
expand. U.S. exports of oilseeds, oilseed products, and
some feeds may benefit as the CEE livestock sector
expands. An expanding and modernizing farm sector
may also raise demand for U.S. agricultural inputs.
Conclusions
As a customs union, the EU favors the importation of
products from member countries over those from third
countries. However, EU expansion will be closely
watched by members of the WTO to make sure that it
complies with WTO rules. 
Much work remains before EU expansion can take
place. CEE agricultural sectors will need to restructure
for successful integration into the EU. Quality discrep-
ancies between EU and CEE agricultural products
could be problematic for the CEE’s. Significant invest-
ment is still needed to improve farm productivity,
complete the privatization of state farms and agro-
industry, simplify government purchasing and market
management practices, increase training in agribusi-
ness and quality control, and implement programs that
encourage rural development and structural adjust-
ment. Further institutional reform will also be needed
before EU integration is feasible. Because the EU has
been functioning as a single market since 1992, the
CEE countries will have to harmonize all of their
legislation with that of the EU. 
Within an enlarged EU, the absence of trade barriers
between existing and new members will likely lead to
trade creation among members. For countries outside
the EU, including the United States, trade with the
CEE countries will likely diminish after accession as
new members adopt the CAP, including veterinary,
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border protection, that is, tariff rates. Bans on meat
will now apply to new members, effectively blocking
nonmember access to the EU market. However, all
news may not be bad. EU integration will likely
improve the economic situation of the CEE’s and
increase overall purchasing power to a level where the
CEE’s may import more than they would otherwise.
External and internal changes are pressuring the EU to
modify the protectionist policies of the CAP. Unlike
Austria, Finland, and Sweden, which entered the EU
as net contributors, the CEE countries will most likely
be net recipients, at least initially. The EU must
modify the CAP to accommodate the budgetary impact
of bringing in several large agriculture-producing
countries and to meet its Uruguay Round/WTO
commitments. The most recent EU reform proposal,
Agenda 2000, reduces price support and increases
direct payments to producers. Externally, the URAA
requires all WTO members to reduce export subsidies
and domestic support and to increase import access
over a 5-year period (1995-2000). This multilateral
agreement effectively constrains the EU’s ability to
lend limitless support to its agricultural sector, despite
a potential increase in the size of the EU.
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I
n recent years, a considerable number of regional
trade agreements (RTA’s) that do not include the
United States have been established in Central and
South America: Mercado Comun del Sur
(MERCOSUR), the Andean Pact, the Central America
Common Market (CACM), the Caribbean Common
Market (CARICOM) and the G-3 agreement among
Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico. In addition, Chile
has established its own agreement with MERCOSUR,
as well as a long list of other bilateral agreements. In
fact, every major country in Central and South
America is a party to at least one regional or bilateral
trade agreement (see map on following page).
Agriculture has often been a particularly sensitive area
of negotiation in these agreements, and there is some
concern that disadvantages to third-country agricultural
exporters such as the United States have been intention-
ally or unintentionally introduced by these agreements.
In a free trade area, preferential tariffs are granted to
members of the agreement and tariffs on third-country
exports remain unchanged. Free trade areas offer few
potential benefits for outside countries and are disad-
vantageous in several respects. The most fundamental
concern of third-country exporters is that they face
stiffer competition with suppliers from within the bloc
whose exports now enjoy a preferential tariff rate,
which forces price reductions and/or sales reductions
(trade diversion). Formation of a free trade area allows
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CARICOMmember countries to keep tariffs high for third-country
exporters; in a free trade area there is no need for
negotiation and compromise around a common
external tariff (CET) as in a customs union.
When one country is simultaneously a member of
several free trade areas, this raises additional concerns.
Transshipment schemes may be set up to circumvent
additional tariffs to the further disadvantage of third-
country exports. Of course, rules of origin that establish
the conditions under which products are to be eligible
for free trade help reduce the impact of this effect, but
the documentation requirements that accompany the
rules of origin regulations also introduce a new set of
transaction costs that must be borne by all exporters. 
Customs unions tend to be less disadvantageous for
third-country exporters. Customs unions grant preferen-
tial tariffs to members of the agreement but also change
third-country tariffs by establishing a common external
tariff (CET). In most cases, tariffs are reduced in the
CET; thus there may be improvement, or at least less
deterioration, in third-country export prospects. GATT
Article XXIV stipulates that, in establishing the CET,
no member of the agreement may raise its overall tariff
level. In spite of this provision, the possibility remains,
however, that certain tariffs may remain high or even
be raised by the CET, so long as other tariffs are
reduced enough to lower the overall average.
Even though the CET tariff structure of a customs
union must reduce overall tariff levels to comply with
WTO provisions, countries may sometimes skew the
structure of the new tariff regime in the pursuit of
domestic objectives. One common example of this is
the case of tariff escalation, in which countries strive
to protect value-added industries by allowing imports
of raw and unprocessed primary products at extremely
low tariff rates but charge higher rates on further
processed products, a scheme which can severely
constrain imports of processed products.
All of the potential problems described above are
present in recent agreements in the western hemi-
sphere. The most significant free trade areas which
exclude the United States are Chile’s bilateral agree-
ments and the G-3 agreement between Mexico,
Colombia, and Venezuela; the most significant
customs unions are MERCOSUR, the Andean Pact,
and the CACM. This paper examines the impact of
these agreements on tariffs faced by third-country agri-
cultural exporters such as the United States.
MERCOSUR
From the standpoint of U.S. agriculture, the most
significant RTA in the Western Hemisphere other than
NAFTA is the MERCOSUR agreement among
Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay.
The formation of MERCOSUR on January 1, 1995,
marked the culmination of a process that entailed a
significant reduction in tariffs faced by agricultural
products. MERCOSUR established a CET ranging
from 0-20 percent for products coming from third
countries and a zero-percent tariff for products traded
within the bloc (with a few exceptions).
Free trade agreement talks between Argentina and
Brazil began in earnest in the early 1980’s, and both
countries have been making strides toward harmoniza-
tion of their respective tariff regimes since at least the
mid-1980’s. Finally, in 1991, Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay signed the Treaty of Asunción,
formally creating MERCOSUR, and agreeing that the
common market would be established by December
1994 for Argentina and Brazil and by 1995 for
Uruguay and Paraguay.
Figure 1 shows Argentina’s applied tariffs on agricul-
tural products in 1987, about the time of the beginning
of discussions with Brazil of the formation of
MERCOSUR. As can be seen from the graph,
Argentina imposed significant tariffs across a wide
range of agricultural products. Tariffs ranged from 0 to
38 percent ad valorem, with about half of the agricul-
tural products facing a tariff above 20 percent and the
Economic Research Service/USDA Regional Trade Agreements and U.S. Agriculture/AER-771 U  133
Western Hemisphere Trading Blocs and Tariff Barriers for
U.S. Agricultural Exportsother half below 20 percent. Higher tariffs tended to be
charged on processed products such as meat, animal
offal or animal blood sausages, prepared or preserved
fish, crustaceans and mollusks, chocolate, and other
food preparations, with all of these products facing a
tariff above 30 percent. The average tariff rate in 1987
was 20 percent.
Figure 3 shows Brazil’s applied tariffs on agricultural
products in 1986. Brazil’s tariffs were much higher
than Argentina’s, ranging from 0 to 105 percent ad
valorem, with most products facing a tariff above 40
percent. As in Argentina, higher tariffs tended to be
charged on processed products such as prepared or
preserved meat or meat offal, prepared or preserved
fish, crustaceans and mollusks, prepared or preserved
vegetables and fruits, beer, grape must, and wine made
from fresh grapes, with all of these products facing a
tariff above 100 percent. The average tariff rate in
1986 was 58 percent.
Figures 2 and 4 show CET tariffs applied to countries
outside MERCOSUR such as the United States as 
of 1995. By the time the MERCOSUR agreement
went into effect in 1995, Argentina and Brazil had
lowered their average applied tariff levels by 50 
and 82 percent, respectively. Argentine tariffs on
consumer-oriented agricultural products such as dairy
products, processed fruits and vegetables, and fruit 
and vegetable juices, among others, ranged from 20 
to 38 percent during the 1980’s. In 1995, when
MERCOSUR went into effect, tariffs on these prod-
ucts dropped to an average of 14 percent. In Brazil
these products had faced a tariff above 100 percent,
but in 1995 the average tariff faced by these products
went down to 16 percent with the establishment of
MERCOSUR.
Recently (December 1997), in response to trade
concerns arising from the Asian financial crisis, the
MERCOSUR countries agreed to allow a temporary 3-
percent increase in tariffs on most products in the
CET. Given MERCOSUR’s track record of success in
negotiating considerable reductions in tariffs, it seems
likely that this measure will prove to be temporary and
will be removed on or before the year 2000 as has
been promised.
The MERCOSUR trading bloc is also important
because of its potential to expand to include additional
members from the rest of the American continents and
to negotiate with such powers as the European Union.
MERCOSUR has signed a bilateral agreement with
Chile (see below), and another one with Bolivia,
making these two countries associate members of
MERCOSUR. The Bolivia-MERCOSUR Economic
Complementarity Agreement (ECA) went into effect
January 1, 1997. It anticipates the eventual formation
of a free trade area between Bolivia and the
MERCOSUR countries in 10 years through a gradual
tariff elimination process.
After Bolivia became an associate member of
MERCOSUR, the rest of the Andean Pact became
interested in signing a bilateral agreement with
MERCOSUR, and talks and negotiations are on 
the way to establish a MERCOSUR-Andean Pact
agreement.
The MERCOSUR group is also having talks with
Mexico to see if a bilateral agreement between these
two parties would be possible.
Chile’s Regional Agreements
Chile has been notable for its more advanced and
freer trade policies in comparison with other Latin
American countries. In 1988, Chile’s tariffs were
reduced from 26 percent to 15 percent, and in 1990,
when democratic government resumed, tariffs were
slashed further to 11 percent. It is due to its freer
trade policies that Chile has pursued signing bilateral
agreements rather than joining RTA’s. If it were to
join an RTA in the Western Hemisphere, Chile would
be required to raise its low tariffs to the CET set by
the RTA.
Chile’s need for export markets led to the negotiation
of the ECA with MERCOSUR, five bilateral ECA’s
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Venezuela (1993), Bolivia (1993)1, Colombia (1994),
and Ecuador (1995)), and a very recent agreement
with Canada (1997).
These agreements lower tariffs on trade among the
parties and eliminate many nontariff barriers but have
no effect on tariffs faced by third countries such as the
United States. The biggest U.S. agricultural concern
regarding Chile’s bilateral agreements is with regard to
the recent agreement with Canada. As a result of this
agreement, Canada enjoys more favorable tariff rates
than the United States for such products as wheat,
vegetable oil, and potatoes.
Another U.S. concern regarding the multiple and over-
lapping set of agreements that have been entered into
by countries like Chile,2 is that schemes may be set up
to use this criss-crossing of agreements to “unfair”
advantage. It is conceivable, for example, that
processing may be set up in Chile for products that use
some freely imported inputs from Canada, and some
domestic Chilean inputs to produce products that
qualify for tariff-free status for export to
MERCOSUR. Wheat or potatoes, for example, might
be imported by Chile from Canada (or Bolivia, or
Peru, etc.), processed and packaged as bread or as
french fries, and then exported into lucrative
MERCOSUR markets. Of course, all agreements
contain domestic-content requirements that somewhat
restrict the wholesale avoidance of all duties through
such arrangements, but some potential for loss of U.S.
market opportunities due to existence of such strate-
gies inevitably remains.
The ECA between Chile and MERCOSUR went into
effect on October 1, 1996. It provides for the gradual
elimination of mutual trade barriers, but does not
require Chile to adopt MERCOSUR’s higher Common
External Tariff. Chile’s uniform 11 percent tariff rate
continues to apply to all third-country agricultural
products except vegetable oils, sugar, wheat, and
wheat flour, which are under price band mechanisms. 
The ECA will eventually phase out all tariffs on trade
between Chile and MERCOSUR countries according to
a schedule consisting of four product categories:
“general” with tariffs reaching zero by the year 2004;
“sensitive” with tariffs phasing to zero by the year 2006;
“especially sensitive” with tariffs phasing to zero by the
year 2008; and “major sensitivity.” Many agricultural
products fall in the category of “major sensitivity” for
which tariff reduction will not begin until 2006. Tariffs
on these products will be phased down to zero over 5
years, beginning in 2006. Some of Chile’s “major sensi-
tivity” products are wines, raisins, apples, fresh grapes,
and ice cream, and for MERCOSUR, soybean oil,
sunflower oil, boneless meat, soybean cake, and rice
(for more details on Chile’s regional trade agreements
see USDA, 1996 in references).
The Andean Pact
The Andean Group was first established in 1969 with
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela as its
members. The agreement was not very effective in the
early years, but in the early 1990’s the Group members
decided to revive and implement the policies created
under the Andean Pact. A CET was designed which
consists of four levels of tariffs: 5, 10, 15, and 25
percent. But Bolivia has requested and been granted
permission to apply only two tariff rates of 5 percent and
10 percent, and Peru, currently engaged in a dispute over
the CET, has left the group temporarily and is applying
only two tariff rates—15 percent and 25 percent.
Therefore, the only countries of the group applying the
CET rates are Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.
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1Chile’s agreement with Bolivia does not establish a free trade
area, but rather involves partial trade liberalization with relative
reciprocity and cooperation in the area of energy.
2Another example is the G-3 agreement between Venezuela and
Colombia, which are also members of the Andean Pact, and
Mexico, which is also a NAFTA member.The agreement has four annexes with Annex I estab-
lishing the tariff levels for all traded goods; this is the
main list of products applying the CET. Annex II lists
those products from Annex I for which Ecuador is
permitted to charge a tariff rate 5 percentage points
lower. Annex III contains a short list of health and
education products that may enter all three countries
duty-free. Annex IV lists all those products for which
each country has requested special treatment with
respect to the tariff levels indicated in the CET (excep-
tions). Ecuador has 400 products in this list, Colombia
and Venezuela over 200. However, each country has
agreed to reduce its list of exceptions each year, with
the objective of eliminating Annex IV within a 4-year
period ending in 1999.
One aspect of the Andean Pact agreement of concern
to third-country exporters is the tendency of the CET
structure to be disadvantageous to processed products.
In contrast to the MERCOSUR agreement, which has
less tendency to protect agricultural processed prod-
ucts in its CET structure than had existed previously
under individual countries’ tariff schedules, the
Andean Pact has been criticized for establishing a CET
that has steeply escalating tariffs for processed prod-
ucts (Tavares de Araujo, 1995). A basic tenet of the
Andean Pact CET schedule is to apply low (5 percent)
tariffs on raw materials, with progressively higher
rates for value-added industries as follows: 10 percent
for basic inputs, 15 percent for intermediate goods,
and 20 percent for most final goods.
Using Ecuador as a representative country, Tavaros de
Araujo calculates that the CET tariff structure trans-
lates into an effective rate of protection for Ecuador’s
food and beverage industry ranging from 23 percent
for malt beverages and soft drinks to as high as 125
percent for flour products. Similar rates would be
expected to apply for other Andean Pact countries
since value-added coefficients are likely to be similar
across countries.
Tariff escalation within the CET structure means that
although the United States may enjoy the benefits of
low tariffs and enhanced export opportunities for bulk
commodities like wheat, corn, and soybeans, processed
products and high-value products—that have provided
the source of much of the U.S. export growth in
regions like Asia in recent years—may not develop to
their full potential in the Andean Pact countries.
A second area of concern regarding the Andean Pact
tariff regime is its failure to abolish price bands. Price
bands act as variable-rate surcharges, effectively
setting a floor on the import price of third-country
products. As a result of price bands, the United States
and other third-country exporters will find their trade
displaced by intra-Andean Pact trade whenever such
trade can occur at less than the floor price. The prod-
ucts covered by price bands under the Andean Pact
CET are palm oil, soybean oil, rice, sugar, barley,
milk, corn, soybeans, wheat, chicken, and pork. 
The Central American Common 
Market (CACM)
The CACM3 was established in 1960 by El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua and joined later
in 1963 by Costa Rica. The agreement was not fully
implemented due to political, military, and economic
difficulties, and was revived in the early 1990’s.
As with the CET of the Andean Pact, the CACM CET
tariff structure tends to provide a high rate of protec-
tion for many of the processed products that the
United States might seek to export. Exports of prod-
ucts like wheat, corn, and soybeans are not likely to
be sharply reduced by tariffs on the order of 5-10
percent, but further-processed products from the
United States will have difficulty competing with
intermediate and final consumer products that use
competitively priced primary products and CACM
country processing facilities.
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3Belize and Panama participate in CACM summits but not in
regional trade integration.In October 1993, the CACM presidents signed the
Protocol to the General Treaty on Central American
Economic Integration (known as the Guatemala
Protocol) as an addition to the original treaty. The
Guatemala Protocol allows greater commercial expo-
sure and diminishes the protectionist nature of the
original 1960 CACM agreement.
The agreement provides for free trade for goods origi-
nating within the region except for those products listed
in Annex A of the agreement, and a Common External
Tariff (CET) for products coming from third countries
such as the United States, with some exceptions.
As with many other international trade negotiations,
agricultural commodities are the most sensitive
commodities under discussion within the CACM. This
is not surprising, considering the importance of agri-
culture to the Central American region, where the
low-income population depends on near-subsistence
agricultural production for their livelihoods.
One of the main goals of the CACM nations today is
to revise the list of products exempted from the agree-
ment in order to eventually eliminate Annex A. If
successful, Central America will one day achieve a full
customs union. To date, these revisions have been very
successful. In the early 1960’s, Annex A included
about 30 agricultural products, and special tariff rates
and import quotas were negotiated on a bilateral basis
among member countries. After the last revision of
Annex A on September 1, 1995, only 7 agricultural
products are still exempt from the Common External
Tariff. This illustrates the continuing movement
toward greater integration of the Central American
Common Market. 
For a limited number of agricultural commodities,
complete liberalization does not appear likely over the
next few years. One example of this is Costa Rica’s
dairy industry; another is in Honduras, which applies
price bands on corn-based products. 
The CET structure was significantly revised by the
Guatemala protocol in 1993. The CET is composed of
three parts. Section I lists products that share the
CET—about 979 agricultural products can be found
here. Section II shows products still under negotiation
(including about 27 agricultural products), for which
each country is allowed to maintain its own tariff rate.
Section III lists Costa Rica’s national tariff rates for
sensitive products, with nine agricultural products.
The CET has four levels of tariff rates for products in
Section I: 5 percent, 10 percent, 15 percent, and 20
percent. About half of the 979 agricultural products are
subject to the highest 20-percent tariff rate. Most
vegetables are subject to a 15-percent tariff. Products
in Sections II and III that are not yet subject to the
CET are subject to various tariffs.
Since February 1996, the Central American Common
Market has been making efforts to fully harmonize
tariffs and trade policy. One of its main goals is to
reduce the CET levels on most finished goods to a
ceiling of 15 percent and reduce tariffs on raw mate-
rials to zero. El Salvador has been the most
determined to lower tariffs and Costa Rica one of the
most reluctant. Under its economic liberalization
program, El Salvador envisioned reducing tariffs, and
it will do so independently of other CACM members.
Costa Rica has said it will reduce its CET levels in a
gradual manner starting in 1997. Honduras,
Guatemala, and Nicaragua have not yet defined their
respective time frames for reducing tariff levels. The
separate CET reductions that each member country
plans to implement individually will cause CACM
members to temporarily apply different levels of the
CET. The Secretary for Central American Economic
Integration (SIECA) believes that full tariff harmo-
nization and reduction could take 3 to 4 years. 
Conclusion
We examined the tariff structure of the most significant
Western Hemisphere trade agreements and discussed
their impacts on tariff regimes faced by third-country
agricultural exporters such as the United States.
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Western Hemisphere Trading Blocs and Tariff Barriers for
U.S. Agricultural ExportsThe MERCOSUR agreement, which includes the two
largest economies in South America, namely Brazil
and Argentina, has introduced the most favorable trade
regime vis-a-vis third-country agricultural exporters of
any of the agreements examined. Although
MERCOSUR does, of course, introduce tariff prefer-
ences for parties to the agreement, the CET,
established in 1995, also represented a significant
reduction in tariffs faced by third-country agricultural
exporters. The recently enacted 3-percent increase in
most MERCOSUR CET rates in response to the Asian
financial crisis hopefully does not set a precedent, but
rather represents a reasonable temporary measure in
response to a very special set of circumstances.
The other agreements examined are more problematic
for third-country exporters. Both the Andean Pact and
the CACM CET’s include steeply escalating common
external tariff structures that are disadvantageous to
processed products and high-value products from third-
country exporters such as the United States. In addition,
the Andean Pact’s price band mechanism for certain
important agricultural products restricts third-country
exports in times of falling prices. Chile’s numerous
Economic Complementarity Agreements allow partner
countries preferential tariff rates without reducing tariffs
faced by third-country exporters such as the United
States. This may prove particularly important to the
United States, for example, with respect to the recent
trade agreement between Chile and Canada.
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Western Hemisphere Trading Blocs and Tariff Barriers for
U.S. Agricultural ExportsThe model-based analyses in this report use
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models and a
partial equilibrium model. Beginning with the NAFTA
negotiations, CGE models have become a widely used
tool for evaluating the effects of trade policy reforms
in both regional and multinational initiatives (U.S.
International Trade Commission, 1992; Francois and
Shiells, 1994; Martin and Winters, 1995). While
economic theory identifies how policy changes will
affect economic variables, it does not define the size of
the impact and, in the case of RTA’s, leaves the net
effect ambiguous. CGE models provide an empirical
foundation for policy analysis that can quantify the
magnitudes of the effects identified by theory, and
suggest the likely net effect, whether trade creating or
trade diverting, of an RTA.
Each CGE model is described below, including discus-
sion of sectoral structure, factor markets, macro
closure, data sources, and any innovative features of
the model, such as dynamic behavior and international
labor migration.
One of the two analyses of European enlargement used
a partial equilibrium model, the European Simulation
Model (ESIM). This model has more disaggregation of
EU agriculture than is now available in a CGE model,
and includes detailed modeling of EU farm programs.
ESIM is described below. 
NAFTA CGE Model 
(Mary Burfisher, Sherman Robinson,
and Karen Thierfelder)
The NAFTA-CGE model is composed of three single-
country models of the United States, Mexico, and
Canada, linked by trade and labor migration flows.
The model updates and extends the U.S.-Mexico CGE
model built at ERS in 1991 to include Canada. The
U.S.-Mexico CGE model is documented in Robinson,
Burfisher, Hinojosa, and Thierfelder (1991) and
Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder (1994). 
The NAFTA-CGE model follows the standard neoclas-
sical specification of trade-focused CGE models. Each
sector produces a composite commodity that can be
transformed according to a constant elasticity of trans-
formation (CET) function into a commodity sold on
the domestic market or into an export. Output is
produced according to a constant elasticity of substitu-
tion (CES) production function in primary factors and
fixed input-output coefficients for intermediate inputs.
The model simulates a market economy, with prices
and quantities assumed to adjust to clear markets. All
transactions in the circular flow of income are
captured. Each country model traces the flow of
income (starting with factor payments) from producers
to household, government, and investors, and finally
back to demand for goods in product markets. 
Consumption, intermediate demand, government, and
investment are the four components of domestic
demand. Consumer demand is based on Cobb-Douglas
utility functions, generating fixed expenditure shares.
Households pay income taxes to the government and
save a fixed proportion of their income. Intermediate
demand is given by fixed input-output coefficients.
Real government demand and real investment are
fixed exogenously. 
The model includes six primary factors and associated
factor markets: rural labor, urban unskilled labor,
urban skilled labor, professional labor, capital, and
agricultural land. Land is disaggregated into irrigated
and nonirrigated land in Mexico. Full employment for
all categories is assumed, and aggregate factor
supplies are set exogenously. In the experiments
reported here, we assume that all factors are fully
mobile. However, labor markets are segmented. For
example, rural labor does not work in the industrial
sectors and urban labor does not work in agriculture.
Labor markets are linked through migration equations. 
There are three key macro balances in each country
model: the government deficit, aggregate investment
and savings, and the balance of trade. Government
savings is the difference between revenue and
spending, with real spending fixed exogenously, and
revenue depending on a variety of tax instruments. The
government deficit is therefore determined endoge-
nously. Real investment is set exogenously and
aggregate private savings is determined residually to
achieve the nominal savings-investment balance. The
balance of trade for each country (and hence foreign
savings) is set exogenously and valued in world prices.
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Appendix: Model DocumentationEach model solves for the relative domestic prices and
factor returns that clear the factor and product markets,
and for an equilibrium real exchange rate which brings
aggregate export supply and import demand into
balance, given the exogenous aggregate trade balance
of each country. 
Agricultural trade policies and domestic farm
programs are modeled explicitly, rather than as fixed
ad valorem wedges. Policies include tariffs, tariff rate
quotas, import and production quotas, input subsidies
to producers and consumers, fixed guaranteed and
target prices, export subsidies, and direct payments,
including U.S. deficiency payments and PROCAMPO
payments. 
The model has 25 sectors, including 20 farm and food
processing sectors and 5 nonagricultural sectors. The
model base year is 1993. Data for each country are
drawn from national income and product accounts, and
were built into social accounting matrices by ERS
under a National Research Initiative grant from
CSREES/USDA. Trade data are from the United
Nations. Tariff data are from the WTO. Domestic agri-
cultural policy data are from OECD. 
APEC CGE Model 
(William Coyle and Zhi Wang)
This model is a recursive, dynamic, computable
general equilibrium model of world production and
trade. The model divides the world into 12 regions,
and classes all goods and services into 12 sectors,
produced by five production factors—agricultural
labor, unskilled labor, skilled labor, land, and capital. 
There are four sources of economic growth in the
model: labor force growth, accumulation of physical
capital, changes in the skill composition of the labor
force, and total factor productivity (TFP) growth. The
labor force growth rate is set exogenously. It was
calculated from the International Labor Office’s popu-
lation and labor force projections from 1990 to 2020,
which take the demographic structure and labor force
participation rates into consideration. Capital stock in
each 1-year simulation period equals the last period’s
capital stock plus total investment minus depreciation.
No optimal behavior is assumed for investment and
capital accumulation. All net investments in the
previous period are assumed to become new produc-
tion capital in the next period.
Agricultural labor and urban unskilled labor are not
substitutable in production, but are linked by rural-urban
migration flows, which are endogenous in the model
and driven by the rural-urban wage differential and
structural changes in production and trade. The increase
in the skilled labor force is based on the growth in the
stock of tertiary educated labor in each region estimated
by the World Bank (Ahuja and Filmer, 1995), which
provides an indication of changes in the numbers of
those qualified for employment as professional and
technical workers. TFP growth rates are obtained from
econometric estimates by the World Bank (Vinod and
Wang, 1993, Martin and Mitra, 1996). 
The major data source for the model is the Global
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database, version 3.
The model was implemented in General Algebraic
Modeling System (GAMS) software. Detailed descrip-
tion of the structure and algebraic specification of the
model can be found in Wang (1997) and Wang and
Schuh (forthcoming).
FTAA Model 
(Xinshen Diao, Agapi Somwaru,
and Terri Randy)
The model is based on neoclassical growth theory. It is
a global, intertemporal (dynamic) CGE model with 10
countries/regions and 7 production sectors. The data
used for calibrating the base-run are GTAP database,
version 3. It is different from a static CGE model in
which firms make production decisions for only one
period at given level of factor endowments. In the
intertemporal dynamic model, firms of each region
have intertemporal optimization behavior, i.e., besides
employing labor, capital and land, as well as interme-
diates to conduct production, firms also make
investment decisions to maximize their intertemporal
profits. Thus, capital accumulates over time endoge-
nously. On the other hand, the representative consumer
of each region maximizes an intertemporal utility
function by making consumption and savings deci-
sions. Thus, another difference from a static CGE
model is that a country’s savings is endogenously
determined. This implies that the model not only
captures bilateral commodity trade flows, but also
financial capital flows among countries/regions over
time. The intertemporal budget constraint for each
country/region is equivalent to the macro-closure in
the static model, but along transition, international
borrowing/lending, trade deficits/surplus, and hence
the accumulation of foreign debt/assets in each region
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ments due to an RTA take time, and the entire
transitional path to the steady state can be solved from
the model. 
The model also captures the linkage between trade and
TFP growth by introducing technological spillovers.
That is, if a country becomes more open in trade to
other countries, it is more likely to learn and adopt
advanced technologies embodied in international trade,
which will improve its factor productivity, so more
outputs can be produced using the same amount of
productive resources. The technological spillover elas-
ticity is borrowed from econometric studies (Coe and
Helpman, 1995; Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister, 1997;
and Wang and Xu, 1997). The detailed description of
the model can be found in Diao and Somwaru (forth-
coming). 
EC-CEEC Model
(Peter Liapis and Marinos Tsigas)
To analyze the impact of CEEC accession to the
European Union (EU) we extended the Global Trade
Analysis Project (GTAP) framework developed by
Hertel (1997). GTAP is a global trade applied general
equilibrium framework documented in Hertel and
Tsigas (1997); Huff, et al. (1997); and Gehlhar, et al.
(1997).
The model is calibrated to 1992 macro and trade data.
GTAP has domestic and international data for 30 single-
country and composite regions, and 37 commodity
aggregates (McDougall, 1996). We aggregated those
data to 8 regions and 16 traded commodities.
The GTAP data have tariffs and export subsidies estab-
lished by the Uruguay Round Agreement (URA), and
domestic support rates for 1992 (McDougall, 1996).
For the EU, however, the URA commitments do not
reflect the lower domestic prices which resulted from
the 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP). To reflect the impact of the CAP reform, we
used recent border policies for agriculture in the EU
and CEEC-7 (Hertel, et al. 1997).
GTAP is a comparative static model with price-taking
behavior for all economic agents and full employment
of resources. Land is employed in agriculture only, and
it is imperfectly mobile across sectors. All sectors
employ labor and capital, which are perfectly mobile
across sectors in a region. Households maximize
utility derived from consumption and savings subject
to regional income, which consists of primary factor
payments and net tax collections. International trade
clears commodity markets, with each commodity
being differentiated by its place of origin. Regional
investment is financed by domestic savings and net
capital inflow from all other regions. A price index for
global savings is the numeraire.
To consider impacts on the costs of the CAP, we 
modified the GTAP model by including a budget
component for the CAP. We determine CAP expendi-
tures, given our policy assumptions, and an income tax
rate needed to generate the necessary revenue to
finance those expenditures.
Global CGE Model 
(Mark Gehlhar)
This analysis uses the GTAP model as described
above (see Liapis and Tsigas). To simulate the effects
of multiple RTA’s throughout the world, the standard
GTAP model was used with a 10-region/country
aggregation. This regional breakdown consists of the
individual NAFTA countries, the MERCOSUR, Chile,
other APEC countries, the EU, Central and Eastern
European Countries, and the rest of the world. The
sectoral breakdown consisted of a 6-sector aggrega-
tion which was aggregated from the 37-sector GTAP
database. 
ESIM Model
The European Simulation models (ESIM) are linear,
time-dependent, constant elasticity, partial equilibrium
models. ERS currently has five individual
country/region ESIM models (EU-15, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) and the EU-
18 model used for this analysis (EU-15 plus the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland). ESIM covers 18
major commodities in the agricultural sector: wheat,
corn, barley, other coarse grains, soybeans, rapeseed,
sunflowerseed, soymeal, rapemeal, sunmeal, soyoil,
rapeoil, sunoil, other oils, fluid milk, beef and veal,
pork, and poultry. ESIM also includes 12 feeds and a
detailed feeding scheme. It was developed by Jan
Blom of LEI/DLO in the Netherlands.
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